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Abstract 
This thesis critiques the historical and modern relationship between war, military 
contracting, and military effectiveness. Its central aim is to review and add to the theory and 
practice of the relationship between military contracting and military effectiveness. Specifically, 
it questions the “bigger is better” dictum that currently informs military contracting policy by 
constructing and testing a competing perspective: contractor force employment (CFE). To 
facilitate, and to ensure the outcomes have policy relevance, the thesis evaluates contractor 
manpower and contractor force employment perspectives by analyzing quantitative and 
qualitative data relating to military contracting in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). It argues that 
military contracting effectiveness can be better understood through a combination of material 
terms as well as non-material terms. This approach is original - a new way of thinking about the 
historical and modern prevalence and utility of military contracting.   
A second purpose of the thesis is to demonstrate that military contracting policy rests on 
weak foundations because it insists that military contracting enhances military effectiveness 
though the provision of manpower. By questioning this rhetoric, and introducing the CFE 
perspective, scholars and practitioners should have a stronger understanding of how military 
contracting impacts military effectiveness, resulting improvements to the practice of military 
contracting. Ultimately, the thesis strengthens military contracting policy by demonstrating the 
importance of contractor employment methods to military contracting and, in turn, military 
effectiveness. 
 To date, the manpower perspective that underpins military contracting policy has not 
been effectively reviewed and critiqued. Moreover, recent research in Strategic Studies on the 
importance of force employment to military effectiveness has not been applied to military 
contracting, leaving a “gap” in the canon. This thesis takes on the responsibility of filling that 
gap. So far, no attempt has been made to test the historical, material relationship between 
contractor manpower and military effectiveness (that is, does hiring more contractors yield 
improvements to military effectiveness?), and no theorist has constructed a non-material 
perspective for understanding military contracting. Therefore, updating the military contracting 
literature is a second major motivation of this thesis. 
 Two central arguments are prevalent throughout. First, the thesis argues that the military 
contracting literature is oversimplified and outdated because it overemphasizes the importance of 
v 
 
contractor manpower to determining victory and defeat. Historically, superior manpower was a 
decisive factor in armed combat thus making the addition of contractors to a force a key 
determinant of military victory. However, this equation does not hold true in the post-Cold War 
security environment. Through a detailed analysis of OIF, the thesis unequivocally demonstrates 
that hiring additional manpower did not enhance military effectiveness. This is an important 
conclusion to reach because casting doubt on the importance of contractor manpower to military 
contracting serves to refocus the military contracting policy debate on contractor force 
employment, particularly from a non-material perspective. 
 Second, the thesis argues that reifying, testing and adopting a CFE perspective expands 
the theory, practice and ultimate effectiveness of military contracting. Developing CFE models, 
methods and analyses result in greater military-contractor integration and improved military 
effectiveness. By expanding on the theoretical and practical understanding of military 
contracting beyond material resources, this thesis demonstrates that how military contractors are 
employed is more important than what or how many contractors are employed. 
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CHAPTER ONE - SECURITY AND SURVIVAL: THE CAUSES OF POLITICAL 
DEVELOPMENT 
 
 This thesis critiques the historical and modern relationship between war, military 
contracting, and military effectiveness. To that end, it summarizes, challenges, and revises the 
theory and practice of military contracting, or the outsourcing of tasks previously performed by 
uniformed personnel to private civilians. So far, the combat effectiveness of military contractors 
in theaters of war has been understood through a wide variety of perspectives to include material 
and non-material perspectives by scholars such as Peter Singer (2003),1 Deborah Avant (2005),2 
Christopher Kinsey (2006; 2009),3 and Molly Dunigan (2011).4 This scholarship has enhanced 
general knowledge of military contractors, however, as is the nature of academe, it is important 
to build on such work. As Newton once wrote, “If I have seen further it is by standing on the 
shoulders of giants.”5 In this heuristic respect, this thesis aims to review and complement extant 
literature, theory, and policy regarding the relationship between military contracting and military 
effectiveness. Specifically, it argues that military contracting effectiveness can be better 
understood through a combination of material terms as well as non-material terms. This approach 
is original - a new way of thinking about the historical and modern prevalence and utility of 
military contracting.   
This introductory chapter begins by situating the thesis and briefly introducing its main 
topics: war, military contracting, and military effectiveness. Themes and controversies relating to 
the interplay between these three topics are then explored and, in doing so, a fundamental 
question emerges – Does military contracting actually enhance a military’s effectiveness? This 
question drives much of the following inquiry. The chapter concludes by explaining the 
contribution of this thesis to the canon of Strategic Studies, reiterating its core arguments and 
                                                          
1 Peter W. Singer, Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University 
Press, 2003). 
2 Deborah D. Avant, The Market for Force: The Consequences of Privatizing Security, (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge 
University Press, 2005). 
3 Christopher Kinsey, Corporate Soldiers and International Security: The Rise of Private Military Companies 
(London: Routledge, 2006); Christopher Kinsey, Private Contractors and the Reconstruction of Iraq: Transforming 
Military Logistics (New York, NY: Routledge, 2009). 
4 Molly Dunigan, Victory for Hire: Private Security Companies’ Impact on Military Effectiveness (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2011). 
5Written in a letter from Sir Isaac Newton to Richard Hooke dated February 15, 1676. Isaac Newton, accessed, 
January 6, 2013, http://phrases.org.uk/meanings/268025.html. 
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outlining the chapter structure of the thesis. It is important to note that the purpose of the thesis is 
to analyze whether military contracting enhances a military’s ability to achieve policy objectives. 
 
1.1 Omnipotence of War in History, Society, and Culture  
 
 At its most basic level, war can be defined as a political “act of force to compel our 
enemy to do our will.”6 This understanding of war separates it from disorganized, sporadic, 
intuitive acts of individual or tribal violence that preceded the advent of ‘civilization’. To fight 
wars, in other words, a polis is necessary, an administrative means of politically organizing 
offensive or defensive capabilities. War has been a central part of the human story since 
antiquity.  
 The historian Geoffrey Blainey estimates that war (politically organized violence 
between disparate groups) began in the days shortly before the Cradle of Civilization (c. 12,000 
BCE) when nomadic peoples began to settle, domesticate crops and animals, and experiment 
with farming, irrigation and political techniques.7 In times of drought or “near-famine”, outsiders 
(unsettled nomads or ‘barbarians’ to use Nobel laureate J.M. Coetzee’s term)8 would raid fixed 
settlements, which now required defending, defenses and fledgling armed forces.9 In 10,000 
BCE, for instance, “cemeteries from northern Mesopotamia to Egypt attest to early warfare on a 
fairly significant scale”10; Jericho, one of the world’s oldest habitations, provides evidence that a 
fortified city with imposing defenses stood on the site before 7000 BCE and even the earliest 
story – The Epic of Gilgamesh – mentions war (again in Mesopotamia, this time in 2700 BCE 
between Sumer and Elam).11  
 Since then, war has dominated human history and grown in frequency, scale and 
intensity. The Peloponnesian War (431-404 BCE) was central to the development of the ancient, 
western world, as were the Greco-Persian Wars (499-449 BCE). War was fundamental to the 
                                                          
6 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, trans. Michael Howard and Peter Parat (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 
1976), 75. 
7 Geoffrey Blainey, A Short History of the World (Camberwell, Australia: Penguin, 2000), 45-65. 
8 J.M. Coetzee, Waiting for the Barbarians (New York, NY: Penguin Books, 1980).  
9 Blainey, A Short History of the World, 48. 
10 The best known being Jebel Sahaba, Egypt and the so-called Site 117 where fifty-nine skeletons were uncovered, 
all of whom show clear evidence of violent death at about the same time. 
11 Joshua J. Mark, “War,” Ancient History Encyclopedia (September 2, 2009) Accessed January 6, 2014, 
http://www.ancient.eu.com/war/. 
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Roman Empire and the notion of Pax Romana, just as it was to the rise and spread of Islam and 
the brief terror of the Mongol Warlords (13th to 15th centuries) who controlled a landmass from 
the edge of Europe to the northern Pacific.  
 War, therefore, is central to society, culture and progress. Its permanence is expressed in 
the statement, “only the dead have seen the end of war.”12 War has driven revolutions in science, 
technology, and engineering. It has been glorified and reviled in literature, in countless novels 
and poems such as Wilfred Owen’s tragic “Dulce et Decorum est” (1917), and war remains 
memorialized in countless capital cities, their centers arrayed with museums, monuments and 
statues of past warriors, fallen, silent monoliths to war.  
War is part of the human story. According to Sheehan, “around 14,400 wars have 
occurred throughout recorded history, claiming the lives of some 3.5 billion people.”13 Perhaps 
this statement alludes to why Foucault referred to war as a permanent form of social and political 
behavior - the “military dimension of society.”14 
According to Blainey, “No wars are unintended or ‘accidental’” and generally occur for a 
number of reasons.15 For Hobbes, war stems from the “state of nature”, where there is, 
 
“[N]o commodious Building; no Instruments of moving, and 
removing of things as require much force; no Knowledge of the 
face of the Earth; no account of Time; no Arts; no Letters; no 
Society; and which is worst of all, continuall feare, and danger of 
violent death; And the life of man, solitary, poore, nasty, bruitish, 
and short.”16 
 
                                                          
12This quote has been attributed to Plato although there is no record of it in his works. This misattribution has 
occurred since General MacArthur addressed graduates at West Point in 1962 with this quote citing Plato. However, 
the first known record of the quote is in George Santayana, Soliloquies in England (London: Scribners, 1924), 106. 
See, Bernard Suzanne, “Plato and his Dialogues,” accessed April 8, 2011, http://plato-
dialogues.org/faq/faq008.htm#note1. 
13 Michael Sheehan, “The Changing Character of War,” in The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to 
International Relations, eds. John Baylis, Steve Smith, and Patricia Owens. (New York, NY: Oxford University 
Press, 2007), 216. 
14Michel Foucault, “What Our Present Is,” Foucault Live: Collected Interviews 1961-1984 (New York, NY: 
Semiotent(e), 1996), 415. 
15 Geoffrey Blainey, The Causes of War 3rd ed. (New York, NY: Free Press, 1988), 292. 
16 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, Revised Student Edition, ed. Richard Tuck (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 1996), 89. 
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Hobbes’ perspective—characterized by desire, power and the competitive nature of humans—
suggests that our race is stuck in irreducible, and permanent conflict, a war of “every man against 
every man.”17 
Morgenthau writes that war occurs not because of human nature but because of a scarcity 
of resources. Nations, therefore, must compete, often aggressively so, over a finite supply of 
resources. Scarcity accounts for the first recorded wars. In Mesopotamia, roughly 12,000 years 
prior to Morgenthau’s writing, resources critical to basic functions of production (arable land, 
crops, animals, timber, people, and water) were fought over. Religion, territorial disputes, 
borders, geopolitics, tyranny, power, or just good old plain madness can also lead a nation to 
war. As a first principle, however, it is fair to argue that peoples, nations, and groups engage in 
war for two primary reasons - to survive and to be secure.  
 As a political concept, survival is influenced by Charles Darwin’s theory of natural 
selection and Hubert Spencer’s theory of “survival of the fittest.”18 For nations, survival is the 
keystone; without it all other functions such as order, identity, security, justice, and welfare are 
redundant. Many theorists and practitioners speak of it in almost holy terms. States, for 
Mearsheimer, must “never subordinate survival to any other goal, including prosperity.”19 
Alexander Hamilton enunciated this basic principle when he wrote that safety from external 
danger is “the most powerful director of national conduct.”20 Stalin asserts the primacy of 
survival to states in stating, “we can and must build socialism in the [Soviet Union]...but in order 
to do so we first of all have to exist.”21 Waltz agrees with this sentiment noting that “only if 
survival is assured can states safely seek other goals such as tranquility, profit, and power”, and, 
it might be added, security.22  
 In terms of security, Niccolò di Bernardo dei Machiavelli writes that “men rise from one 
ambition to another: first, they seek to secure themselves against attack, and then they attack 
others.”23 As such, “security is the highest end” for states to maintain their position within a 
                                                          
17 Hobbes, Leviathan, 88. 
18 See, Bradley A. Thayer, Darwin and International Relations: On the Evolutionary Origins of War and Ethnic 
Conflict (Lexington, KY: The University Press of Kentucky, 2004). 
19 John Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York, NY: Norton, 2001), 371.  
20Alexander Hamilton, The Federalist (1787), No. 8, Modern Library edition (New York, 1937), 42. 
21 Stalin in Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, 30. 
22 Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1979), 126. 
23 Niccolo Machiavelli, The Historical, Political, and Diplomatic Writings vol. 2, trans. Christian E. Detmold 
(Boston, MA: J.R. Osgood and Company, 1882), Chapter XXXVII. 
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competitive and anarchical political system of allies and rivals.24 Adam Smith wrote that the 
primary duty of the government is “that of protecting the society from the violence and invasion 
of other independent societies, and can be performed only by a means of military force.”25 
Objectively, security can be defined as the probability that a nation’s acquired values will not be 
challenged or violated over some reasonable time span.26 Subjectively, it can be understood as 
“the absence of fear that such values will be attacked.”27 In this context, security dominates 
international relations because it determines whether a nation prospers or perishes.28 
Establishing, enhancing, and guaranteeing security has been fundamental to the evolution of 
political structures throughout history because, above all else, security insures survival.29  
The early political structures evolved from band to tribe to chiefdom, for instance, 
because each new structure was better at organizing resources, deterring threats and, to repeat, 
providing security to ensure the survival of the group. These tenets, more importantly had to be 
integrated with the war machine. The military simply had to be effective; the more effective the 
machine, the greater the survivability.  
 
1.2 Political Organization, Military Effectiveness and Survival  
 
 The anthropologist Jared Diamond states that: “the history of interactions among 
disparate people is what shaped the modern world through conquest, epidemics, and genocide.”30 
Arguably, then, states that fail to enhance military effectiveness through innovation are destroyed 
or subsumed by stronger, more effective militaries. Thucydides’ (460-395 BCE) put this simply 
when he wrote that “the strong do what they have the power to do and the weak accept what they 
                                                          
24 Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 126. 
25 Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (Pennsylvania State University, 
2005), 408, accessed September 9, 2014, http://www2.hn.psu.edu/faculty/jmanis/adam-smith/wealth-nations.pdf. 
26 Glenn H. Snyder, “Mearsheimer’s World—Offensive Realism and the Struggle for Security,” International 
Security vol. 27, no. 1 (Summer 2002): 153. 
27 Arnold Wolfers, “National Security as an Ambiguous Symbol,” in Discord and Collaboration: Essays on 
International Politics, ed. Arnold Wolfers (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins Press, 1962), 150.   
28 Security and survival are the dominant concepts of this thesis. However, it is important to note that security and 
survival are not the dominant concern of all International Relation theory paradigms. 
29 See, Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (Cambridge, MA: Basic Books, 1974). 
30 Jared Diamond, Guns, Germs and Steel: The Fates of Human Societies (New York, NY: Norton, 2005), 16. 
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must”, a sentiment rarely contradicted in the subsequent relations between disparate nations.31 A 
brief historical discussion serves to illustrate this important relationship between politically 
organized groups, military effectiveness, and survival.  
From bands to chiefdoms to states, political structures evolved because each structure 
provided more resources (land, labor and capital goods), which led to more effective armies and, 
ergo, better security and prospects for survival. These efficiencies of scale, both in terms of 
manpower resources and tax base, established an irreducible relationship between war, resources 
and effectiveness. To wage offensive or defensive war therefore required material and non-
material resources. The Troglodytes, for example, marshaled material resources (manpower and 
weapons) and non-material resources (organization and leadership) on the African Red Sea coast 
by establishing bands consisting of five to eighty people as an early form of collective security 
by community.32   
Around 3000 BCE, the Sumerians in Mesopotamia replaced the band system with the 
tribal system. The Sumerians did so because the tribe was comprised of hundreds of people, 
therefore representing more security. “Pioneering tribes” were separated into farming tribes and 
nomadic tribes. The farming tribes flourished because they innovated to develop methods of 
storing grain, maintaining flocks and herds of animals, and developing technology. These 
methods led to better nourishment which, in turn, enabled farming tribes to “outbreed, displace, 
conquer, or kill off” their nomadic counterparts.33 Expansive land, larger populations and better 
organization—“to farm is to organize”—fostered greater security and survival versus the smaller, 
less organized nomadic tribes, and paved the way for the chiefdom.34  
The chiefdom supplanted the tribal system because it had an even greater ability to 
organize. The chiefdom drew resources from thousands of people, instead of hundreds, helping it 
to guarantee survival and security.35 The greater likelihood of survival enabled the chiefdom to 
develop “bureaucracy, police forces, and taxes” which fostered even greater security.36  
                                                          
31 Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, trans. Rex Warner (Harmondsworth, England: Penguin Books, 
1972), 403-404. 
32 Diamond, Guns, Germs and Steel, 273. 
33 Diamond, Guns, Germs and Steel, 154. 
34 Blainey, A Short History of the World, 48.  
35 Diamond, Guns, Germs and Steel, 265-292.  
36 Diamond, Guns, Germs and Steel, 272. 
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 The pattern of political change for the purpose of security and survival continued beyond 
the chiefdom. In the Middle Ages (1066-1485), the European feudal system declined because it 
was incapable of insuring security and survival. The feudal manor was too small to generate the 
resources required to field militaries large enough to counter better-organized, expansive and 
emerging pseudo-state militaries as seen with Italy and France. The pattern continued throughout 
the seventeenth century and the advent of the nation-state. 
The modern state emerged as a result of the Religious Wars of seventeenth century 
Europe. The battle for souls between the Holy Roman Empire and nascent, radical forms of 
worship such as Lutheranism or Calvinism culminated in the Thirty Years’ War (1616-1646). 
The Treaty of Westphalia that signaled the end of “one of the most brutal conflicts in history” 
was important in many respects. It reified the notion of the state as well as its guiding principles - 
raison d’état (national interest), sovereignty, diplomacy, religious particularism, and so on. 
While this “medieval to modern shift” might have guaranteed a cessation of local hostilities, 
anarchy was pushed up a level, to the international system of states. The shift marked the 
beginning of an era of national conflicts, of conscripted armies, laws of war, and fixed borders 
between the exhausted but suspicious ‘new’ states.37 Military effectiveness remained crucial to 
survival and security because the more effective a state’s military was, the more power the state 
had to produce and re-produce the security it desired. Weaker militaries, on the other hand, could 
not guarantee survival as seen with the destruction of the Ottoman, Austro-Hungarian, German, 
and Russian Empires following WWI.38 Little wonder then that Tilly famously writes “war made 
states and states made war.”39   
 
1.3 Military Contractors and Military Effectiveness 
  
As this discussion indicates, fielding an effective military is one reason why people 
formed larger and larger organizational bodies, from bands numbering a few dozen individuals, 
to tribes of few hundred, to chiefdoms with a few thousand to a few tens of thousands, to today’s 
                                                          
37 John Gerard Ruggie, “Continuity and Transformation in the World Polity: Toward a Neorealist Synthesis,” in 
Neorealism and Its Critics, ed. Robert O. Keohane (New York, NY: Columbia University Press: 1986), 141; 
Richard Langhorne, The Coming of Globalization: Its Evolution and Contemporary Consequences (Basingstoke: 
Palgrave, 2001), 33. 
38 Stephen Biddle, “Strategy in War,” PS, Political Science & Politics (July 2007): 461. 
39 Charles Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European States (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990), 67. 
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states consisting of anywhere from fifty thousand to just over a billion.40 The purpose of polities 
remains the same in the modern era. The state is indispensible for organizing resources 
conducive to an effective military, and, correlatively, an effective military is an indispensable 
means of ensuring the security and survival of the state.41 This relationship compels states to 
constantly seek opportunities to become more militarily effective. This thesis defines “military 
effectiveness” as a military’s ability to bend the enemy to its will.42 The definition encompasses 
both the capability to wage war effectively as well as the ability to wage war at all. 
Historically, states have sought to enhance military effectiveness by increasing the 
amount of material resources available to its military. Such resources can include money in 
defense budgets, expanded troop numbers to facilitate a surge capacity, increased steel/iron 
production and energy consumption, and/or technological sophistication as seen with precision 
guided missiles, unmanned aerial vehicles (drones), and stealth aircraft.43 Recently, states have 
increasingly turned to military contracting in order to marshal private resources to enhance 
military effectiveness either through the sole provision of additional resources or through the 
provision of resources that facilitate greater political flexibility.44  
Today, the private sector supplements the military with civilian manpower and expanded 
levels of technological sophistication, enabling the state to tap resources beyond traditional 
military capacity. 45 One perspective asserts that “states have increasingly turned to military 
contracting because they have become so dependent upon the private sector that they cannot 
wage war without it.” This perspective suggests that military contracting is not conducted to 
enhance military effectiveness since contractors are used to field a force before it even goes into 
battle. Proponents of this perspective also view military contracting in terms of its long-term 
impact and find that military contracting erodes state capability such as its ability to wage war.   
                                                          
40 There are other sociological reasons for people forming groups however these do not concern this thesis. See, for 
example, Diamond, Guns, Germs and Steel, 193-292.  
41 For example, Nye views the military as a source for both hard and soft power. Joseph S. Nye Jr., “Get Smart: 
Combining Hard and Soft Power,” Foreign Affairs vol. 88, no. 4 (July/August 2009): 160-163. 
42 For a more thorough discussion of the term “military effectiveness,” see section 2.7.1. 
43 Stuart A. Bremer, “National Capabilities and War Proneness,” in The Correlates of War, vol. 2, ed. J. David 
Singer (New York, NY: Free Press, 1980), 63-66. 
44 Chapter two of this thesis is devoted to the history of military contracting, from antiquity to Westphalia and from 
the end of the Cold War to the twenty-first century. See section 2.4.2 especially. 
45  
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The other perspective recognizes that military contractors will continue to be relied upon 
to fight wars. It therefore concentrates on the short-term need for wartime capabilities in order to 
immediately wage war successfully.46 This thesis avoids this theoretical debate by focusing its 
analysis on the relationship between military contracting and military effectiveness during 
wartime. It tests assumptions about whether, and how, a state can increase military effectiveness 
through military contracting in the short term. 
The global trend of military contracting expanded significantly since the end of the Cold 
War. In Africa during the 1990s, weak states employed military contractors from France, the 
United Kingdom (UK), and South Africa to conduct passive security. Passive security evolved 
into active security as private military and security companies began to supply arms and 
participate in operations in Sierra Leone, Uganda, Kenya, Congo, and Angola. In the Middle 
East and Europe, developed states like the United States (US) and UK employed American and 
British contractors to augment already superior forces during the first Gulf War in Iraq (1990-
1991) and the Balkan War (1992-1995). These contractors not only performed security but also 
unarmed logistical tasks such as general maintenance, cooking, and cleaning. The intensity of 
military contracting was so great that during the Balkan War, contractors were employed at the 
same rate as uniformed personnel, or accounted for at least half of the Department of Defense’s 
total workforce. The one-contractor-to-one-soldier ratio was a historical first for modern 
warfare.47 
Such activity on the battlefield has attracted academic attention. Subsequently, 
scholarship began to redefine the term “mercenary”. Following the Cold War, David Isenberg 
points out, contemporary mercenaries differed from traditional mercenaries in that they operated 
in a corporate structure.48 In 2003, Singer re-defined these neo-mercenary corporations as 
                                                          
46 Risa Brooks, “Introduction: The Impact of Culture, Society, Institutions, and International Forces on Military 
Effectiveness,” in Creating Military Power: The Sources of Military Effectiveness, eds. Risa A. Brooks and 
Elizabeth A. Stanley (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2007), 7-8.  
47 Daniel Frisk and R. Derek Trunkey, “Contractors’ Support of US Operations in Iraq,” Congressional Budget 
Office (August 2008): 13; “Private Battles,” The Economist, August 19, 2008, accessed April 23, 2013, 
http://www.economist.com/node/11955577. 
48 David Isenberg, Soldiers of Fortune Ltd.: A Profile of Today’s Private Sector Corporate Mercenary Firms 
(Washington, DC: Center for Defense Information, November 1997), 3-4, accessed December 16, 2013, 
http://www.aloha.net/~stroble/mercs.html.  
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“privatized military firms.”49 This thesis refers to all contractor companies as private military 
and security companies (PMSCs). It defines PMSCs as for-profit companies hired to perform 
services that were previously performed by the military. The thesis refers to those armed and 
unarmed civilians hired by PMSCs as “military contractors” and calls the practice of hiring 
military contractors “contracting”. 
In the twenty-first century, states continue to increase their demand on the private sector. 
To illustrate, seventy militaries have employed 19.5 million contractors to enhance effectiveness 
since the year 2000.50 In the War on Terror, contractors became so widely used that the private 
military industry became the second largest contributor to the “coalition of the willing” 51 and 
was subsequently referred to by some as the “fifth branch of the military.”52 During Operation 
Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan, for example, 
Department of Defense (DoD) contractors were employed at historically high numbers. 
Contractors first outnumbered US troops in Iraq by 20,000 in 2007 equaling a ratio of eight 
servicemen to nine private contractors.53 At the time of writing, the number of contractors 
operating in Afghanistan is 108,000 to 65,700 servicemen equaling a ratio of 1.6 contractors per 
serviceperson.54 The employment of contractors has been so significant that the world’s most 
powerful military, the United States, “can’t go to war without them.”55 Following the lead of the 
United States, other states, like China, have begun contracting security. Today, contractors are 
                                                          
49 Singer defines private military firms as “business organizations that trade in professional services intricately 
linked to warfare. They are corporate bodies that specialize in the provision of military skills, including combat 
operations, strategic planning, intelligence, risk assessment, operational support, training, and technical skills.” See, 
Singer, Corporate Warriors, 8. 
50 Nicolas Florquin, “A Booming Business: Private Security and Small Arms,” Small Arms Survey 2011, 104-106. 
51 The term “coalition of the willing” refers to military personnel from the United States, the United Kingdom, 
Australia, Poland, the Iraqi National Congress, and the Peshmerga. R. Abrahamsen and M. Williams, “Introduction: 
The Privatisation and Globalisation of Security in Africa,” International Relations, vol. 21, no. 2 (2007): 132. 
52 Anna Fifield, “Contractors Reap $138bn from Iraq War,” The Financial Times, March 18, 2013, accessed March 
20, 2013, http://im.ft-static.com/content/images/22d56a5e-900c-11e2-9239-
00144feabdc0.img?width=855&height=678&title=&desc.  
53 T. Christian Miller, “Private Contractors Outnumber U.S. Troops in Iraq,” Los Angeles Times, July 4, 2007, 
accessed October 11, 2014, https://www.commondreams.org/archive/2007/07/04/2284; Richard Fontaine, and John 
A. Nagl, Contracting in Conflicts: The Path to Reform (Washington, D.C.: Center for a New American Security, 
June 2010); Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan, Transforming Wartime Contracting: 
Controlling Costs, Reducing Risks, (Washington, DC, August 2011). 
54 Moshe Schwartz and Jennifer Church, “Department of Defense’s Use of Contractors to Support Military 
Operations: Background, Analysis, and Issues for Congress,” Congressional Research Service (May 17, 2013): 2. 
55 Peter W. Singer, “Can’t Win with ‘Em, Can’t Go to War without ‘Em: Private Military Contractors and 
Counterinsurgency,” Brookings Foreign Policy Paper Series (September 2007), 
http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2007/09/27militarycontractors (accessed January 17, 2014). 
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integral to operations in Yemen, Libya, and the Congo and are actively employed in Syria and 
off the Horn of Africa in the Gulf of Aden fighting Somali maritime piracy. 56     
The escalation in contractor employment signifies a fundamental change in the structure 
of armed forces. Today, states are more willing to employ contractors than to commit their own 
troops. Some states, like the US, for example, consider contractors as being part of the “total 
force”.57 The growing reliance on military contractors is further illustrated by US government 
officials stating that contractors are “integral and permanent”58 and “indispensable”59 to military 
operations. Although future combat operations will likely be different from those of the past, US 
government officials suggest that contractors are “here to stay as real players” 60 and that future 
projections of American power will “heavily involve contractor support.”61 In fact, one senior 
DoD official projects that contractors may comprise fifty percent of the workforce in future 
overseas operations.62 War, therefore, is undergoing a dramatic change from the public to the 
private. How the state structures and employs its forces and how policymakers and academics 
think about military contractors and military effectiveness is critical to the security and survival 
of that state.   
 
1.4 The Debate: Do military contractors actually enhance military effectiveness? 
 
 Despite the perceived importance of military contracting to war, security, and survival, 
the use of military contractors has become a controversial area of theory and practice in modern 
                                                          
56 Ernesto Londono, “Report: Iraq Reconstruction Failed to Result in Lasting, Positive Changes,” The Washington 
Post, March 6, 2013, accessed October 10, 2013, http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-03-
05/world/37465020_1_iraq-reconstruction-american-reconstruction-effort-senior-iraqi-officials; Fifield, 
“Contractors Reap $138bn from Iraq War”.  
57 Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report (Washington, DC, February 2006), 74. 
58 Mark Cancian, “Contractors: The New Element of Military Force Structure,” Parameters vol. 38, no. 3 (2008): 
71. 
59 John J. Hamre, deputy secretary of defense in the Clinton administration, quoted in Leslie Wayne, “America’s 
For-Profit Secret Army,” New York Times, October 2002, accessed October 11, 2014, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2002/10/13/business/america-s-for-profit-secret-army.html. 
60 Stuart Bowen, the Special Inspector General of Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) quoted in Fifield, “Contractors Reap 
$138bn from Iraq War”. 
61 U.S. Army, Urgent Reform Required: Army Expeditionary Contracting (Report of the Commission on Army 
Acquisition and Program Management, November 1, 2007), 20. 
62 Moshe Schwartz, “Training the Military to Manage Contractors During Expeditionary Operations: Overview and 
Options for Congress,” Congressional Research Service (December 17, 2008): 2. 
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society. This is because of military contractor involvement in the Abu Ghraib prisoner abuse,63 
the killing of innocent civilians in Iraq,64 evidence that contractors are a source of waste, fraud, 
and abuse,65 as well as scholarly allegations that military contractors hurt democratic 
institutions.66 Compounding the controversy is the fact that the practice of military contracting is 
continually growing. Although representing unprecedented growth for the military contracting 
industry in modern times, forty-eight PMSCs were founded from 2002 to 2006 accounting for a 
forty percent expansion of the international military contracting industry.67 In addition, the 
world’s largest contractor, the DoD, more than doubled its contract obligations from 1999 to 
2012 (from $170 billion to $360 billion (in FY2012 dollars)), with contract obligations now 
accounting for approximately ten percent of the entire FY2012 budget of $3.5 trillion.68 These 
factors have resulted in a vibrant debate taking place in academic and policy environments the 
world over. One of the central questions being debated is: Does military contracting actually 
enhance a military’s effectiveness? This question is an ideal starting point to shed light on the 
nature of military contracting, warfare, and security in the twenty-first century.  
                                                          
63 Fred Schreier and Marina Caparini, “Privatising Security: Law, Practice, and Governance of Private Military and 
Security Companies,” Occasional Paper No. 6 (Geneva, Switzerland: Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of 
Armed Forces, 2005): 47; Caroline Holmqvist, “Private Security Companies: The Case for Regulation,” SIPRI 
Policy Paper No. 9 (Stockholm, Sweden: Stockholm Institute for Peace Research, 2005): 26; John H. Cushman Jr., 
“Contractor Settles Case in Iraq Prison Abuse,” New York Times, January 8, 2013, accessed October 11, 2014, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/09/world/middleeast/contractor-settles-case-in-iraq-prison-abuse.html?_r=0. 
64 Tom Jackman, “Security Contractor Cleared in Two Firings,” The Washington Post, August 2, 2007, accessed 
October 11, 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/08/01/AR2007080102350.html. 
65 See, for example, Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR), Learning From Iraq (March 2013), 
accessed October 10, 2014, 
http://psm.du.edu/media/documents/us_research_and_oversight/sigir/lessons_learned/us_sigir_final-report_learning-
from-iraq.pdf.   
66 See, for example, Deborah D. Avant, The Market for Force: The Consequences of Privatizing Security, 
(Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 2005); Paul R. Verkuil, Outsourcing Sovereignty: Why Privatization 
of Government Functions Threatens Democracy and What We Can Do About It (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2007); Allison Stanger, One Nation Under Contract: The Outsourcing of American Power and the Future of 
Foreign Policy (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2009). 
67 It should be noted that many of these companies have likely disbanded following the end of OIF and OEF. 
Nicholas Dew and Bryan Hudgens, “The Evolving Private Military Sector,” Acquisition Research Sponsored Report 
Series (August 11, 2008): 7, accessed October 11, 2014, http://www.acquisitionresearch.org/files/FY2008/NPS-AM-
08-012.pdf. 
68 Moshe Schwartz, “Twenty-five Years of Acquisition Reform: Where Do We Go From Here?,” Statement of 
Moshe Schwartz before the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, Congressional Research 
Service (May 17, 2013), 1-2. 
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Generally, the debate includes issues such as how a state innovates and organizes its 
military to pursue security and survival amongst a diverse range of security challenges.69 These 
are important topics, because they impact how states such as the US and UK, for example, plan 
and structure their forces in order to “fill the gap” following recent defense budget reductions.70 
There are two sides of the debate: those that argue military contracting is indeed effective, and 
those that argue it is not.  
Advocates of military contracting such as former US Secretary of Defense Donald 
Rumsfeld and General David Petraeus (ret.) assert that PMSCs can benefit militaries. They argue 
that military contracting increases the military’s ability to achieve its goals by lowering 
operational costs, enhancing technological sophistication, providing additional resources, and, 
most importantly, acting as a force multiplier by trebling manpower levels. 71 
The argument for military contracting as being a force multiplier, or dramatically 
increasing the effectiveness of the force, is illustrated by a quote from General Petraeus (ret.), 
then-commander of Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I): 
 
They [private contractors] are securing a variety of different activities in 
Iraq and those are so important that we would likely have to use US or 
other forces to secure them. The reason we have them there is that we 
don’t have the forces to perform some of those missions. And so this 
would be a significant drain on our combat power if it were carried out.72  
 
                                                          
69 Some security challenges, for example, are countering piracy, insurgency, and genocide as well as delivering 
humanitarian aid. See, for example, United States Institute of Peace, The QDR in Perspective: Meeting America’s 
National Security Needs in the 21st Century (2010): 24-24. 
70 Jennifer Elsea and Nina M. Serafino, “Private Security Contractors in Iraq: Background, Legal Status, and Other 
Issues,” Congressional Research Service (May 28, 2004): 14; Moshe Schwartz, “Operational Contract Support: 
Learning from the Past and Preparing of the Future,” Statement of Moshe Schwartz before the Committee on Armed 
Services, House of Representatives, Congressional Research Service (September 12, 2012), 1. Defense News, 
“Experts: U.K. Logistics Shake-up Means More Work for Contractors” (June 11, 2012): 18. 
71 See, for example, U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Armed Services. Prepared Testimony of U.S. Secretary of 
Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld  108th Cong., 2nd sess., (September 23, 2004), 4, accessed October 11, 2014, 
http://www.dod.mil/dodgc/olc/docs/test04-09-23Rumsfeld.pdf. 
72 U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Armed Services. The Nomination of General David Petraeus to be 
Commander of U.S. Central Command and the Nomination of General Raymond Odierno to be Commander of 
Multinational Force-Iraq.  110th Cong., 2nd sess., May 22, 2008. 
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The arguments made by these practitioners only have tacit scholastic support.73 For 
example, Kinsey argues that PMSCs provide “armies with the capability to fight.”74 In addition, 
Singer states that contracting has “potential financial cost benefits”, like enabling a military to 
hire personnel when the need arises and let them go when their services are no longer needed.75 
However, despite scholarly support, military contracting for effectiveness is not without its 
critics. 
Critics of PMSCs, argue that employing military contractors decrease military 
effectiveness in two primary ways. First, they argue that military contractors undermine the 
achievement of military objectives. For example, critics assert that contractor aggression and 
abuses strengthened anti-American sentiment thus impeding the coalition’s ability to win the 
hearts and minds of the local population in Iraq and Afghanistan while establishing and 
maintaining security. 76 As a result of such transgressions, some scholars suggest that restricting 
military contracting to “support functions and those geographic areas where the rule of law 
prevails” would be beneficial for both ethical and strategic reasons.77 
Second, critics of military contracting argue that PMSCs decrease military effectiveness 
by being a source of waste, fraud, and abuse. For example, in 2013 Senator Claire McCaskill, an 
outspoken critic of military privatization, complained that “in the last decade [2001-2013], we’ve 
seen billions in taxpayer money spent on services and projects that did little—sometimes 
nothing—to further our military mission.”78 Evidence that contractors wasted at least eight 
billion dollars supports McCaskill’s argument and illustrates that contractors are not an 
alternative to uniformed personnel.79 Further, some practitioners argue that such waste, fraud, 
and abuse has a “debilitating effect on our military and threaten[s] America’s technological 
                                                          
73 In the academic community, these ideas are not without controversy. To illustrate, the following scholars have 
also made statements against military contracting. Chapter Three fully explore the literature relating to PMSCs.  
74 Kinsey, Private Contractors and the Reconstruction of Iraq, 10. 
75 Singer, Corporate Warriors, 146. See, also, Frank Camm and Victoria Greenfield, How Should the Army Use 
Contractors on the Battlefield? (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2005), 1-2 
76 Department of Defense, Counterinsurgency, Field Manual 3-24 (December 2006), 1-9; Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, Operational Contract Support, Joint Publication 4-10 (October 17, 2008): IV-20; Department of 
Defense,  Quadrennial Defense Review Report (February 2010): 93; Commission on Wartime Contracting In Iraq 
and Afghanistan, Transforming Wartime Contracting, 5; Government Accountability Office, Operational Contract 
Support: Management and Oversight Improvements Needed in Afghanistan, GAO-12-290 (March 29, 2012): 1-2. 
77 Vice Admiral Jeff Fowler, Superintendent, US Naval Academy, Executive Summary for the US Naval Academy’s 
9th Annual McCain Conference on Ethics and Military Leadership, Annapolis, MD, April 23, 2009, accessed 
October 11, 2014, www.usna.edu/Ethics/Seminars/mccain.htm.  
78 Fifield, “Contractors Reap $138bn from Iraq War”.  
79 See, for example, Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, Learning From Iraq.   
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advantage and military capabilities.”80 Points made by practitioners suggest that financial 
efficiency is critical to an effective military. 
These criticisms have scholastic support. Dunigan, for example, argues that PMSCs “tend 
to decrease military effectiveness.”81 Avant finds that outsourcing violence to PMSCs weakens 
state and international security by diffusing state control over violence.82 In addition, Avant 
argues that PMSCs have lessened security by weakening democratic states’ ability to effectively 
choose which conflicts to undertake.83 Despite recognizing the benefit of military contracting, 
Singer sees that military contracting “has created both huge vulnerabilities and negative 
consequences for the overall mission.”84 The negative consequences have caused T.X. Hammes 
to argue that the “United States should strive to keep contractors out of conflict zones”, citing 
problems with controlling contractor actions on the battlefield.85 
These perspectives illustrate that the debate is ongoing which suggests that there is not a 
clear answer to the contractor effectiveness question. This is an odd situation. Contractors have 
been highly visible in modern warfare for at least the past twelve years. Recently, data on 
personnel numbers and expenditures has emerged and is available in the public domain. Why, 
then, is the answer to such a simple question so elusive?  
For one, there are different interpretations of the term “effectiveness”. The difference in 
interpretation is evident in the commitment of states to employ military contractors in the future 
despite evidence of their role in wasting billions of dollars. Or, perhaps, it could be that the 
theories informing the use of military contracting need more work? Or, more likely, scholars and 
practitioners are focusing too much on material resources such as manpower, technology, and 
money and ignoring the non-material resources such as doctrine, training, and organization.   
 
                                                          
80 Moshe Schwartz, “Twenty-five Years of Acquisition Reform,” 14; Business Executives for National Security, 
Getting to Best: Reforming the Defense Acquisition Enterprise (July 2009), 4, accessed October 11, 2014,   
http://www.bens.org/document.doc?id=12. 
81 Dunigan, Victory for Hire, 76. 
82 Singer, Corporate Warriors, 23. 
82 Avant, The Market for Force, 229. 
83 Deborah Avant, “The Implications of Marketized Security for IR Theory: The Democratic Peace, Late State 
Building, and the Nature and Frequency of Conflict,” Perspectives on Politics 4 (2006): 507-528. 
84 Singer, “Can’t Win with ‘Em, Can’t Go to War without ‘Em”. 
85 T.X. Hammes, “Private Contractors in Conflict Zones: The Good, the Bad, and the Strategic Impact,” National 
Defense University Press (November, 2012): 34, accessed October 11, 2014, http://www.ndu.edu/press/private-
contractors-in-conflict-zones.html. 
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1.5 Thesis, Aims and Contribution to the Canon of Strategic Studies 
 
 This section outlines the key arguments of this thesis, the ‘gaps’ it seeks to fill, the 
problems with current understandings of military contracting and military effectiveness, the 
thesis’s aims, purposes, and areas of responsibility. Critically, the thesis is centered on three 
central problems with current theoretical and practical understandings of military contracting and 
effectiveness: 
 
1. An overemphasis on material factors such as manpower, technology and numerical 
preponderance, as determinants of military and, consequently, contractor 
effectiveness.  
2. A de-emphasis of non-material factors such as contractor force employment (doctrine 
and tactics) as determinants of contractor effectiveness. 
3. Moreover, the lack of a rigorous methodological framework to understanding how 
PMSCs contribute to military effectiveness.  
 
The first problem the thesis addresses is that the bridge between the theory and practice 
of military contracting overemphasizes material resources. Extant theory guiding contracting 
suggests that contractors are simply ‘guns for hire’ or extra ‘boots on the ground’, however, 
military contracting is a diverse practice that has existed for and evolved over millennia. To date, 
scholars and practitioners of military contracting overemphasize the importance of contractor 
material resources (manpower and technology) to battlefield outcomes. Most practitioners 
understand military contractors almost exclusively on material terms. Usually, three normative 
assumptions are made by policymakers about military contracting. First, that military victory is 
determined by the size of the military force (the more manpower a military has, the more 
effective it will be).86  Second, that victory is determined by the technological superiority of a 
                                                          
86 U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Armed Services. The Nomination of General David Petraeus to be 
Commander of U.S. Central Command and the Nomination of General Raymond Odierno to be Commander of 
Multinational Force-Iraq.  110th Cong., 2nd sess., May 22, 2008; United States Congress, Senate Committee on 
Armed Services. Prepared Testimony of U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld  108th Cong., 2nd sess. 
(September 23, 2004), 4, accessed October 7, 2014, 
http://www.dod.mil/dodgc/olc/docs/test04-09-23Rumsfeld.pdf. 
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force (the more technologically sophisticated the military, the more effective it will be).87 Third, 
that wealth and victory are fungible (the more money a military spends, the more effective it will 
be).88 These assumptions are problematic. 
The second problem is that non-material resources are ignored. Material assumptions are 
problematic because effectiveness assessments in relation to military contracting solely based on 
manpower, technology, and money ignore deeper organizational issues like how these resources 
are actually employed to achieve objectives. On the one hand, the result of ignoring 
organizational issues and non-material resources, like force employment, is that assessments will 
tend to overestimate military contractors that provide significant material contributions but are 
poorly employed. On the other hand, assessments will tend to underestimate well employed and 
high achieving military contractors that contribute fewer resources. The result is the belief that 
resources are the sole determinants of battlefield outcomes. As such, non-material changes made 
to increase military effectiveness go unnoticed because manpower levels of material remain 
constant.  
So what is the end result? The end result is an oversimplified understanding of military 
effectiveness that translates into poor policy and underutilized private resources. It is 
characterized by an overemphasis on material factors that result in confusion over contractor 
effectiveness – What it is? How to measure it? and How to improve it? Different theorists and 
practitioners in a range of academic disciplines have different answers to each of these questions. 
Even within the relatively narrow field of Strategic Studies, as discussed above, there are 
disagreements on the definition of contractor effectiveness.  As the practice and scholarship of 
military contracting expands, so too do the differences of opinion. To rectify this problem, a 
more encompassing theoretical approach must be developed before the debate becomes more 
                                                          
87 Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Annual Report to the President and the Congress, (Washington, D.C., 
2002), 67-83. 
88 See McCaskill remarks in Fifield, “Contractors Reap $138bn from Iraq War”. See also, Hans Morgenthau, 
Politics Among Nations, 141-42; Klaus Knorr, Military Power and Potential (Lexington: D.C. Heath, 1970), 119-
36. Martin Wight, Power Politics (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1978), 26-7; Charles L. Glaser and Chaim 
Kaufmann, “What is the Offense-Defense Balance and Can We Measure It?,” International Security vol. 22, no. 4 
(Spring 1998): 55-7; Timothy McKeown, “The Limitations of ‘Structural’ Theories of Commercial Policy,” 
International Organization vol. 40, no. 1 (Winter 1986): 43-64; Biddle, Military Power, 18; Eli Berman, Jacob N. 
Shapiro, and Joseph H. Felter, “Can Hearts and Minds be Bought? The Economics of Counterinsurgency in Iraq,” 
Journal of Political Economy vol. 119, no. 4 (2011): 766-819; Stanley Hoffman, Janus and Minerva (Boulder, CO: 
Westview Press, 1987), 396; Timothy Dunne, “Liberalism,” in The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction 
to International Relations eds. John Baylis, Steve Smith, and Patricia Owens, (New York, NY: Oxford University 
Press, 2007), 110. 
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deeply entrenched and further impinges on the policy and practice of military contracting. In 
other words, the theory guiding military contracting needs to be summarized, reviewed, and 
expanded in order to improve the general understanding of the relationship between military 
contracting and military effectiveness. If theory continues to conceptualize PMSCs in material 
terms and ignore the non-material, then states will be unable to improve military effectiveness 
through military contracting.  
These issues relate to a third major problem regarding general understandings of PMSCs 
that this thesis wishes to highlight, discuss, and amend - the lack of a rigorous framework to 
understanding how PMSCs contribute to military effectiveness and, more specifically, contractor 
effectiveness. The confusion over contractor effectiveness stems from two factors: shallow 
methodology and the lack of empirical analysis (unanalyzed empirical data and the lack of good 
data sources). Although there has been some good ontological and epistemological work done by 
scholars such as Singer, Avant, Kinsey and Dunigan, there has not been an in-depth discussion 
over methodology and the application of a mixed methods analysis. As PMSCs are a complex 
area of theory and practice, the same depth needs to be applied to how they are understood in a 
rigid, esoteric fashion.  
The second factor – the lack of empirical analysis – is an area this thesis exposes and 
seeks to amend by analyzing previously unanalyzed data. Not only do many scholars focus on 
material factors they also make such claims on dated empirical data. For example, data related to 
the total contracting expenditures and the number of contractors deployed was not made 
available until 1995 and 2007, respectively. However, the field of military contracting research 
has yet to analyze this data which means their findings may not accurately represent the current 
state of military contracting. It is almost self-evident to state that rigorous methodology and good 
data are fundamental to shoring up strong empirical research. In this respect, although there is a 
well-established literature on military contracting, much of it could benefit from rigorously 
analyzing military contracting in modern war, if only to substantiate previous qualitative 
findings. In addition, the literature would benefit from statistical analysis to test long-held 
material assumptions of military contracting upon which policy is based. The results from 
statistical analyses of contractor manpower contributions might cause an impetus for scholars 
and practitioners to look beyond material resources to understand how contractors can be used to 
win wars.  
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 To re-iterate, this thesis is concerned with demonstrating, reviewing and amending the  
three problems highlighted above. In addition, it has three broad aims identified with key 
weaknesses of current research, particularly the limitation of data analysis and its impact on 
informed decision-making of effectiveness. First, it seeks to critique material approaches to 
military and, specifically and in due course, contractor effectiveness. By providing a thorough 
review of the literature on the relationship between military contracting and military 
effectiveness, it tests the role of contractor material resources to military effectiveness by 
analyzing the impact resources have on battlefield outcomes. In statistically analyzing manpower 
resources, the thesis finds that the correlation between contractor manpower levels and measures 
of military effectiveness varies. 
Second, the thesis borrows from the excellent work done by Biddle and Dunigan on the 
importance of non-material factors to military effectiveness and develops and applies it to 
contractors. The thesis tests the role of contractor force employment methods to military 
effectiveness by analyzing the development of contractor doctrine and structures in relation to 
battlefield security as measured by violence. Contractor force employment is related to 
battlefield outcomes and therefore can be used to expand understandings of the impact military 
contracting has on military effectiveness.  
Contractor Force Employment (CFE) – a term unique to this work – has not yet been 
fully explored. CFE relates to the non-material methods a military uses to employ private 
military resources in the pursuit of battlefield objectives. The perspective can be applied to adapt 
the military organization to private contractors and develop contractor employment methods that 
increase military effectiveness. CFE is vital to understanding modern warfare: developing 
contractor employment methods should enable militaries to derive more utility from private 
resources by integrating military objectives with contractor tasks, and reconciling the operational 
and tactical differences between military and contractor groups.  
 Testing the traditional manpower perspective informs much of this thesis, which takes on 
the responsibility of expanding the military contracting literature beyond the material resource 
dimension to include contractor force employment. Generally, the thesis argues that by focusing 
on material terms theorists and scholars are missing the point: figuring out the impact of military 
contractors on military effectiveness should not focus on what resources military contractors 
provide but, rather, how those resources are employed. It contends that the primarily material 
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logic behind military contracting is a poor determinant of contractor effectiveness alone while 
the inclusion of contractor force employment methods enhances the accuracy of its predictions.89  
Given this situation, the thesis attempts to contribute to the ongoing debate over whether or not 
military contracting is effective.  
 The third aim of this thesis is to build an appropriate framework or paradigm to analyze 
contractor effectiveness in both material and non-material terms. That means building a rigorous, 
esoteric methodological paradigm that specifically relates to contractor force employment. As 
part of this process, the thesis seeks to address deficiencies in the data used to uphold claims on 
contractor effectiveness 
 This thesis also has important practical implications. The widespread belief that the 
future of military contracting hangs in the materialist balance forces PMSC to lower costs to the 
detriment of effectiveness. However, if material resources are not the key determinant to 
measuring contractor effectiveness, then assessments should base military contractor 
effectiveness on whether it aids the military in achieving its objectives. This means that policies 
need to reconsider the importance of integrating military organizational components with 
military contractors. It would also mean that military effectiveness could potentially be increased 
by improving contractor force employment instead of increasing the amount of resources 
available to the military. Therefore, military effectiveness could be increased without increasing 
spending, which is particularly important today when defense budgets are being cut while 
security threats persist. 
The thesis will have theoretical and practical implications by filling the gaps in the 
military contracting literature. Filling the gaps should prove useful to those outside the defense 
policy field as they address how organizations can optimize resources to maximize effectiveness. 
For insiders, this research is useful to understanding how the military can draw lessons from the 
past to better structure itself and employ contractors in future military operations. This thesis also 
benefits contractors by providing them with information on how to make themselves more 
effective and desirable to contracting states. In general, the thesis seeks to bridge the gap 
between theory and practice in order to encourage debate on the importance of both material and 
non-material resources.  
                                                          
89 See sections 4.2 - 4.4 for a review of the material logic behind military contracting. 
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A wider discussion will not only improve the theory, practice, and policy of military 
contracting, but also the effectiveness of the military in general. The thesis is significant because 
understanding military contracting through CFE will inform the debate on whether military 
contracting helps a military achieve its objectives. In addition, it will also shed light on the 
importance of non-material resources to wider military debates. In a practical sense, a stronger 
understanding of the military contracting-military effectiveness relationship will enable states to 
improve their military contracting strategies which will lead to increased military effectiveness. 
 
1.6 The Chapter Layout  
  
This section outlines the chapter layout which can be categorized across three general 
academic areas of enquiry: ontology, epistemology and methodology. Beyond this first chapter, 
Chapters Two and Three are focused on the ontology of PMSCs, what we know about military 
contracting in history and in the literature.  
In Chapter Two, the practical, historical use of military contracting is surveyed in three 
phases: antiquity to WWI; WWI to the end of the Cold War; post-Cold War to present day. The 
survey illustrates that the evolution in the practice of military contracting has been premised on 
its ability to enhance military effectiveness thorough the provision of material resources. The 
chapter identifies key trends in military contracting throughout history that help explain the 
evolution and the reasons behind the constant employment of military contractors.  
Chapter Three conducts a theoretical review of the military effectiveness and military 
contracting literatures. It critiques the literatures to demonstrate that a theory behind employing 
military contractors to boost military effectiveness is underdeveloped. The critique thus outlines 
the gap that this thesis intends to fill.  
Following the ontology, the thesis engages in epistemology relating to military 
contracting and military effectiveness – how military effectiveness can be theorized in a material 
and non-material context. In other words, it discusses what we know or think we know about 
war, military effectiveness, and military contracting. As such, Chapter Four describes and 
reviews the value of the material approach to military effectiveness in general war. The review 
uncovers theoretical strengths and weaknesses of the relationship between material resources and 
military effectiveness and applies them to military contracting. The review lays the foundation 
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needed to analyze the material manpower focus of contemporary military contracting and argue 
for the need of force employment research in the military contracting literature. 
Chapter Five extends Chapter Four by describing and reviewing the value of the non-
material approach to military effectiveness beginning with a general war perspective and then 
applying it more specifically to military contracting. The review uncovers additional theoretical 
weaknesses in the material approach while uncovering strengths in a non-material approach to 
understanding the relationship between military contracting and military effectiveness. 
Specifically, Chapter Five argues that what resources are employed is less important than how 
and why they are employed. The chapter thus casts doubt on manpower being a key determinant 
of military effectiveness and suggests that force employment is a more proximate determinant. 
The chapter closes by introducing the Contractor Force Employment (CFE) perspective to 
military contracting which helps guide the case study analysis. 
The third crucial area of the thesis is methodology. To that end, Chapter Six discusses the 
methodological foundations of this thesis. The chapter presents an argument for the use of the 
mixed method approach to testing the impact contractor manpower resources and contractor 
force employment methods have on military effectiveness. The chapter provides a detailed 
outline of the data collection process, the specific quantitative and qualitative analysis methods 
employed, and the key limitations of this thesis. 
Chapter Seven tests the manpower and Contractor Force Employment hypotheses by 
examining military contracting in Operation Iraqi Freedom (2003-2011). The Iraq case study is 
selected because it represents the highest instance of contracting employment in history. As a 
consequence of the high rate of contractor employment, OIF provides maximum theoretical 
leverage for proving the contractor manpower perspective’s claims and disproving the contractor 
force employment perspective’s claims relating to military effectiveness. 
Chapter Eight concludes this thesis. It provides a detailed summary of the main findings. 
The chapter discusses the theoretical and practical implications of these findings and then 
contrasts them with current employment methods. The chapter asserts that the contrasts between 
the findings and current practices are significant and that military contracting scholarship and 
policy cannot optimize contractor resources without considering contractor employment in 
greater depth. The chapter closes by suggesting future research in contractor employment that 
would greatly add to the theory, policy, and practice of military contracting.  
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CHAPTER TWO: THE HISTORY AND TRENDS OF MILITARY CONTRACTING 
 
Chapter Two addresses the ontology of military contracting by surveying the history of 
military contracting in practice. It does so for three reasons. First, the chapter conducts the 
survey of literature to reaffirm that the practice of employing military contractors on the 
battlefield is long and extends over millennia. Second, the survey demonstrates that the practice 
of military contracting is diverse and has become even more so over the years. Third, it identifies 
key terms and past trends that have guided the practice of military contracting and, in doing so, 
explains the reasons for the consistent employment of military contractors.  
The survey introduces a new taxonomy. It categorizes military contracting into three 
broad phases: Manpower (antiquity – WWI), Technology (WWI – the end of the Cold War), 
Manpower and Technology (Post-Cold War – present day). These phases classify and document 
the contributions contractors have made to governments seeking to enhance military 
effectiveness. The phases provide prominent examples of military contracting to illustrate the 
private supply of manpower and technology.90 Taken together, the three phases illustrate that 
contracting has evolved subject to the demands of warfare. The survey complements the 
historical view and expands the current view of the military contracting literature. Moreover, it 
demonstrates that the evolution of military contracting has been guided by material factors of 
military power. In this respect, history can be a guide to the present and future of military 
contracting. 
The chapter is structured to these ends. First, the terms ‘military contracting’ and 
‘military contractors’ are defined to ensure an understanding of the various forms of military 
contractors throughout history. Second, the three phases and overarching rationale for each phase 
are outlined to indicate the key determinant of military effectiveness during that time period.91 
Each phase then validates the rationale with historical evidence. When these phases are defined 
and historically validated, key trends begin to emerge.  
 
 
 
                                                          
90 The survey is not a complete or exhaustive historical account. To do so would be beyond the scope of this thesis. 
91 A more detailed history of military contracting in the Thirty Years’ War is given in Chapter Four while Operation 
Iraqi Freedom is the case study used in Chapter Six. 
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2.1: Previous Attempts at Unraveling the History of Military Contracting  
  
Several theorists argue that military contracting is not a new phenomenon but has “new 
and distinct” characteristics.92 David Isenberg, for example, states that the private military 
industry is not as new “as is frequently claimed,”93 while Peter Singer writes that “nearly every 
past empire, from the ancient Egyptians to the Victorian British, contracted foreign troops in 
some form or another.”94 Dunigan, writes that there is a “long historical trajectory” of 
contractors being hired by nations.95 Therefore, there is a general agreement that military 
contracting has a long history.  
Other scholars have gone further, establishing approaches to categorize military 
contractors and demonstrate their diversity. The three most notable approaches come from 
Singer, Avant, and Kinsey. Singer’s “tip of the spear” approach categorizes military contractors 
into three groups based on the types of services they provide.96 The three groups are: military 
provider firms, military consultant firms, and military support firms. Singer’s approach is 
referred to as the “tip of the spear” typology because it categorizes military contractors based on 
their proximity to the battlefield. Military provider firms deal with implementation and command 
functions and are therefore close to combat and are at the “tip of the spear”. Military consultant 
firms operate farther away from combat and military support firms even farther away. As such, 
both are located farther away from the “tip of the spear”.  
Avant suggests that the private military industry inhibits such a simplistic approach to 
categorization. She argues that contracting companies blur established categories by operating in 
more than one of Singer’s categories at a time. For this reason, Avant refines Singer’s typology 
by using the contract as the unit of analysis instead of the contractor company.97 For Avant, the 
details of the agreement between the contractor and the contracting entity specify exactly what 
type of involvement military contractors will have on the battlefield. Avant lists five categories: 
1) Operational Support; 2) Site/Personal Security; 3) Military Advice and Training; 4) Crime 
                                                          
92 Elke Krahmann, States, Citizens and the Privatisation of Security (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 
2010), 21-50. 
93 Isenberg, Shadow Force, 4. 
94 Singer, Corporate Warriors, 20. 
95 Dunigan, Victory for Hire, 6. 
96 Singer, Corporate Warriors, 93. 
97 Avant, The Market for Force, 17. 
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Prevention/Intelligence; and 5) Logistical Support. These categories correspond with Singer’s 
“tip of the spear” approach in terms of locating contracts in relation to combat, but also indicate 
the various services in which contractor companies function. 
Kinsey categorizes military contracting based on two elements: the “means of securing 
the object” and the “object to be secured.” In the first element, Kinsey categorizes military 
operations based on whether lethal or non-lethal force is employed to fulfill the contract. The 
second element categorizes military contracting based on whether the contract is performed for a 
public or private purpose.98 Thus, Kinsey helps differentiate between state military operations 
that employ a high level of lethality to secure a public goal and military contractor operations 
that employ lower levels of lethality to secure private goals. As such, the typology supports 
analysis between military contractors as well as between contractors and state militaries. 
Differentiation on lethal/non-lethal and public/private lines is critical to understanding military 
contracting. It provides a specific picture of the key actors in a geographic region and helps 
depict the environment in that region based on the number of personnel employing lethal force. 
The most significant contribution Kinsey’s typology makes to the field is in enabling the analysis 
between military contractors and state militaries. This enables analyses to differentiate between 
functions performed by contractors and those functions performed by military personnel. In turn, 
these analyses can help determine which services are best outsourced to military contractors and 
those that should remain a function of the state. Therefore, the typology is critical to assessing 
contracting and planning for future contracting. 
Singer’s, Avant’s, and Kinsey’s typologies are useful because they expand the body of 
knowledge on military contracting beyond the traditional monolithic interpretation that 
contractors are simply “guns for hire”. Contextualizing the diverse range of functions served by 
contractors and the different modes of serving those functions is necessary to account for 
traditionally imperceptible changes in the industry. Accounting for these small changes is 
important to understanding military contracting because small changes can produce large effects 
over time in military, technology, and policy which affect battlefield outcomes. Moreover, a 
better understanding of military contracting helps states assess the force’s capability, enabling 
the assessment of strategic asymmetries and comparative advantages and disadvantages between 
                                                          
98 Kinsey, Corporate Soldiers and International Security, 10; Christopher Kinsey, Private Contractors and the 
Reconstruction of Iraq, 7. 
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opponents.99 As a result, Singer’s, Avant’s, and Kinsey’s approaches provide a means to 
acquiring more precise information about military contracting that can be used to calculate a 
military’s total strength and assess the outcome of potential conflict.100 Furthermore, they help 
inform scholars and practitioners on force structure, strategic planning, and budgetary 
assessment.  
In describing and categorizing military contracting, these typologies have broadened the 
understanding of military contracting. However, they are limited in that they do not describe how 
or why hiring military contractors is perceived as enhancing military effectiveness and do not 
facilitate the analysis of the development, or evolution, of military contracting across a wider 
historical landscape. For example, in each of the typologies it is unclear what purpose military 
contracting serves and how the provision of services impacts military effectiveness. The 
typologies only focus on the military contracting services that are currently offered. The 
typologies do not capture the work that military contractors could potentially engage in.101  
In other words, the typologies are specific and provide a detailed understanding of 
military contracting, however they miss broader thematic trends. They demonstrate the diversity 
of military contracting and help account for small changes in military contracting; they are less 
adept at accounting for larger shifts. For example, Avant accounts for contractor shifts in the 
services they employ on the battlefield but does not account for the larger shifts in warfare, to 
which military contracting services are based and in a constant state of flux due to “market 
forces”.102 Recognizing larger industry shifts that reflect broad battlefield demands are critical 
because they indicate how militaries use contractors to enhance military effectiveness. 
Policymakers must be aware of not only the specific daily and yearly changes to military 
contracting, but also the larger shifts which indicate the future or the industry that are 
imperceptible unless studied over time. 
Changes in military contracting must reflect warfare. If contractors do not reflect the style 
of warfare, then they will prove to be ineffective. In turn, if contractors are not effective, then 
                                                          
99 Department of Defense, Directive 5111.11, (Washington DC, August 2001). 
100 Paul Bracken, “Net Assessment: A Practical Guide,” Parameters vol. 36, no. 1 (Spring 2006): 93. 
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they will not produce a profit and will be unable to sustain operations. Without recognizing these 
shifts, military effectiveness cannot be assessed and, as a result, the future trajectory of military 
contractor use cannot be plotted. Recognizing military contractor trends and how those trends 
relate to military effectiveness is thus integral to the success of both actors. Expanding the 
military contracting literature to account for these thematic trends will increase our 
understanding of the field. To this end, a new approach is required. 
The thesis now conducts a meta-survey of the history of military contracting from 
antiquity to the early twenty-first century. As opposed to the approaches described above, the 
thesis categorizes military contracting using broad trends in warfare across history. Each of the 
three phases represents three general trends over the past 4000 years of military contracting 
history. Each phase is unique in that it contains a unique motivation for using military 
contractors. This does not mean that the motivations for using contractors are universal and 
constant during a specific phase. Instead, it refers to an observable general trend of military 
contracting. 
The categorization uncovers why contractors were employed during different periods of 
time, thereby demonstrating the diverse and evolving nature of the private military and security 
industry. Moreover, the survey demonstrates that early military contracting was a useful means 
of increasing military effectiveness because it provided states with additional military resources. 
However, more recent military contracting policies that revolve around using contractors to 
augment material resources appear to be limited because they ignore the growing role of non-
material resources to military effectiveness.  
 
2.2: Phase I: Manpower—Military Contracting from Antiquity to the Introduction of 
Radical Firepower in WWI 
  
In antiquity, military contracting went by the broad term of “mercenarism” and those 
engaged were referred to as mercenaries. Mercenaries are individual soldiers who fight for a 
state other than their own, or for a non-state entity to which the mercenary has no direct tie, on 
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condition of monetary payment rather than obedience or loyalty.103 Mercenaries have been 
referred to as “dogs of war,” “soldiers of fortune,” “war profiteer,” and “guns for hire” 
suggesting that they make a living by killing.104 Mercenaries offer the broadest range of military 
services possible, including combat and illegal activities such as coup d’états.105 Since the 
beginning of recorded history, mercenaries have been employed to supply manpower, weapons, 
and technology in order to field a fighting force and/or enhance a military’s effectiveness. In 
doing so, mercenaries have been central to creating security and ensuring the survival of the 
group since time immemorial. 
The use of mercenaries dates back to circa 2094-2047 BCE when King Shulgi of Ur 
employed foreign fighters in his army.106 Egypt began augmenting its military with mercenaries 
in 1479 BC and the Hebrews followed suit in 1250 BC.107 Greek city-states flourished with an 
army of specialized mercenaries like the Cretan slingers, Syracusan hoplites and Thessalian 
                                                          
103 Scholarship and practice both lack an agreed upon definition. Definitions are often on two criteria: motive and 
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Mercenaries (A/37/43) no. 43 (1982); Janice E. Thomson, “State Practices, International Norms, and the Decline of 
Mercenarism,” International Studies Quarterly vol. 34, no. 1 (1990): 23; Singer, Corporate Warriors, 41. Article 
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compensation substantially in excess of that promised or paid to combatants of 
similar rank and functions in the armed forces of that Party; 
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a Party to the conflict; 
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cavalry.108 Macedonia’s one hundred years of conquest led by Alexander the Great,109 
Hannibal’s victory against the numerically superior Rome in the Battle of Cannae (216 BCE),110 
and the protection of the ancient Chinese Han Dynasty (36 BCE) were all accomplished by 
armies that heavily employed mercenaries.111 Additionally, mercenaries helped the Roman 
Empire dominate for hundreds of years as Roman emperors like Julius Caesar let “war support 
war” by waging war to pay mercenaries and using mercenaries to wage war.112 
Mercenaries were critical to the success of these militaries because of the importance of 
manpower. Manpower was central to ancient warfare (recorded history to 5th century AD) 
because it consisted of massed infantry tactics where bows and spears were the weapons of 
choice.113 However, non-material resources such as tactics and training were also critical to 
victory as a well employed force could defeat a numerically superior force.114 Consequently, a 
key characteristic of victorious militaries in ancient history was the ability to organize 
manpower. This meant that mercenarism was critical to warring parties not only because they 
augmented manpower but because they could integrate with it. Thus, troop augmentation and 
integration made mercenaries a hallmark of ancient warfare.  
Following the ancient period and beginning in late antiquity (2nd-8th century), the advent 
of heavy cavalry, siege engines, and naval power changed the character of warfare.115 
Consequently, rudimentary skills such as riding horses, constructing and operating siege engines, 
and maritime navigation became critical to successfully engaging in war. As the tools of warfare 
became more advanced, skilled manpower was needed to effectively employ those tools in 
military operations. The importance of these tools provided mercenaries with an opportunity for 
employment. Mercenaries began to offer cavalry, siege, and naval expertise on the free market. 
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In the Middle Ages, Venice, amongst other Italian cities, supplied salaried rower-soldiers during 
the First Crusade (1096-1099). Salaried rowers played an important logistical function in 
transporting Roman Catholic forces to battle that led to the capture of Jerusalem in 1099.116 In 
terms of manpower on land, roughly half of the force that William the Conqueror’s used in the 
Norman Conquest of England in the eleventh century employed both mercenary infantry and 
cavalry.117 Feudal lords supplemented their forces with mercenaries beginning in the twelfth 
century in an effort to gain security.118 In the Thirteenth and Fourteenth centuries, states hired 
companies of mercenary troops, called Free Companies, to increase their military power since 
nation-states lacked the funds required to maintain a standing force. Over and over again, 
historical experience demonstrated the continued importance of mercenaries to manpower, and 
the centrality of manpower employment to victory. Indeed, from the end of the thirteenth century 
through the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 “virtually all force was allocated through the market” 
and the market hinged on the availability manpower.119  
The market allocation of force was driven by the demand of warring parties. Belligerents 
required mercenary manpower to help them achieve victory since fielding a numerically superior 
force was central to military success. As warfare advanced, mercenary manpower had to develop 
skills that maintained their battlefield effectiveness and their importance to contracting nations. 
Accordingly, as warfare evolved the demand for contractor resources changed. More technical 
warfare meant that belligerents required more skilled labor. As such, in order to be profitable, 
mercenaries had to supply technical expertise to be effective. Thus, in the pursuit of profit, 
mercenaries had to evolve with warfare so that the services offered helped states win wars. If 
they did not evolve their services, mercenaries would be unable to cause victory and would 
therefore not be hired. However, the provision of skilled labor and technical expertise was 
problematic. The problem came to a head in the fourteenth century. 
In fourteenth-century Europe, battlefield demands and market forces altered 
mercenarism. Previously, privately funded and operated armies called “Great Companies” were 
successful. The companies were a massive source of manpower as they consisted of 
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approximately ten thousand men.120 As such, their employment could greatly sway the outcome 
of battle. However, although the Great Companies had had previous success in offering their 
manpower, the demands of warring parties called for skilled labor, which companies could not 
meet.  
The Great Companies struggled to provide skilled labor that met battlefield demands. The 
results were unreliable profits and an unsustainable business model. The source of the 
unsustainability was that they made their profit largely from plunder and did not possess any 
strategic goal beyond immediate self-enrichment.121 Intermittent wars meant that they were paid 
only intermittently. Even when they were employed, they were inadequately compensated, as 
plunder was not replenished quickly. The Great Companies became increasingly more averse to 
investing in themselves because there was little prospect in making back their initial investment. 
Thus, on the one hand, the inability to make a profit meant that they could not afford to hire and 
pay the wages of skilled labor that the market demanded or employ men for a long enough 
period of time for them to develop that expertise. On the other hand, the inability to sustain a 
skilled force meant that they were ineffective on the battlefield and could not make a profit. The 
Great Companies met their demise because their business model was not sustainable. In an effort 
to gain profit with the labor they possessed, the companies expanded the size of the territories in 
which they operated. The farther their operations took them from familiar territory, the more 
likely they were to face concerted resistance to which they were vulnerable.122  
The experience of the Great Companies demonstrated that manpower remained important 
to the battlefield, so long as it was skilled manpower. In addition, it demonstrated that a stable 
source of income was required to maintain skilled manpower. The complete independence of the 
Great Companies from political organizations made it difficult to offer the technical skills 
necessary to increase military effectiveness. They required more consistent financial support 
from at least one belligerent. The logic was that if a company could guarantee a source of 
income, it could maintain the quality of men required to provide a technically proficient force 
required to win wars. Thus, mercenary companies evolved to seek out consistent financial 
support. 
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This strategy was first implemented in sixteenth century Renaissance Italy.123 Italian city-
states contracted mercenaries for protection, naming them condottieri. In doing so, they gained 
support from territorial powers through service contracts. The extensive market for service 
contracts enabled independent militaries to gain funding for at least the duration of a local 
conflict without having to rely exclusively on plunder. Service contracts helped extend the 
profitability and survivability of military contracting organizations but only as long as the war 
lasted. As a result, military contracting companies invested their own money to raise skilled 
troops because they believed that the war they were contracted for would continue long enough 
for them to be compensated for their initial investment.124 
The new strategy, however, proved little better than that of The Great Companies in the 
fourteenth century. The primary issue was that the money raised by the political organization to 
pay the contracted labor was in itself unsustainable. If the funding stopped, the state would be 
unable to sustain the employment of their hired military and risked it defecting to an opponent 
that could afford to pay.125  
In addition, the fickle, self-interested nature of mercenaries meant that there was always a 
possibility of mercenary defection for higher pay even when they were properly funded. Such 
characteristics caused strategists like Sun Tzu and Machiavelli to question the actual value 
mercenaries had on the battlefield and the potentially disastrous effect defection could have. Sun 
Tzu expressed his concern in writing that “The nominal strength of mercenary troops may be 
100,000, but their real value will be not more than half that figure.”126 Machiavelli notably stated 
that mercenaries and auxiliaries are “the most dangerous; for the prince or republic that calls 
them to their assistance has no control or authority whatever over them, as that remains entirely 
with him who sends them.” Machiavelli based his opinion on the historical use of mercenaries 
and auxiliaries in Italy.127  
The distrust of Sun Tzu and Machiavelli to hired military labor indicates the importance 
of skilled and disciplined mercenaries to manpower and, in-turn, non-material aspects of 
                                                          
123 Shearer, “Outsourcing War,” 2. 
124 Parrott, The Business of War, 105. 
125 This was particularly the case with the Habsburg’s during the Long Turkish War (1593-1606). See, Parrott, The 
Business of War, 93-95. 
126 Sun Tzu, The Art of War, trans. Lionel Giles (Blacksburg, VA: Thrifty Books, 2009), 73. 
127 Niccolo Machiavelli, The Discourses on Livy, Trans. Ninian Hill Thomson (London: Penguin Books, 1998), 340; 
Machiavelli, The Prince, Chapter XII. 
33 
 
manpower to victory. To be sure, the result of the French mercenaries defection during the 
Habsburg-Ottoman War (1593-1606) provides just one example supporting mercenary distrust 
and confirming the pivotal role manpower played during this phase.128 French mercenaries 
defected from the Habsburg army and joined the Ottomans causing a shift in the balance of 
power enabling the Ottomans to win the war.129 This underlying financial motivation thus 
highlights the problem political organizations risk when hiring contractors as well as the issues 
contractors must overcome to generate profits. Moreover, it illustrates the importance of not only 
manpower, but of quality manpower. 
The emerging conflicts in Europe that culminated in the Thirty Years’ War (1618-1648) 
provided mercenaries with the prospect of a long war and sustainable profits. Mercenaries 
enabled belligerents to wage war on an unprecedented scale. The high level of mercenary 
employment caused some to refer to the Thirty Years’ War as the “pinnacle of mercenarism”.130 
Mercenarism was conducted on such a massive scale that it prompted Tilly to comment that: “the 
great seventeenth-century organizers of war involved themselves in supply as much as in 
battle.”131 To illustrate the magnitude of mercenarism, the Habsburgs employed over 100,000 
mercenaries in 1628-1629 and Sweden employed approximately 150,000 in 1631.132 
Nevertheless, huge mercenary armies resulted in military gridlock. Mercenary armies 
were slow and consumed significant resources making it difficult for belligerents to pay their 
forces. Gridlock meant that large mercenary armies were not winning wars, which resulted in 
little, if any plunder. The combination of scare resources and the failure of mercenaries to be 
paid forced a reduction in the size of armies. Smaller armies were more affordable and the 
pseudo-state could afford to pay their mercenary labor. Smaller armies also meant greater 
maneuverability enabling them to exploit the weaknesses of larger, slower opponents.133 As a 
result, scarce resources caused the reduction of army size, which in turn caused battle to break 
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the gridlock thus illustrating the necessities of contractors to conform to the character of war and 
of states to employ their manpower resources strategically.  
Following the Thirty Years’ War the methods of employing smaller units of contractors 
was abandoned and the importance of skilled mercenaries was forgotten. The employment of 
mercenaries for manpower, however, remained important. The only difference was that 
manpower was just acquired differently as states directly enlisted foreign individuals, purchased 
or leased regular army units, or the subsidized another state’s army.134 As such, mercenarism 
remained important to the security and survival of states.  
Switzerland was the “premier” supplier of mercenaries in the sixteenth and seventeenth 
century and Swiss mercenaries were employed by the Prussian, French, British, Austrian, and 
Dutch armies.135 On the European Continent, the sale of regiments and licenses to allow the 
recruitment of private citizens was prominent between states.136 The British (1600-1874), Dutch 
(1602-1798), and French (1664-1769) East India Companies, for example, were private armies 
employed to ensure the survival of their expanding empires from the seventeenth century to the 
late nineteenth century.137 The British East India Company was established on December 31, 
1600 by Queen Elizabeth “To form an associate to trade directly with India” and employed 
significant numbers of mercenaries to do so.138 The company used superior manpower to 
dominate its sphere of influence as seen in the 1757 Battle of Plassey.139  The importance of 
numerical preponderance led the British East India Company to go on to 150,000 mercenaries in 
1815.140  
By the eighteenth century, the mercenary trade expanded as states hired large mercenary 
contingents to address the increasing scope of warfare. All of the major armies relied on 
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contracted labor as mercenaries constituted half of the Prussian army, a quarter of the British, a 
third of the Spanish, and a third of the French.141 The world’s most powerful militaries could not 
compete without mercenary manpower. Napoleon himself employed ex-royals as cooks as well 
as a Polish and Austrian corps.142 The significance of contracted cooks is made evident by 
Napoleon’s famous quote “An army marches on its stomach.”143  
While contractor manpower significantly enhanced the ability of militaries to win, it is 
not to say that manpower was the only contribution mercenaries made. Contractor expertise 
proved integral for the American victory in its revolutionary war. 144 In 1778, American forces 
numbered no more than 20,000 at a time and were pitted against a British army consisting of 
80,000 troops to include over 30,000 German (Hessian) mercenaries.145 The United States 
employed, for example, Prussian officer Baron von Steuben to train troops. Steuben published 
the first field manual that was used as the official guide to military training and maneuvers until 
1812.146 The manual helped professionalize the US Army helping it to overcome inferior 
numbers.147  In addition, the US employed the Marquis de Lafayette who was a known for his 
leadership and led the defeat of numerically superior Hessian forces at the Battle of 
Brandywine.148 Thus, contractor manpower was not the only way that military contracting 
impacted the battlefield and the revelation prompted states to rethink their military’s 
composition. 
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Although low levels of military contracting continued, hiring individual mercenaries had 
largely disappeared by the late eighteenth century.149 One explanation suggests that the decline 
was caused by the increased demands on military labor from developments in military 
technology, strategy, and tactics and the increased levels of competition caused by population 
growth and territorial expansion. 150 In other words, manpower demands were so significant and 
important to victory that states began to reassess how they raised their manpower. Rather than 
rely on vast and expensive mercenary contingents, states sought to pursue increases in military 
effectiveness by meeting the demand for additional labor through conscription and compulsory 
service.151 States mobilized their own populations on a previously unknown scale because they 
believed that their citizenry was a greater, more consistent, and less expensive source of labor. 
Mobilization led to the establishment of the citizen army. The citizen-army displaced the 
monetary incentives required for the existence of mercenaries.152 Therefore, the ability of states 
to meet their demand of military labor through citizen-armies caused the decline of mercenarism. 
However, military contracting continued to be undertaken on a small scale. 
The contrast between mercenaries employed in ancient warfare and those employed 
through the nineteenth century demonstrate the growing diversification of contractors and the 
development of military contracting. As militaries became more specialized they required more 
skilled personnel. At the beginning of Phase I, the goal of military contracting was only to 
increase unskilled manpower levels. Superior manpower meant victory because warfare was 
unskilled. However, the change in the character of warfare and the technology employed to wage 
it caused states to demand skilled labor from the market. Skill meant that the contractor had 
training and/or experience. To illustrate, dividing the army into infantry, artillery, and cavalry 
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units required specially trained and proficient personnel to operate in each of these capacities. 
Moreover, specially trained personnel were also in higher demand, as advanced weaponry, such 
as cannons, for example, required more technical expertise. This indicated that manpower, 
although necessary, was no longer sufficient to achieve victory. As a result, mercenaries became 
more organized to become more skilled. 
At the beginning of WWI, contractors served as a source of skilled manpower to operate 
the introduction of radical firepower to the battlefield. Phase II describes the diversification and 
expansion of military contractor functions. Contractor development following 1918, as Phase II 
illustrates, parallels advancements in battlefield technology.  
 
2.3 Phase II: Technology—Military Contracting from World War One to the End of the 
Cold War 
 
The end of Phase I demonstrated that military contracting transitioned from supplying 
unskilled manpower during massed warfare to supplying more skilled manpower as warfare 
became more complex. Phase I ended with the decline of military contracting on a large scale. 
From World War One (WWI) through to the end of the Cold War (Phase II), military contracting 
existed only on a small scale. In Phase II, ninety percent of the world’s armed forces recruited 
exclusively from within the state.153 However, complex warfare forced states to contract in order 
to fill the manpower requirements of advanced weaponry.154 For example, contractors were 
employed for their specialized cutting-edge expertise in “state of the art” technology, which was 
sought by states to provide additional firepower and heightened lethality to their militaries. Thus, 
the focus of contracting evolved to become a support feature in order for a military to utilized 
advanced technology. However, the purpose of military contracting remained unchanged: to 
enhance a military’s ability to field, fight, and win wars.   
The advancement of technology on the battlefield meant that the quality of manpower 
became more important to victory than the quantity of manpower. Phase II demonstrates that 
military contracting reflected this trend. However, this is not to say that military contracting for 
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manpower became obsolete. In fact, although contracting for technological sophistication 
became more important during Phase II, the emphasis of contracting remained on manpower.  
Phase II begins with the introduction of radical firepower to the battlefield in 1918. The 
introduction, in the form of artillery, spurred the re-emergence of military contracting by 
increasing the demand on labor. Artillery represented a technological shift in warfare as new 
firepower enabled fewer personnel to kill larger groups of enemy combatants. As the tools of war 
became more advanced, the importance of the quantity of manpower was marginalized for those 
possessing modern technology. Manpower was made more important for those that did not 
possess that technology. For those possessing and employing radical firepower, higher personnel 
numbers were required to operate and maintain the new weapons. In addition, states required 
additional personnel to offset the increased fatalities they faced in the field as seen in WWI. The 
increased demand for manpower on both sides of “no man’s land” caused the world’s armies to 
look beyond their own state population for a supply of military labor. Subsequently, states began 
employing contractors to meet the skilled and unskilled labor requirements of the war.  
The practice of contracting to obtain skilled labor carried over from WWI to WWII, and 
beyond. In fact, technological innovation intensified states’ needs for additional contractors to 
field an effective fighting force. States began employing contractors to either augment their 
standing armies or as ad hoc forces.155 For example, the increasingly technological and complex 
military equipment caused the US to employ contractors as technical specialists on a conflict-
need basis. The US increased its military contractor usage from one contractor to twenty-four 
military personnel in WWI to one contractor to seven soldiers during WWII.156  
Conflicts in Spain, the Congo, Yemen, Oman, Nigeria, Comoro Islands, Angola, 
Rhodesia, and Vietnam all had contractors on the battlefield.157 The majority of the demand for 
military contractors came from Africa throughout the 1960s and 1970s and 1980s. The demand 
was largely met by hiring individuals from developed states. During this time period, infamous 
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mercenaries like Irishman “Mad” Mike Hoare and Frenchman Bob Denard were involved in 
conflicts surrounding decolonization.158 Mercenaries assisted national liberation groups in 
Angola and Nigeria, as well as sought to destabilize the governments of Benin, the Comoro 
Islands, the Congo, and the Seychelles.159 In engaging in these operations, contractors served as 
a source of advanced weapons technology and skill that improved their employers’ chances of 
victory.160  
While several mercenaries were employed throughout Africa, Frenchman Bob Denard is 
perhaps the best-known and most prolific mercenary during this time period. Denard provided 
developing states with advanced skills and weaponry. Both the Congolese government and the 
rebels intermittently employed him from 1960 to 1968. Denard’s forty-five man team was also 
hired by the Yemeni Royalists in their civil war in 1963. In 1975, Denard was hired to overthrow 
the president of the Comoro Islands. After Denard succeeded, he was then hired by the deposed 
president to overthrow the president he helped put into power. Denard was successful in both 
missions and employed only a group of fifty mercenaries armed with sawed-off shotguns and 
hand grenades.161  
Other mercenaries operating during this phase also provided technological capabilities 
and skilled personnel typically numbering between thirty to several hundred men.162 These 
mercenaries provided specific expertise and were explicitly supported by the governments that 
employed them and often implicitly supported by foreign governments, as was the case with Bob 
Denard and France. In commenting on Denard’s mercenary role, a former head of France’s 
foreign intelligence service stated that, “When special services are unable to undertake certain 
kinds of undercover operation [sic], they use parallel structures.”163 This suggests that in 
particular circumstances mercenaries were uniquely suited to and important for achieving state 
policy goals, which was not only limited to France. 
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For instance, although not actively employed for battle, Saudi Arabia also employed 
contractors in the form of Pakistani troops to serve in their military from the 1950s to the 1980s. 
12,000 specially trained Pakistani troops were employed to serve in technical positions as well as 
serve in “infantry, armored, and anti-aircraft units.”164 In return, Saudi Arabia provides Pakistan 
with one billion dollars in annual aid.165 In 1982, as many as 30,000 Pakistanis were employed 
within Saudi Arabia.166 
In Vietnam,167 the increasingly technological and complex military equipment and 
hardware caused the US to rely on contractors as technical specialists. The US employed 
contractors for traditional logistical support functions to the military like medical care, 
transportation, and engineering as well as technical functions.168 The US acquired contractors 
from South Korea, the Philippines, and Thailand militaries and paid for them on a per capita 
basis.169 These contractors were employed “side by side with deployed military personnel”170 at 
a rate of one contractor per every five troops in Vietnam.171 
Contractors operating during Phase II evidence two trends. First, contractors employed 
by developed states indicate a continued transition from employing unskilled mercentary to 
increase manpower to employing them to enhance technological sophistication. Second, military 
contracting by developing states, particularly in decolonized Africa, shifted from employing 
unskilled to skilled contractors organized in corporate military contracting companies. The fact 
that the majority of contractors employed in Africa hailed from developed states with advanced 
militaries demonstrates this point clearly.172 These Phase II trends foreshadowed the rise in the 
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importance of technology and the corporatization of the private military industry that would take 
place following the end of the Cold War. 
 
2.4 Phase III: The Synergy of Manpower and Technology—Military Contracting from the 
End of the Cold War to the Twenty-First Century 
 
 Phase II demonstrated that military contracting was changing for two reasons. First, skill 
continued to become a more important factor on the battlefield, which meant that contractors 
were hired to perform technical work as well as fill manpower requirements. Second, the 
organizations that provided contracting services began to change. For example, mercenaries 
became public figures as those like Denard gained an international reputation that helped them 
gain employment globally. The changes in Phase II paved the way for the corporatization of 
military contracting following the Cold War and the employment of military contractors to 
increase both manpower and technical sophistication. Consequently, Phase II military 
contracting provided the necessary foundation for the re-emergence of contracting on a large 
scale and the use of contracting to increase manpower and technology in the pursuit of military 
effectiveness. Phase III illustrates the diversification of military contracting and its development 
from supplying only manpower to supplying both manpower and facilitating technological 
sophistication.  
Prior to the end of the Cold War, developed states did not employ military contractors on 
a large scale because contractors focused on combat operations. The end of the Cold War 
brought a complex of developments that intensified the unskilled to skilled movement that cause 
the use of military contracting to increase dramatically. The major change following the end of 
the Cold war was that military contracting underwent corporatization.173 The result was a 
“private” company that possesses internal structures similar to those of business corporations.  
 The primary difference between mercenaries and today’s military contractors is that 
corporatization caused the military contracting to become more complex and organized. 
Corporatization stratified military contracting by creating the private company. In other words, 
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instead of individual mercenaries banding together and offering their services directly, private 
companies like Executive Outcomes and MPRI, for example, act as the middlemen between 
individual contractors and the contracting entity. As such, these companies bid on contracts and 
then select, train, and deploy individual contractors in the fulfillment of those contracts. 
Contracts are typically awarded based on the professional experience and performance of 
companies on previous contracts. Private companies are often publicly traded on international 
stock exchanges and publicly advertise their services.174 As such, companies are highly visible in 
order to attract clients. In contrast, mercenaries tended to be far less visible as a consequence of 
their smaller size and their lower budget. 
Another feature that Phase III that differentiates mercenaries from contemporary military 
contractors is that PMSCs are truly transnational in nature as, in 2014, they operate in over one 
hundred countries and have the capability to hire hundreds of thousands of men representing at 
five or six different nationalities at a moment’s notice.175 In addition, individual contractors 
answer only to the company and not to international law where mercenaries, at least in theory, 
fell under international customary law. In turn, domestic or international law does not bind the 
company to such legal agreements.176  Instead, the company is legally bound only by the terms 
of their contract.177  
These companies are generally referred to as private military and security companies 
(PMSCs), and the personnel they employ, as military contractors.178 PMSCs globally source 
skilled and unskilled military labor and are therefore more responsive to market demands. The 
global reach enables them to draw from a larger supply of global contractors that can easily 
leverage technological sophistication. The globalization of military contracting intensified the 
unskilled to skilled trend which caused the re-emergence of military contracting on a large scale. 
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The return of military contracting began with the end of the Cold War. The demise of the 
Soviet Union meant that funding military operations on a global scale, particularly in regions 
such Africa and the Middle East, was no longer possible for the Soviet Union or necessary for 
the United States.179 As a consequence, long-suppressed cultural tensions came to the fore as 
governments previously supported by superpower funding became vulnerable to their citizenry. 
In addition, escalating cultural tensions increased the demand for military labor and equipment 
so that sub-governmental groups could provide themselves with security.  
In addition, the collapse of the Soviet Union meant that Western militaries designed for 
hegemonic full-scale conventional warfare were made superfluous. As a response, Western 
militaries began to downsize. To illustrate, the world's military forces fell from approximately 
28,320,000 in 1987 to 23, 500,000 in 1994.180 In an effort to lower military costs and become 
more efficient, states like the US and UK began to specialize their militaries in “core 
competencies” and outsource non-core competencies to the private sector in order to reduce 
force numbers. 181 The number of active personnel in the US military decreased from 
approximately 2,130,000 in 1989 to 1,384,000 in 2000.182 Simultaneously, the market was 
flooded with Soviet military equipment and labor helping to transform cultural tension in Third 
World countries into cultural violence. Taken together, violence and instability escalated at a 
time when Western states were less capable and less willing to engage in military conflicts. 
These factors led to the revival of military contracting in corporate form and the re-
emergence of military contracting on a large scale. Western states needed a proxy to engage in 
warfare and developing states needed developed capabilities. As such, the private military and 
security industry flourished as the demand for their services was high and the barriers to entry 
were low given the availability of inexpensive Soviet weaponry.183  
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2.4.1 Post-Cold War Military Contracting by Developing African States  
 
Since the Cold War, military contractors have been used by developing and developed 
states as well as non-governmental entities. Developed states, such as the US and UK for 
example, directly hire military contractors to provide additional capabilities, that were once 
performed by military personnel. In addition, military contractors are also hired by developed 
states to provide training or other services to foreign governments, as was the case with the US 
paying for military contractors operating in the Balkans. Developing government entities such as 
states, regimes, or rebel movements or non-governmental entities also employ military 
contractors to serve as their military. The key reason for employing military contractors is for 
their skill and technological sophistication. Phase III is resplendent with examples of small 
numbers of military contractors overcoming numerical inferiority to win on the battlefield.184  
Immediately following the Cold War, military contractors were primarily employed in 
developing African states. PMCs first found significant employment in Africa (Angola, Central 
African Republic, Congo, Kenya, Sierra Leone, Uganda, and Rwanda, for example). Military 
contracting companies, such as the South African PMC Executive Outcomes (EO) and the 
British PMC Sandline International, provided increased technology and weapons capabilities to 
African states with limited military capacity. At first, both companies were hired to conduct 
passive security for natural resource companies.185 Passive security then evolved into active 
security as the companies supplyied arms and engaged in coup d’états.186 EO and Sandline 
served as a last resort to end rebel movements, and in operating in that capacity, executed 
missions in the same manner as a national army.187 The use of military contractors caused 
increases in military effectiveness for material and non-material reasons. 
In 1992, Gulf Chevron and Sonangol hired Executive Outcomes to protect their assets in 
Angola. A year later in 1993, fifty EO contractors commenced combat operations against 
hundreds of National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (U.N.ITA) rebels in order to 
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recover the companies’ facilities on the Soyo oilfields.188 After a week of hostilities, EO gained 
control of the oilfields. Following EO’s withdrawal a few weeks after hostilities ended, the rebels 
recaptured the oilfield prompting the Angolan government to offer the company another 
contract. 
In fulfillment of its second contract (1993-1994), EO trained between 4,000-5,000 
Angolan troops and assisted in combat operations.189 EO-run operations forced the rebels to pull 
out of the territory by November 1994 ending three years of civil war that led to diplomatic 
negotiations in 1995.190 According to Isenberg, EO killed 300 rebels in recovering the oilfields 
while employing no more than 500 contractors at a single period of time.191 EO was therefore 
able to overcome inferior personnel numbers to achieve mission success.  
Following the recovery of the oilfields in Angola, EO was then hired by Sierra Leone in 
1995 to “support, train, and aid” the Republic of Sierra Leone Military Forces (RSLMF) against 
the Rebel United Front (RUF).192 EO provided training, intelligence, combat assistance and the 
use of its radar in order to push the RUF away from the Sierra Leone capital and recover a 
titanium oxide mine and a bauxite mine.193 EO employed no more than 250 men that were 
responsible for killing several hundred rebels and causing over a thousand to desert.194 EO 
fulfilled their contract after nine days of hostilities forcing the RUF to sign a peace accord in 
1996. 195   
In succeeding in both Angola and Sierra Leone, EO employed highly skilled contractors 
and modern weapon technology against lightly armed unskilled rebels. For instance, EO 
possessed Soviet era fixed wing and rotary wing aircraft to included MI-17 helicopter troop 
carriers and was supported by MI-24 helicopter gunships, Soviet-made ground attack aircraft.196 
In addition, EO had at its disposal Boeing 727 and Andover transport aircraft used for casualty 
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evacuation, Swiss Pilatus planes that fired air-to-ground rockets, radio intercept systems, and 
Land Rovers mounted with anti-aircraft guns and artillery.197 The relative sophistication of EO’s 
technology compared to the rebels suggests that technology played a significant role in enabling 
contractors to overcome inferior personnel numbers. The result of Sandline International in 
Sierra Leone substantiates EO’s experience in Africa. 
In 1997, Sandline International was also hired by Sierra Leone. The company was 
contracted to train and equip the militia, plan the strategy for assault, provide arms, ammunition, 
transportation, food, and air support as well as coordinate joint forces and gather intelligence.198  
Sandline was well resourced in fighting rebels. The company possessed MI-17 and MI-24 assault 
helicopters, 57mm rocket launchers and grenade launcher systems.199 Sandline succeeded in 
restoring its client to power in which technology played a critical part. 
Despite EO and Sandline being critical to ending rebel movements, both companies went 
out of business: EO in 1998 and Sandline in 2004. The cause of their demise was that their 
involvement in weak African states led to the decline of local state governance as well as the 
decline of local military response, which caused controversy.200 In addition, few states were able 
to to afford their combat services. These points combined to cause a shift in the private military 
industry away from catering to developing states and executing combat missions. Instead, 
contracting companies began to cater to developed states that are less interested in combat 
services and more interested in combat-support services. As a result, the private military and 
security industry began to provide less central military functions and grew to be worth as much 
as $100 billion.201 
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2.4.2 Post-Cold War Military Contracting by Developed States  
 
The military contracting industry’s shift away from combat operations caused developed 
states to more readily hire them. In the First Gulf War (1990-1991), technological advantages in 
communications enabled developed states representing coalition forces to wage network-centric 
warfare in order to repel occupying Iraqi forces from Kuwait. Later, in the Bosnian War (1992-
1995), US-sponsored PMSCs provided advanced technology and military doctrine enabling 
Croatian forces to dominate the battlefield which forced diplomatic negotiations and ended 
hostilities. Contractors made these advantages possible by providing a range of services and 
goods, such as logistical functions, to augment already technologically superior US and UK 
forces.202 The combination of skill and superior weapons and technology with enhanced force 
employment methods enabled states employing contractors to be victorious against numerically 
and technologically inferior militaries with less developed force employment methods.  
Military contractors were employed in Iraq to provide immediate support to a downsized 
post-Cold War military. The US demonstrated a “[g]rowing reliance on contractors to support 
the latest weapons and provide lifetime support of the systems.”203 The US employed nine 
thousand contractors to provide operational support for capabilities such as TOW and Patriot 
missiles, M1A1 tanks, and Bradley fighting vehicles.204 In the Balkans, military contractors from 
American companies such as Military Professional Resources International (MPRI) were 
employed to fill the immediate operational needs of the Croatian military. Contractors provided 
extensive military training and functioned in a range of tasks from training the Croatian army to 
camp building.205 In addition, contractors were used by the US so that it could bypass United 
Nations arms embargoes placed on the Balkans and give military assistance to the region without 
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having direct involvement.206 Using military contractors enable the US to avoid taking the issue 
of involvement to Congress or the American public.207   
In 1995, MPRI signed two contracts to provide doctrinal advice and aid in scenario 
planning. During the Balkan war, contractors began to have a more active role in providing 
military assistance and began providing logistical and combat support, and even accompanied 
the Croatian military on the battlefield.208 With MPRI’s assistance, the Croatian military 
reversed the defeats they suffered from the Bosnians, enabling them to recover nearly all of 
Croatia’s territory as well as twenty percent of Bosnia.209 The more active role military 
contractor played caused the number employed to expand to twenty thousand contractors,210 
making it the first time in modern history that contractors were used at a one-contractor-to-one-
soldier ratio.211  
 
2.4.3: Military Contracting Post-September 11, 2001 
 
The end of the Cold War created the environment required for military contracting to re-
emerge on a large scale. The post-9/11 period is when the re-emergence of military contracting 
on an unprecedented scale actually occurred. Similar to the environment following the Cold War, 
the cause of the post-9/11 private boom was due to a lack of military labor and an increase in 
global violence. Unlike the post-Cold War environment, developed states were now willing to 
address global security threats and engage in conflicts. The private military and security industry 
was capable of supplying the manpower and technology and states sought to employ them to 
both increase the manpower levels and technological sophistication of their militaries in order to 
enhance military effectiveness.   
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Military contracting dramatically expanded as a response to the emerging international 
security threat that terrorism posed. The infamous PMSC named Blackwater got its first major 
contract in 2000 following the al-Qaeda bombing of the USS Cole in the Gulf of Yemen. 
Blackwater was hired by the US Navy to train more than 100,000 seamen in the use of small 
arms.212 Following the September 11, 2001 attacks, contractors proved critical to fighting 
terrorism as states sought to gain increased security through employing contractor manpower and 
technology.  
For example, the Global War on Terror (GWOT) was a United States-led response to the 
September 11th attacks that required contractor support. The GWOT began with Operation 
Enduring Freedom (OEF) when the US and UK deployed troops to Afghanistan on October 7, 
2001.213 The two primary operations of the GWOT were Operation Enduring Freedom in 
Afghanistan (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) in Iraq. The US heavily employed 
military contractors in both of these operations. 
OEF and OIF proved to be a boon for the military contracting industry in several ways. 
First, militaries like the US remained small relative to their Cold War size thereby requiring 
private support for wartime as well as emergency operations.214 Second, fighting in Afghanistan 
and Iraq simultaneously put heavy demands on military labor. Third, the decision to engage in 
two theaters of war with a small but highly technological force meant that the military required 
technical expertise that it did not possess.215 Fourth, the unforeseen problems that the coalition 
faced in OEF and OIF stretched coalition resources thin. The coalition sought to deal with these 
setbacks by surging forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. These factors combined, led the US to 
employ contractors so that it could increase security, enable governance, and foster development 
in fulfillment of its counterinsurgency policy.216 
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Specifically, policymakers sought to employ contractors to enhance military effectiveness 
by increasing the manpower available to the force. Military contractors working for PMSCs were 
hired because they deployed faster than a similarly skilled and sized military force. Second, 
PMSCs could be hired and fired quickly allowing states to save money and more easily adapt 
their militaries to the changing strategic environment. Third, contractors provided expertise in 
specialized fields that the government workforce lacked, such as linguistics, cultural knowledge, 
and technical weapons systems. Fourth, and most importantly, contractors served as a force 
multiplier it is argued, by expanding the amount of resources (manpower and technology) 
immediately available to the military. The expansion of manpower allowed uniformed personnel 
to focus on conducting combat operations. The logic of military contracting was that increased 
manpower and increased technology would lead to increased effectiveness.  
In using contractors to provide a more preponderant and technologically sophisticated 
military, the demand for contracting companies escalated. As a consequence, the range of 
functions and the amount of contractors employed dramatically grew. Prior to 9/11, contractors 
were used primarily to function as traditional logistical support by providing services in 
industries such as construction, transport, telecommunications, linguistic support, food, laundry, 
and administrative services.217 Post-9/11, contractors had a more active role in providing military 
assistance extending beyond traditional support to function as direct combat support.218 For 
instance, contractors provide combat support, which includes occupying roles such as 
interrogators in prisons, translators for combat units, security guards for convoys and forward 
operating bases.219 Contractor tasks also include force training, training local security, site 
security, and crime control (both private policing personnel and police training), intelligence, 
counterinsurgency, anti-terrorism, and other special operations. In addition, contractors provide 
military advice and command armed battlefield operations and operational support in areas such 
as weapons, transportation, and communications/control systems as well as agricultural technical 
assistance.220 The expansion of contracting to these new sectors caused the US to employ 
contractors at an unprecedented level.  
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The expansion of functions performed by contractors led to them being employed at 
unprecedented levels in Iraq as DoD-hired contractors outnumbered US troops in 2007 by 20,000 
equaling a ratio of eight servicemen to nine private contractors.221 In fact, contractors were so 
widely used that the private military industry became the second largest contributor to the 
“coalition of the willing” 222 and was subsequently referred to by some as the “fifth branch of the 
military.”223 In 2013, the number of DoD-hired contractors operating in Afghanistan was 
108,000 to 65,700 servicemen equaling a ratio of 1.6 contractors per serviceman.224  
Not only did the scope and scale of contracting expand in the third phase of military 
contracting, but it also deepened. Today, contractors perform tasks “critical to the US military’s 
core missions” that were previously provided by uniformed personnel. These tasks include 
conducting army aviation training, performing maintenance and administration duties for F-117 
stealth fighters, the B-2 stealth bomber, the U-2 reconnaissance plane, duties for naval surface 
ships, as well as training naval personnel in small arms.225 In particular, the US relies on military 
contractors to operate a range of technological equipment from unmanned aerial vehicles 
(UAVs) and the data links they used to transmit information to guided missile systems aboard its 
ships as well as commercial communications systems.226 
The use of military contractors by developed states is not limited to the operations in Iraq 
and Afghanistan. Today contractors continue to be employed to address emerging international 
security threats ranging from civil war to maritime piracy in a variety of states to include Yemen, 
Libya, the Congo, Somalia, and Syria.227 In addition, contractors now protect the provision of 
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humanitarian aid.228 The reason that governmental and non-governmental actors employ them is 
because these actors associate manpower with increased security.229 
 
2.5 What Can We Learn From Military Contracting History?  
 
The survey of military contracting demonstrates that military contracting evolved in 
complexity as states engaged in progressively more complex warfare. The state need for 
increasingly skilled manpower and advanced technology forced contractors to become more 
skilled and technological. Whether or not, and to what extent, military contractors were hired has 
depended on the contracting state’s idea of how military contractors could help cause victory. 
For example, the perception that numerically superior forces dominated the battlefield in Phase I 
led to the policy of contracting for manpower. The perception that modern weapons dominated 
the battlefield in Phase II caused states to hire military contractors that were technically 
proficient. The perception that both skilled manpower and technological sophistication 
dominated the battlefield in Phase III led to the policy of contracting for numerical and technical 
superiority. However, despite the evolution alongside the complexity of war, military contracting 
lacked a theory for force employment which caused each phase to begin with an overemphasis 
on contracting for manpower and an under-emphasis on the need for force employment methods. 
The three-phase meta-survey conducted in this chapter confirms the omnipotence of 
military contracting throughout history. Using history as a guide, the use of military contractors 
indicates that they will continue to be used in the future, especially considering the growth of the 
industry following the September 11th attacks. The relative permanence of using the military 
contracting industry to enhance military effectiveness suggests that understanding the 
intersection of military contracting and military effectiveness is important when addressing 
emerging security threats. As such, lessons learned from history can be used to inform future 
practice.  
This thesis draws two lessons from the survey. First, that semantic accuracy is needed to 
understand the provision of services that the military contracting industry supplies. Second, that 
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the relationship between military contracting and battlefield outcomes can be best understood 
using three broad terms: military effectiveness, numerical preponderance, and technology.  
 
 
 
 
2.6 Defining Military Contracting 
 
 First of all, the practice of military contracting has been known by different names 
throughout history. The different terms have led to confusion as to what each term means to the 
practice of military contracting. For instance, in discussing the differences between mercenaries 
and military contractors, some go as far as to say that it is “unfair” to label military contractors 
working for PMSCs as mercenaries.230 On the other hand, others like former Secretary General 
of the United Nations Kofi Annan, for example, suggest that there is no “distinction between 
respectable mercenaries and non-respectable mercenaries.”231 More recent definitions of military 
contractors working for private military companies and private security companies have also 
sparked confusion and debate. 
 Following the corporatization of military contracting, the first “private” company to 
emerge was called a private military company (PMC). Shearer (1998) coined the term PMC and 
defined it as an organization that operates to have “a strategic impact on the security and 
political environments of weak states facing a significant military threat.”232 According to 
Shearer, PMCs are companies that deliver only military services such as “military assessments 
and training as well as, occasionally, supplying equipment to a state’s security forces; direct 
involvement in a conflict is less common.”233 
 PMCs are contrasted with private security companies (PSCs). PSCs are companies that 
deliver only security services. According to Avant, PSCs perform logistics, operational support, 
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and training.234 Although there is a clear definitional difference between PMCs and PSCs, the 
demarcation in practices is less clear. The development of military contracting over the years has 
made it “quite different from the traditional private security industry that provides watchmen and 
building security.”235 To illustrate the change, it is now possible for a single company to occupy 
PMC and PSC tasks simultaneously. 236  
This thesis uses the term “military contracting” to avoid the definitional confusion and 
pejorative connotations, and provide a clearer understanding of military contracting. The term 
‘military contracting’ is used to mean the provision of a military service or product previously 
produced exclusively by the public sector.237 Military contractors are those private individuals 
hired to provide a good or service, which encompasses mercenaries and those working for PMCs 
and PSC. More specifically, military companies are referred to generally as private military and 
security companies (PMSCs).238 As such, PMSCs provide a range of services including logistics, 
operations support of weapons systems, training, interpreting, interrogating and conducting 
personal security.239 The term PMSC is similar to Singer’s “privatized military firm” (PMF).240 
Thus, PMSCs encompass the provision of not only traditional logistical support but also front-
line combat support both armed and unarmed. 241 
 
2.7 Understanding the Terms: Military Effectiveness, Numerical Preponderance, and 
Technology 
 
 The second lesson that emerged from the historical survey is key terms help inform the 
intersection of military contracting and military effectiveness. Specifically, the practice of 
employing military contractors from antiquity to modern war revolves around three key terms, 
which are useful for understanding PMSCs. Military effectiveness is of particular note to this 
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thesis, which as a reminder, argues that in order to translate contractor resources into enhanced 
military effectiveness, a military must first learn how to employ those resources. Numerical 
preponderance and technology represent unique perspectives of the key factors of military 
effectiveness. 
 
 
2.7.1 Military Effectiveness  
 
 Military effectiveness is a very broad term. Consequently, in order to better understand 
the impact military contracting has on military effectiveness, a more specific definition must be 
constructed. In simple terms, effectiveness is defined as “producing a result that is wanted.”242 
This thesis defines military effectiveness as the military’s ability to achieve strategic objectives. 
Therefore, an effective wartime military is one that can effectively project power and bend the 
enemy’s will through physical force.243  
The ability of a military to bring physical force to bear on the battlefield against an 
enemy is called military power.244 Military power is critical to victory and was enshrined by 
Thucydides in his timeless account of the Melian dialogue: “The strong do what they have the 
power to do and the weak accept what they must.”245 Superior physical force helps enable a 
military to control territory, inflict enemy losses while limiting its own losses, and prevail 
quickly.246 Therefore, a powerful military is more capable of forcing its enemy to capitulate by 
causing or threatening to cause physical damage. The more power a military has relative to its 
enemy the easier it is for it to achieve victory.247 Thus, power is critical to a military’s 
effectiveness.  
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Power used on the battlefield translates into effectiveness in one of two ways. First, 
power enables a military to inflict enough damage to render its enemy physically incapable of 
continuing the prosecution of war, as was the case with Germany in WWII. Second, power can 
break the enemy’s will to fight by making the enemy’s costs exceed the value of their political 
goal or by making victory improbable as was the case with Japan in WWII.248 The precise 
amount of damage required for victory depends on the goals of war and the physical 
characteristics of the armed forces committed to its prosecution. 
Military power itself is the outcome of the military’s ability to maximize its resources and 
pit personal strengths against enemy weaknesses. According to Gentry, “Military power is best 
characterized by the extent to which actors’ strategic political-military goals, including, but not 
restricted to, battlefield victory, are achieved.”249 For Millett and Murray, “A fully effective 
military is one that derives maximum combat power form the resources physically and politically 
available.”250 In addition, Brooks states that military power is created “from a state’s basic 
resources in wealth, technology, population size, and human capital.”251 These statements 
suggest that material and non-material resources are critical to a military’s ability to project 
power and use that power effectively. Of particular interest to this thesis is the military’s ability 
to optimally employ private military resources to these ends. A more in-depth discussion on 
resources, military effectiveness, and military contracting is conducted in Chapters Four and 
Five. 
 
2.7.2 The Numerical Preponderance and Manpower Perspectives of Military Effectiveness 
 
One perspective of understanding military power is one that asserts that numerical 
preponderance is the most significant determinant of military power. Numerical preponderance is 
a composite measure of a belligerent’s population and wealth as well as the number of personnel 
in its military and the level of its military expenditure.252 Numerical preponderance suggests that 
the greater a state’s numerical preponderance, the more powerful it is assumed to be on the 
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battlefield. Thus, states with larger populations, more advanced economies, and larger defense 
budgets, field bigger militaries more likely to win wars because they can raise more manpower 
than their opponents. Consequently, manpower is the central feature of numerical preponderance 
and is the principle concept underlying contemporary military contracting policies. 
Manpower is defined as the “power available from or supplied by the physical effort of 
human beings.”253 In war, manpower is critical to victory because personnel are the primary 
means by which wars are fought. Without personnel force could not be brought to bear on the 
battlefield. The common assumption the manpower perspective makes is that the more 
manpower a military possesses, the higher the likelihood it has of being victorious.  
Proponents of the manpower perspective support their argument with quotes from famous 
military strategists exemplifying the importance of manpower. For instance, Napoleon states that 
“God is on the side of the big battalions.”254 General George Patton went as far as saying, “Wars 
may be fought with weapons, but they are won by men.”255 The importance of manpower to 
victory is illustrated by the victory of the Prussians in the Prussian War of 1870 and the Russians 
over the Germans in World War Two. In addition, the manpower perspective is one of the 
reasons for the consistent employment of military contracting throughout history.  
 
2.7.3: Technology  
 
 Another perspective to explain military effectiveness is one that emphasizes technology. 
Technologists assert that technology has been the primary source of warfare development 
throughout history. Technology is “the use of science in industry, engineering, etc., to invent 
useful things or to solve problems.”256 More generally, technology is the “process of 
manipulating the material world for human purposes.”257 Therefore, military technology is the 
                                                          
253 “Manpower.” Merriam-Webster.com (2011), accessed October 11, 2014, http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/mapower. 
254 John Bartlett, Familiar Quotations, 10th ed. (Boston, MA: Little, Brown, 1919), no. 9707 in Biddle, Military 
Power, 14. 
255 General George S. Patton, “George S. Patton Quotations,” (2009), accessed October 11, 2014, 
http://www.military-quotes.com/Patton.htm (February 19, 2014). 
256 “Technology.”Merriam-Webster.com (2011), accessed October 11, 2014, http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/technology (accessed February 19, 2014). 
257 Alex Roland, “War and Technology” The Newsletter of FPRI’s Wachman Center, vol. 14, no. 2 (February 2009) 
accessed October 16, 2014, http://www.fpri.org/footnotes/1402.200902.roland.wartechnology.html. 
58 
 
use of science in warfare to achieve the goals of war. Examples of technology include 
gunpowder, airplanes, radios, tanks, drones, microchips, ships, global positioning systems (GPS), 
and nuclear capabilities. Technology has been referred to as a “catalyst” in warfare and has been 
said to “define war” suggesting that it is a critical determinant of victory.258 
Advancements in military technology have contributed to the ability of manpower to 
engage in warfare more effectively. Technology has multiplied the relative effectiveness of each 
individual that possesses superior technology while drastically diminishing the relative 
effectiveness of those that do not possess it. For example, militaries that adopted chariots 
between the eighteenth century BCE and the second millennium BCE dominated land warfare.259 
More recently, radical firepower introduced in 1918 enabled militaries to attack their enemy 
from beyond where their enemy could attack them. The importance of technological superiority 
to victory is most clearly evidenced in the US-led coalition’s victory over Iraq in the Persian 
Gulf War (1991). In the Gulf War, weapons technology asymmetry enabled the “state of the art” 
Coalition force to achieve decisive victory against a technologically obsolete Iraqi force after 
only one hundred hours of hostilities. Technological firepower thus makes it possible for 
militaries with inferior manpower to overcome significantly larger enemies.260 Technological 
advances have made it imperative for belligerents to increase the number of personnel employed, 
or adopt new technologies, or are rendered incapable of engaging in battle. Despite the recent 
dominance of technology in Strategic Studies, as seen in the prominence of the revolution in 
military affairs (RMA) thesis, manpower is still held as being the primary purpose of military 
contracting. 
This chapter sought to survey the practice of military contracting from antiquity to the 
present. It found that military contractors matter in the past and present and, judging by current 
trends in warfare, will continue to matter in future wars, conflicts, and matters of state security 
and survival. Moreover, the chapter introduced three key terms – numerical preponderance, 
manpower, technology, and military effectiveness – that the practice of military contracting 
revolves around. The aim of this chapter was to illustrate that military contracting in practice 
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matters to military effectiveness. In theory, however, is a different matter. Considering the 
historical prominence of military contractors on the battlefield, it would be expected for there to 
be a burgeoning amount of theoretical literature relating to what military contractors are and the 
roles they play as well as how they can help enhance a military achieve victory. However, as the 
next chapter demonstrates, the thesis finds the theoretical literature on military contracting 
lacking.  
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CHAPTER THREE – THE THEORY BEHIND MILITARY CONTRACTING 
  
Chapter Two explained that military contractors have been regularly employed 
throughout history to boost a military’s effectiveness. Chiefly, this chapter argues that a theory of 
military contracting does not exist. While Chapter Two showed that military contracting could be 
found across history (with a lull between the late eighteenth century to the late twentieth 
century), the same cannot be said of theory. In fact, it is only in the past half century that the 
theoretical literature has only recently begun to develop, and this, arguably, is lacking too. These 
and other arguments will be explored and reified throughout this chapter.  
Chapter Three conducts a literature review of military contracting in relation to war and 
military effectiveness. Similar to Chapter Two, it focuses on the ontology of military contracting. 
It is broken into four sections. First, the chapter begins by explaining how academics and 
scholars study the phenomenon of war by outlining specific fields of study. Next, it reviews the 
classic literature on war and relates it to military contracting before turning to the contemporary 
literature in section three. The chapter then critiques the military contracting literature revealing 
its strengths and weaknesses and denoting the ‘gap’ in the literature that this thesis intends to fill. 
Fourth, the chapter demonstrates that the evolution of strategic theory has not been carried over 
to military contracting. The chapter closes by introducing the rules of thumb used to predict 
victory and defeat based on manpower balances.  
 
3.1 Part One - Situating the Thesis in International Relations and Strategic Studies 
 
The pursuit of military victory is based, at least in part, on theory. Theory is developed by 
studying questions about what we know, such as: How do we understand war? What are the 
causes and consequences of war? How should it be conducted? Why have states consistently 
adopted policies of military contracting? Do military contractors enhance a military’s ability to 
win wars? Studying these questions help states prepare for and successfully engage in war. The 
field of study that generally addresses such heady topics is International Relations (IR).  
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IR is a field of study with its origins in war. The history of IR can be traced back to 3,500 
BCE in the strategic interactions between Sumerian city-states.261 Aspects of IR have been 
studied since 431 BCE when Thucydides began documenting the twenty-seven year war between 
Greek city-states in his famous book, The History of the Peloponnesian War.262 Prior to World 
War One (WWI), scholarship on the relations of states was conducted through diplomatic 
history, international law, and other established disciplines (law, history, mathematics, and 
physical sciences). However, the inability of these disciplines to answer the question of why 
states failed to prevent the Great War that ended the preceding hundred years of peace so 
abruptly spurred the need for a new interdisciplinary field to study the relations between 
disparate nations. Thus, the academic discipline of International Relations began following 
WWI. 
Interest in solving these problems led to the establishment of the first Chair of 
International Politics at Aberystwyth University, Wales in 1926. At Aberystwyth University, 
scholars and practitioners began to draw intellectually from various fields like engineering, 
economics, geography, history, and philosophy for example, to analyze and formulate the foreign 
policy of states.263 These days, IR is the study of relationships among states and non-state actors 
such as inter-governmental organizations (IGO), international non-governmental organizations 
(INGO), non-governmental organizations (NGO), and multinational corporations (MNC). 
Moreover, IR is an interdisciplinary field comprised of several subfields such as international 
political economy, international organization, international law, environmental studies, and 
security studies.264 These subfields narrow IR study down to more specifically analyze and 
formulate policy. Of particular interest to this thesis is how International Relations understands, 
conceptualizes, and theorizes about using military contracting to enhance a state’s military 
effectiveness. This topic is located in the IR subfield is called Strategic Studies.  
The categorization of the Strategic Studies sub-field within IR is a little confusing. As 
Figure 1 illustrates below, Strategic Studies is a subfield within the Security Studies subfield. 
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Security Studies is broader, dealing with “everything that bears on the safety of a polity.”265 
According to Brodie, Security Studies deals “with political, social, economic, as well as military 
matters in both domestic and foreign contexts.”266 Strategic Studies is more specific as it focuses 
exclusively on military force.267  
 
 Figure 3.1: Locating Strategic Studies within Political Science268 
 
Strategic Studies focuses on analyzing the causes, consequences, and conduct of war. It informs 
the preparation for and systemic use of war as a principle foreign policy tool by states.269 The 
field is defined by its ability to be policy relevant by providing solutions to real world problems. 
The Strategic Studies field provides a significant theoretical and practical body of work that 
examines the interaction of using military power to achieve political goals under social, 
economic, and other constraints.”270 As a consequence, the policy outcomes prescribe the 
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practical inputs required which in-turn dictate the theoretical lens used to understand reality. The 
result is that practice dictates theory in Strategic Studies.  
The Strategic Studies field is of general and specific relevance to this thesis’ topic on the 
understanding the relationship between military contracting and military effectiveness. Given the 
predominant focus of this thesis, the field of Strategic Studies is generally applicable because it 
provides a framework for understanding how empirical analysis can be used to assess policy and 
battlefield outcomes. Strategic Studies is of specific relevance because the thesis concentrates on 
the employment of military contracting as a means of enhancing military effectiveness, and 
Strategic Studies theorizes on how organization, technology, and tactics combine to win 
battles.271 Therefore, although small, in comparison to the ‘umbrella’ IR discipline, the seminal 
authors and works that define Strategic Studies are anything but. Arguably, the literature is 
dominated by some of the most notable thinkers, writers, and strategists in history such as Sun 
Tzu, Machiavelli, and Clausewitz. There is no better place to start a literature review relating to 
war, military contracting, and military effectiveness than with these thinkers and their venerable 
texts.  
 
3.2 Part Two – The Classical Literature and Military Contracting 
 
While the practice of mercenarism has been common since antiquity, the same cannot be 
said of the theory of military contracting. In fact, very few ancient theorists directly discuss 
military contractors or mercenaries as they were then called. The omission raises an interesting 
question: If military contractors mattered on the battlefield, then why have they been absent in 
theory? One task of the following section is to seek an answer to this question. Moreover, it tests 
the assumptions introduced at the end of Chapter Two: does what little contracting theory that 
exists mirror the evolution of warfare from singularly focused on manpower to recognizing the 
importance of both manpower and force employment? In reviewing the classical theoretical 
literature for an answer to this question, key trends emerge demonstrating that military 
contracting theory mirrors practice in asserting that manpower is a key determinant of victory. 
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However, the growing importance of non-material aspects of force employment in the practical 
environment is not reflected in military contracting’s theoretical literature. 
 Chapter Two demonstrated that the practical history of military contracting and the use of 
military contractors are frequent in history. The theory on military contracting in classical 
military literature is, however, sparse. For example, Sun Tzu’s The Art of War written circa 500 
BCE is commonly held to be the first definitive work on military strategy and tactics. Although 
Sun Tzu expresses the centrality of manpower to military strength, he also argues that the 
manipulation of strength is the key to victory. Sun Tzu writes:  
 
I follow Li Ch`uan, who appears to offer the simplest explanation: ‘Only 
the side that gets more men will win.’ Fortunately we have Chang Yu to 
expound its meaning to us in language which is lucidity itself: "When the 
numbers are even, and no favorable opening presents itself, although we 
may not be strong enough to deliver a sustained attack, we can find 
additional recruits amongst our sutlers and camp-followers, and then, 
concentrating our forces and keeping a close watch on the enemy, contrive 
to snatch the victory. But we must avoid borrowing foreign soldiers to 
help us.” He then quotes from Wei Liao Tzu, ch. 3: ‘The nominal strength 
of mercenary troops may be 100,000, but their real value will be not more 
than half that figure.’272  
 
The quote demonstrates that Sun Tzu assessed military effectiveness in part based on manpower. 
It also demonstrates that he placed emphasis on non-material resources, such as skill, discipline, 
and information in that Sun Tzu held mercenary manpower as being inferior to native personnel 
in providing military effectiveness.  This is Sun Tzu’s only contribution to the discussion on the 
use of mercenary forces in war.  
The main point of the book is that non-material resources are critical to victory. The 
importance Sun Tzu places on information, for example, suggests that manpower is not the most 
critical component of military effectiveness and victory. A central message emerges from this 
main point: victory is not achieved through manpower alone but through the manipulation of 
manpower. Sun Tzu is clear in his argument that numerical superiority is not sufficient for 
victory. The lack of input on military contracting by Sun Tzu is interesting given the role 
mercenaries played during that time period and the fact that that Sun Tzu himself was employed 
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as a mercenary general following the completion of The Art of War.273 The omission of 
mercenaries from one of, if not the, most influential strategic manual in history underlines the 
foundation for the theoretical deficit in thinking about and understanding the practice of military 
contracting. The reader is left to wonder how mercenaries can be manipulated in a way that 
increases military effectiveness. The lack of input on military contracting demonstrates that 
ancient warfare lacked a theory on military contracting. 
 During the sixteenth century, Niccolo Machiavelli made the study of war a social science 
by relating it to constitution, economic, and political speculation.274 In The Prince (1532), 
Machiavelli described that a strong government requires two essential components: an effective 
legal system and an effective army.275 His statement that “the presence of sound military forces 
indicates the presence of sound laws” suggests that military power above all else is vital to a 
secure principality.276 In arguing for the primacy of military effectiveness, Machiavelli was 
explicit in his views about military contractors, what he referred to as auxiliaries and 
mercenaries, in “warcraft”.277  
Machiavelli’s conception of an effective military focused on material and non-material 
resources. He writes, “I judge those princes self-sufficient who, either through abundance of 
troops or money, are able to gather together a suitable arms and fight a good battle against 
whoever should attack them; and I consider those who always need the protection of others to be 
those who cannot meet the enemy in the field.”278 However, although Machiavelli, like Sun Tzu, 
recognized that manpower was a critical feature to military victory, and that the practice of hiring 
contractors served this end, he asserted that military contractors were inferior in quality to 
soldiers that were “subject[s], citizen[s], or dependent[s]” of the government.279 Therefore, 
Machiavelli recognized the material value as well as the non-material issues inherent in 
employing contractors.   
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Machiavelli’s contribution to understanding military contracting is limited to 
differentiating between native soldiers and contractors. His opinion is based on historical 
accounts of contracting in Italy. Based on Italy’s wars, he claims that contractors are “disunited, 
undisciplined, ambitious, and faithless.”280 Machiavelli recommended that the best way for the 
prince to secure his principality was by using native personnel in the military. He advised against 
employing auxiliaries and mercenaries because auxiliaries required reliance on other states and 
the use of mercenaries necessitated the reliance on good “fortune” in order to finance them, 
which was, or course, unpredictable.281 In advising against the use of both auxiliaries and 
mercenaries, Machiavelli suggests that the composition of manpower, not just the size of the 
force alone, was critical to the military being victorious. Thus, Machiavelli’s principle 
contribution to understanding military contracting was recognizing specific characteristics that 
differentiated contractors from native forces. In making the differentiation, Machiavelli alludes 
to the fact that military contracting had practical significance. He does not, however, cover an 
explanation of how to use military contractors more effectively. Consequently, a discussion on 
how to understand the practice of hiring contractors is omitted. The omission illustrates that the 
theoretical gap in military contracting remained throughout the Renaissance period. 
The literature’s understanding of military contracting did not improve in the centuries 
following the Renaissance leading into to the eighteenth century. Although strategists began to 
think about war more deeply, and about how to make armies more effective, their work is largely 
devoid of military contracting. For example, Vauban (1633-1707) was famed for opening up the 
military to resources of natural science and technology by designing and overcoming 
fortifications in the seventeenth century,282 yet no mention was made of employing mercenaries 
despite their extensive use in sieges during the Thirty Years’ War. 283 Fredrick the Great (1712-
1786) set the foundation for the modern military organization by establishing a system of 
hierarchy and discipline. Yet, despite Fredrick’s army consisting fifty percent mercenaries, and 
his statement that “one would defeat the whole world, were victories not as fatal to them [citizen 
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soldiers] as to their enemies”,284 he makes no direct mention of contractors in his writing. In 
addition, Adam Smith (1776), Karl Marx, and Friedrich Engels write that the forms of economic 
organization significantly determine the instruments of war and the character of war, yet do not 
discuss market forces in relation to mercenarism in particular.285 As such, these strategic minds 
refrained from addressing military contracting directly.  
Although Clausewitz also refrained from discussing military contracting directly, his 
work on the importance of non-material resources to battlefield outcomes is significant to 
understanding the relationship between military contracting and military effectiveness. The great 
importance of Clausewitz to the Strategic Studies field and the analysis conducted in this thesis 
warrants a detailed discussion of Clausewitz and the seminal piece of literature, On War. 
 
3.2.1 Carl von Clausewitz’s On War  
 
Carl von Clausewitz (1780-1831) was a Prussian officer and scholar. Clausewitz wrote 
On War at the beginning of the eighteenth century based on his observations on the Napoleonic 
Wars. The book was published posthumously in 1832. He focused on improving a military’s 
ability to achieve its objectives. Arguably, the ideas that Clausewitz expressed in On War are as 
popular now as they were during the mid-nineteenth century. According to Rothfels, On War is 
the first book “to evolve a pattern of thought adaptable to every stage of military history and 
practice.”286  Strategists of land warfare, naval warfare, air warfare, and nuclear warfare have 
applied the principles discussed by Clausewitz. Notably, they have not been directly applied to 
military contracting. 
What makes On War a timeless book, and Clausewitz a renowned strategist, is that it 
approaches the study of war from an unorthodox perspective. Clausewitz’s perspective explores 
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the question of “What is war?” by treating the study of war as more of an art than a science.287 
For example, though Clausewitz recognizes the primacy of numerical superiority (ceteris 
paribas),288 he theorizes about how to best employ the advantage of manpower, as well as how to 
overcome a manpower disadvantage by using material as well as non-material resources. 
Therefore, rather than simply seeking to understand the conduct of war like Sun Tzu or the 
consequences of war like Machiavelli, Clausewitz goes beyond by seeking to understand the 
nature or “essence” of war and how to manipulate military resources effectively in order to 
enhance military effectiveness. As such, Clausewitz not only focuses on the military means and 
the political ends of war but the ways that means can be employed to achieve desired ends. 
On War is unique in this approach and differs from pre-Clausewitzian military theory that 
focused explicitly on prescriptions: how to recruit, train, equip and maneuver forces. Clausewitz 
was able to establish a theory of war that integrates a wide range of military concerns (for 
example, political, strategic, tactical, and historical) and is capable of adapting to political and 
historical change. The result is that On War more accurately reflects “the realities of life” by 
looking beyond the monolithic “mathematical system of laws.”289 
On War is pertinent to this thesis because it highlights the relevance of non-material 
factors to military effectiveness even though it does not explicitly discuss military contracting. 
The omission of a discussion on military contracting, despite contractors being highly employed 
by all major European armies at the time, once again demonstrates the deficit in the way theorists 
and strategists understand military contracting. The omission is particularly significant given 
Brodie’s claim that On War is, “not simply the greatest, but the only truly great book on war.”290 
Strategists consistently devalue or relegate military contracting to the sidelines. This indicates 
that the theory on military contracting does not matter. However, while Clausewitz does not 
specifically refer to military contracting in On War, the fact that all of the major armies heavily 
employed contractors during the time of his writing suggests that Clausewitz, like Sun Tzu, 
lumps to them under manpower.291  
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The reason for Clausewitz omitting a discussion on military contracting may be due to 
the fact that military contracting during this period was at a lull and that there use was an 
“anomaly” despite their employment in major Europe militaries.292 Thus, it stands to reason that 
Clausewitz’s discussions on topics such as numerical superiority, maneuver, and cohesion 
pertain to military contractors, despite not being explicitly mentioned, since they were a 
significant part of active forces. Therefore, On War is important to this thesis because it points 
out the relevance of non-material resources as well as material resources to battlefield outcomes. 
Specifically, Clausewitz’s reciprocal relationship between war and politics emphasizes the 
importance of organizational cohesion and integration and Clausewitz’s Trinity emphasizes that 
superior manpower, while important, is rarely the key determinant of war outcomes. 
The first enduring point Clausewitz makes is on the reciprocal relationship between war 
and politics. Clausewitz advocates the examination of the relationship between war and politics, 
or military means and policy ends, to provide a framework for understanding war. In describing 
the relationship, Clausewitz refers to military means as the physical force a military can bring to 
bear against the enemy and policy ends as the goals that warfare aims to achieve, what he calls 
the object of war.293 Clausewitz’s discussion on the means and ends of war is best expressed in 
his oft-cited quote: “War is the continuation of political intercourse by other 
means.”294 Clausewitz argues that military means and policy ends must align for a belligerent to 
be victorious. He states that ultimately, war is about “compelling the enemy to do our will: and 
the point of war is not to defeat the enemy but to create an environment where political goals can 
be achieved. Neither warfare nor politics alone is sufficient for achieving this.295 Policy goals 
will not be achieved if their ambition exceeds the capabilities of the military. In such cases, the 
policy goals must be altered in accordance with the capabilities the military possesses. In terms 
of the military, a military may possess the means necessary to destroy an enemy or force it to 
surrender, but lack the extra-military prowess found in politics required to transform battlefield 
successes into the achievement of political goals.296 Therefore, military victory is different from 
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political victory.297 The more military and political activities align, the higher the probability that 
the policy goal will be achieved. Conversely, the failure to align increases the incompatibility of 
military means and policy ends thereby decreasing the likelihood of victory.  
Aligning military means with policy ends is relevant to understanding the relationship 
between military contracting and military effectiveness. To illustrate, although EO was 
successful at recovering the Angola oilfields from the rebels under its first contract, the Angola 
government was unable to maintain control of the territory until it was able to come to an 
agreement with the rebels. Thus, although battlefield successes produced an environment 
conducive to negotiations, victory depended on the political sphere’s ability to reach an 
agreement. The example demonstrates Clausewitz’s assertion that material alone cannot lead to 
the achievement the object of war.298 Clausewitz’s discussion on military means and policy ends 
suggests the need for “cohesion” between the realms of politics and military and internal 
integration within the components of the military sphere. Therefore, it can be assumed that 
contractors and military personnel must be integrated in order to produce the environment fertile 
for political victory.  
The second important point that Clausewitz makes in On War is his “remarkable trinity”. 
The trinity is characterized by: passion, chance, and politics. To Clausewitz, all other factors 
being equal, numbers ultimately prove decisive in war.299 However, all other factors beyond 
numerical superiority are never held in equilibrium. Clausewitz’s discussions on the remarkable 
trinity suggest that manpower is not the only determinant of victory and that non-material 
resources are also important. In relation to military contracting and military effectiveness, this 
suggests that concentrating solely on the material impact of military contractors, or any fighting 
force, would be to misunderstand the dynamics of war.  
The two points indicated the importance of non-material resources to theorizing about 
victory. Interestingly the importance placed on non-material resources in classic theory is not 
carried over to theorizing on military contracting. Notably, the omission of a non-material 
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military contracting theory in Clausewitz is likely due to the lull in the practice of military 
contracting that occurred from the eighteenth century to the twentieth. As such, influential 
thinkers in Strategic Studies during this period also omit any discussion of military contracting. 
For example, Jomini (1836) emphasizes the importance of deploying superior combat 
power at the decisive point and discussed subjects such as logistics but ignored 
contracting.300 Moltke did not distinguish his manpower resources between mercenary and 
citizen in developing his concept of combining mobilization, concentration, movement, and 
fighting to outflank an opponent; nor did Schlieffen who sought to employ envelopment in order 
to overcome numerical inferiority in WWI. More recently, military theorist B.H. Liddell Hart 
formulated the indirect approach to warfare, which led to the German Blitzkrieg doctrine. 
However, Liddell Hart’s theory too was devoid of a discussion of military contracting.301 
Therefore, contractors were not being used on the battlefield and were certainly not being written 
about. Even after mercenaries were used by developing states in the 60s, 70s, and 80s, the 
literature did not theorize on military contracting. Put simply, contractors were thought of simply 
as being manpower, which did not require a specific theoretical differentiation from citizen 
soldiers. Moreover, the analysis of military contracting was devoid of the non-material 
perspective that strategic theory evolved to include. 
This attitude is enlightening because despite contractors being crucial to a military’s 
manpower and strength, the literature, strategy, and theory focused only on the “grande armee”. 
In this context, contractors were regarded as nothing more than ‘guns for hire’ and counted only 
in terms of manpower. In fact, military contracting does not specifically enter Strategic Studies 
literature until the end of the Cold War when contractors re-emerge on the international security 
scene. However, while the literature finally began addressing the topic of military contracting, as 
the following section demonstrates, only a handful of notable scholars such Singer, Avant, and 
Kinsey address contracting in relation to military effectiveness. In doing so, they focus on the 
PMSC contributions to material resources—manpower and technology. Therefore, the expansion 
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of contracting literature to encompass military effectiveness, while useful, demonstrates the 
monolithic theoretical interpretation of military contracting as being part of the broader force. 
  
3.3 Part Three - The Contemporary Literature 
 
 The re-emergence of military contractors after the Cold War, and the growth of military 
contracting on a large-scale after 9/11, resulted in the literature directly addressing military 
contracting. Thus, after more than 410 human generations of employing military contractors in 
war, the study of the military contracting phenomenon finally began.   
The first literature on military contracting was introduced after the Cold War.302 David 
Isenberg and David Shearer were two of the first to “scratch the surface” in the study of military 
contracting. They addressed contracting from a descriptive perspective. Isenberg was the first 
contemporary author to write on the subject of military contracting beginning in the early 1990s. 
His work culminates in his text Shadow Force: Private Security Contractors in Iraq. Isenberg 
focuses on describing military contractors and PMSCs and the role and implications of 
employing them.303 He dispels the common misconception that that military contracting is as 
new “as is frequently claimed.”304 In addition, Isenberg argues that contractors were different 
after their re-emergence following the cold war because of their corporate nature. Isenberg 
argues that military contracting companies operate the same as any other corporate actor and 
describes them as flourishing “wherever there is a need for security, both in developed and failed 
states.”305  
Shearer’s 1998 Adelphi paper describes military companies in Africa and asserts that 
they are “very different from mercenaries.”306 In addition, Shearer discusses the failure of 
international and domestic legislation to restrict military contracting. In doing so, Shearer recasts 
the debate on the use of military contractors and PMSCs suggesting that military contracting re-
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emerged due to developed states being “reluctant to intervene”307 as contractors provide states 
with a means “to deflect criticism” for involvement in unpopular conflicts.308 Shearer’s later 
work in 1999, further elucidates military contracting by ennumerating the three primary tasks in 
which PMSCs function: 1) providing military expertise to state militaries; 2) offering a strategic 
impact on the security and political environments of weak states facing a significant military 
threat; 3) improving the combat capabilities of a government's military forces to deter attack to 
enhance stability.309 
Both Isenberg and Shearer were pivotal in introducing and setting the parameters of 
military contracting as a field of study. Their initial contributions to the field of study led the way 
for academics and policymakers to take up the topic and analyze military contracting beyond a 
descriptive sense for the first time. The expansion of military contracting literature built on 
Isenberg and Shearer caused the study of military contracting to take shape answering many 
fundamental questions such as: what is a military contractor, what is a PMSC, how do they differ 
from a mercenary, what does a PMSC do, for example.  
As a result of the descriptive research, the study of military contracting expanded to 
include a myriad of topics. For example, history has concentrated its efforts in describing 
military contracting throughout the ages.310 Legal studies focused on the legal limitations of 
military contractors that resulted in the inability to hold contractors accountable for their 
actions.311 Political theory has studied the impact military privatization has had on the state and 
its sovereignty.312  Public policy focused its attention on the economics of military contracting 
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and whether it is a cost-effective alternative to maintaining a standing army.313 Strategic Studies 
literature has sought to answer the specific question of: does military contracting increase 
military effectiveness? However, the literature has largely approached the topic obliquely.  
Krahmann, for example, examines the impact military contracting has on the ability of 
democratic civil-military relations.314 As such, Krahmann does not directly address military 
contracting in relation to battlefield outcomes. However, she indirectly addresses the relationship 
since controlling forces is critical to achieving victory. Stanger analyzes military contracting 
arguing that contractors are indispensible to effective militaries. Stanger’s focus, however, is on 
how the government can manage, oversee, and hold accountable the contractors that impact 
effectiveness.315 Verkuil’s work is similar to Stanger’s by offering doctrinal solutions and 
prescriptions to managing contractors.316 Yet, none of these works analyze whether military 
contracting is effective or the how and why behind their perceived effectiveness.317 The 
following section reviews the seminal texts in the military contracting field of study. 
 
3.3.1 Peter W. Singer’s Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry 
 
Singer was the first to conduct an empirically-driven analysis of the military contracting 
industry. Singer’s seminal book Corporate Warriors went beyond normative analysis and built 
on the descriptive body of military contracting literature by conducting an industry-wide analysis 
of the private military and security industry. Unlike previous research that describes 
contemporary military contracting as a new mercenary phenomenon, Singer frames his research 
by looking more generally at the growing private military and security industry. 
Singer makes three significant contributions to understanding military contracting. First, 
Singer situates contemporary military contracting in history by discussing military contracting 
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from Ancient Greece to the twentieth century. In his history, Singer addresses the causes for 
military contracting and the recent developments in the industry within the context of the post-
Cold War environment. Singer’s second contribution to the field is in distinguishing military 
contractors from their mercenary predecessors. Singer categorizes the private military and 
security industry by developing a tripartite “tip of the spear” approach, as discussed above in 
Chapter Two. In distinguishing each category—military provider firms, military consulting 
firms, and military support firms—Singer conducts an ideal-type case study for each of the 
categorizations. The case studies illustrate the general characteristics of each type of PMSC, 
which he terms private military firm (PMF), thereby illuminating the contemporary practice of 
military contracting. Third, Singer provides a detailed investigation of the practical concerns of 
the military and security industry. He assesses the impact PMSCs have on states and the 
international security environment in general by addressing two questions: 1) How does military 
contracting affect the state?; 2) how does it affect international security? Of particular 
importance to these questions are Singer’s discussions of the loss of state military capacities to 
the private sector. Singer suggests that losing particular functions such as logistical functions 
could have a dangerous impact on the ability of militaries to respond to threats. Furthermore, 
Singer suggests that military contracting has a negative impact on weak states that are forced to 
rely on PMSCs to remain in power.318 
As such, Corporate Warriors is focused on the pragmatic issues involving contemporary 
military contracting. Consequently, more esoteric issues are not addressed. One such issue that is 
introduced but not discussed is the effect military contracting has on conceptions of state 
sovereignty. Singer points out that the private military and security industry may alter patterns of 
power and that the industry may affect the power of the state since the global market influences 
the private military and security industry instead of the territorial state.319 More specifically, in 
relation to this thesis, Singer notes that contracting might increase a military’s cost-effectiveness 
but does not explicitly discuss military effectiveness nor does he empirically analyze military 
contracting in relation to military effectiveness. Given Singer’s focus on describing the private 
military and security industry’s material resources, it can be assumed that his conception of 
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military effectiveness is material. This focus mirrors the historical practice of contracting to 
increase manpower.  
 
3.3.2 Deborah D. Avant’s The Market for Force: The Consequences of Privatizing Security 
 
Avant’s The Market for Force (2005) answers the questions raised by Singer in relation 
to sovereignty and the global market. Specifically, Avant looks at the consequences of “the 
market for force” or the impact military contracting has on control. Avant discusses the control 
of violence in relation to military contracting by distinguishing three categories of control: 
political, functional, and social. Avant defines political control as “who gets to decide about the 
deployment and services.” Functional control concerns “what kinds of capabilities will be 
present” and whether “forces are capable of meeting current challenges.” Social control deals 
with “the degree to which the use of force is integrated with prevailing international values.”320  
The Market for Force makes a significant contribution to understanding the consequences 
of military contracting. Avant provides a vast amount of information about the private military 
and security industry’s role in international security. Avant does so by re-categorizing Singer’s 
“tip of the spear” approach and examining contracts with the governments of the US, Croatia, 
and Sierra Leone. The main point that Avant makes is that military contracting is altering the 
security environment. Specifically, Avant argues that the impact military contracting has had on 
the control of violence has shifted the role of the state, as defined by Max Weber.321 The change 
in control has “undermined states’ collective ability to monopolize violence in the international 
system.”322 Consequently, Avant finds that the development of a private market for force 
impacts the ability of both “strong…coherent, capable, and legitimate” sates as well as 
“weak…ineffective and corrupt” states to control the use of force.323  
Avant’s argument that military contracting diminishes state control over violence, 
resulted in two effects. First, Avant argues that military contracting reduces the ability of states 
and international governmental organizations to influence the security agenda. At the 
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international level, Avant argues that: “to the extent that PSCs [PMSCs] compete with and 
undermine the importance of multi-lateral institutions, the effect is to remove one of the more 
important ways in which political and social control over violence can be coordinated.”324  
 Second, Avant argues that military contracting is changing the practice of military 
professionalism, which impacts control and will negatively influence military effectiveness in the 
long term.325 Avant states, 
 
“It is clear that control of the military varies by the polity’s ability to 
generate the security function it requires – an effective military…Troops 
with lax discipline, ill prepared to defend the nation’s interests, reduce 
functional control, while crack troops ready to perform the tasks required 
for security enhance functional control.  This assumes that the function a 
military should perform is clear but in general, functional control varies 
according to how effective the military agent is at generating security.326 
 
These points made by Avant in The Market for Force are invaluable to enhancing the literature’s 
understanding of military contracting and have greatly informed the literature from a broad 
political perspective by discussing the political ramifications of military contracting. In specific 
relation to military contracting and its impact on military effectiveness, Avant informs the 
indirect impact military contracting has on military effectiveness through the discussion on 
professionalism and control.  
Avant asserts that changes in the control of violence and changes in professionalism 
decrease the functional control over violence. In doing so, Avant connects military contracting 
with decreases in professionalism and establishes an indirect relationship between military 
contracting and functional control. Thus, Avant suggests that military contracting decreases 
functional control causing a net reduction of military effectiveness. However, in highlighting the 
importance of professionalism and control, Avant suggests that military contracting could 
improve military effectiveness if a certain level of professionalism and control could be 
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maintained by military contractors. As such, Avant leaves open the potential that contractors 
could improve military effectiveness should they be integrated with military standards.  
 
3.3.3 Christopher Kinsey’s Private Contractors and the Reconstruction of Iraq: 
Transforming Military Logistics 
 
Kinsey’s Private Contractors and the Reconstruction of Iraq (2009) builds on his 
previous book Corporate Soldiers (2006) that asserts that PMSCs are becoming important actors 
in international security. In Private Contractors and the Reconstruction of Iraq, Kinsey explores 
the reasons for military contracting re-emerging and the impact that re-emergence has had on the 
strategic management of war. Specifically, Kinsey examines the impact of the US employing 
technical and service support contractors in the Iraq war. Additionally, Kinsey explains how and 
where PMSCs fit into the overall strategy for security in Iraq. The goal of the book is to explain 
how state reliance on PMSCs emerged and the implications contracting security functions have 
on governments. In doing so, Kinsey offers new insight into understanding the relationship 
between military contracting and battlefield outcomes.  
As suggested by the title of the book, Kinsey’s analysis focuses on contractors used to 
support warfighting during Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). Kinsey’s overarching argument is 
that “contracting must be considered a strategic activity with regards to the twenty-first-century 
battlefield … Contractors can no longer be ignored by the government and military… Indeed, to 
ignore them may increase the risk of operational failure.”327 As such, Kinsey addresses the 
unresolved issues raised by Avant in relation to the impact military contracting has on the 
battlefield.  
Private Contractors and the Reconstruction of Iraq makes two main contributions. First, 
it presents the most complete historical analysis, to date, of the transformation from mercenaries 
to citizen armies and then again from citizen armies to military contractors and PMSCs 
augmenting citizen armies. Kinsey asserts that PMSCs emerged because of: 1) the rise of 
international terrorism which signaled a non-state shift to the conduct of war; 2) the spread of the 
global economy; 3) the high-tech revolution; 4) the government push to reduce the government’s 
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size by promoting private enterprise. In his discussion, Kinsey focuses the analysis on the impact 
of changes in warfare and technology.  
The second main contribution the book makes is that internal deficiencies between 
contractor companies themselves and between contractor companies and the military has caused 
problems on the battlefield. Kinsey’s research addresses a gap in the literature by recognizing 
deficiencies in the use of military contracting from a legal perspective, the inability of 
governments to coordinate the military with contractors, and the inability of contractors to 
coordinate with one another. In discussing these points, Kinsey draws on military contracting 
experiences from OIF. Kinsey demonstrates these issues by detailing the lack of communication 
between the American Department of Defense and State Department and the UK Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office and the Ministry of Defense that resulted in hiring contractors to perform 
redundant tasks. In addition, Kinsey highlights major military contractor transgressions in OIF 
like the Blackwater shootings in 2004 and 2007, as well as the role contractors had in prisoner 
abuse at Abu Ghraib, for example. In addressing these cases, Kinsey points out that military 
contracting has caused coordination, command and control and communication problems. 
Furthermore, Kinsey argues that these problems must be addressed so that military contracting 
does not impinge upon the military’s ability to achieve its objectives.  
The most unique contribution the book makes is demonstrating that military contracting 
is “leading to the privatization of the pursuit of war, supplying armies with the capability to fight, 
while war itself remains the preserve of state militaries.”328  The book’s focus gives it a unique 
approach to studying the phenomenon of military contracting by differentiating between the 
institutional (support) army and operational (combat) army.329 Although Clausewitz 
differentiates between what he called the “maintenance of the fighting force” and the “utilization 
of the fighting force”, Kinsey makes the differentiation for the first time in relation to military 
contracting.330  In doing so, he firmly situates military contractors within the “art of war” while 
demonstrating that PMSCs directly impact the institutional army and indirectly impact the 
operational army. The key finding of this approach is that that contractors employed in OIF were 
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not treated as operational and tactical assets until later in the war.331 This finding is interesting 
because it suggests that recent military contracting has been undertaken for material resources, 
which is similar to the historical practice of military contracting as was indicated in the Chapter 
Two survey. 
Kinsey’s identification of the separate institutional and operational activities and their 
relation to military contracting is invaluable to understanding the specific impact military 
contracting has on military operations. In addition, the differentiation makes Kinsey’s analysis 
policy-relevant as it informs policymakers on the specific impact military contractor resources 
have had on particular activities. However, Kinsey’s focus on the institutional army limits the 
applicability of his research to understanding the impact military contracting has on battlefield 
results. 
While military contracting did not serve to “outsource” the operational army, the direct 
purpose of military contracting has been to increase the operational military’s ability to perform. 
For example, military contracting was undertaken to free-up uniformed personnel from 
conducting non-war fighting tasks. Thus, while Kinsey’s descriptive and explanatory accounts of 
OIF is invaluable to recognizing and acknowledging the positive and negative impact military 
contracting has had on the military, his explicit focus on the institutional military limits the 
ability of the research to answer the question: What impact has military contracting had on the 
battlefield? Consequently, the problem areas it finds in military contracting are not empirically 
fleshed out in terms of their impact on the battlefield. Therefore, although Private Contractors 
and the Reconstruction of Iraq describes and explains military contracting during OIF, it falls 
short of addressing the impact contractors have on the battlefield. As such, it serves as a 
foundation for a deeper discussion of the relationship between military contracting and the 
operational army. 
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3.4 Part Four – Understanding the Military Contracting Literature in Terms of Military 
Effectiveness  
 
Contemporary research on military contracting led by Singer, Avant, and Kinsey 
demonstrate that the literature has eased into directly addressing the impact military contracting 
has on military effectiveness. Subsequently, it represents the advancement of the military 
contracting literature from pure description to explanation. This is a welcomed change as it 
indicates the expansion in the way that military contracting is understood. However, there are 
two specific ‘gaps’ in the body of military contracting literature: 1) the extant literature has not 
yet analyzed the relationship between military contracting and military effectiveness with respect 
to non-material resources which have been important to understanding military effectiveness in 
the broader Strategic Studies literature; 2) current literature focuses on material resources 
without actually having assessed the relationship between military contracting, material 
resources, and military effectiveness.332 These gaps are significant in that they cause a 
monolithic material interpretation of military contracting thereby inhibiting a comprehensive 
understanding of the relationship between military contracting and military effectiveness. As 
mentioned at the outset, assessing the manpower assumption underpinning military contracting 
and analyzing the role non-material resources have in the military contracting-military 
effectiveness relationship and are the two primary aims of this thesis. 
 
3.4.1: Focusing on Material Resources 
 
The practice of military contracting has evolved from a manpower focus to a force 
employment focus. However, each phase of military contracting in practice began with a focus 
on manpower. This means that the importance of force employment in relation to military 
contracting was not carried over from one phase to the other. This is in stark contrast to the ever-
present importance that non-material resources have in general military operations. The 
difference in emphasis on non-material resources between military contracting and general 
military operations is likely caused by the lack of a military contracting theory that emphasizes 
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the importance of contractor force employment. Military theory is steeped in strategy 
emphasizing the importance of non-material resources as was seen in the discussions on Sun 
Tzu, Machiavelli, and Clausewitz. As such, the preparation for and conduct of war includes 
reference to non-material resources. However, the absence of military contracting theory 
precludes the practice of military contracting to start from an evolutionary baseline. The result is 
that policymakers repeatedly begin military contracting with the misconception that the 
manpower the military contracting industry offers is the most critical source of enhancing 
military effectiveness. These policy assertions are based on the manpower perspective that 
maintains that numerical superior militaries are more likely to win. States assume that additional 
manpower will lead to increases in physical power, and that greater physical power will enhance 
that state’s ability to achieve military victory. As such, modern states contract to increase 
manpower in order to enhance military effectiveness and only learn the importance of force 
employment in the process. 
The assumed importance of manpower resources to military effectiveness has been used 
to support policies of military contracting. However, although the military contracting literature 
has expanded to encompass a vast body of research on material resources, it is important to note 
that, to date, there has yet to be an empirical analysis on whether the dominance of manpower on 
the battlefield carries over to military contractors. Therefore, although it may appear that military 
contracting policies are based on strong strategic foundations, they are not.  In addition, no 
theory of military contracting has been created that advances the importance of force 
employment to the relationship between military contracting and military effectiveness. 
 
3.4.2: Ignoring Non-Material Resources 
 
What is interesting about the literature on military contracting is that the development of 
the contemporary literature reflects the developmental pattern of the classical literature. That is, 
research on military contracting seems to be following the general trend of classical literature: 
describe and explain first in terms of material resources and then look beyond it. The point of 
importance here is that the classical trajectory indicates that the military contracting literature 
will next look beyond material resources and the manpower perspective. 
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To date, the contemporary literature on the theory of military contracting has not 
mirrored the importance the practical emphasis on contractor manpower and force employment. 
The first writings on military contracting following the end of the Cold War focused on the role 
PMSCs had in supplying manpower. Next, the contemporary literature on military contracting 
too began to differentiate between types of contractors as evidenced first in Singer’s “tip of the 
spear” categorization. Significant research has illuminated the relationship between military 
contracting and military effectiveness by focusing on material resources but has yet to emphasize 
the importance of contractor force employment.  
For example, Singer’s industry wide analysis focuses on describing the industry’s 
development in terms of service and products offered. Moreover, his discussion on the impact 
military contracting has on the contracting state hinges on that state losing the capacity to 
provide particular material functions.333 Avant’s discussion on the impact of military contracting 
has on military outcomes revolves around “capabilities”. Avant’s notion of political control 
hinges on “who” decides which capabilities are deployed while her notion of functional control 
revolves around the “kinds of capabilities”334 Kinsey’s analysis demonstrates a material focus in 
arguing that that military contracting became important because of its ability to supply 
technically skilled personnel required to employ advanced weaponry. This focus is highlighted in 
Kinsey’s statement that “Technologically advanced militaries can no longer avoid contractors if 
they want their equipment maintained.”335 Therefore, the theory and practice of military 
contracting understand the relationship between military contracting and military effectiveness in 
terms of material manpower. The next step to expanding the understanding is by including non-
material resources into military contracting theory as has been done in general strategic theory. 
This raises the key question: What are the non-material dimensions of war? 
The literature and policy of military contracting has focused on material resources and 
ignoring non-material resources because there is no theory of military contracting. A theory of 
military contracting would serve as a mechanism for filtering, processing, and integrating the 
large amount of complex data collected by governments on contractors so that the employment 
                                                          
333 Singer, Corporate Warriors, 170. 
334 Although Avant discusses “integration” between military contractors and “prevailing international values”, social 
control is not linked to battlefield outcomes. See, Avant, The Market for Force, 5-6. Dunigan makes this link in 
Victory for Hire as discussed in Chapter Five. 
335 Kinsey, Private Contractors and the Reconstruction of Iraq, 31. 
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of military contractors could be improved upon. As such, determinations about the importance of 
material and non-material resources in relation to military contracting could be made. However, 
without a contractor theory, theorists and practitioners cannot explain and predict the impact 
military contracting had on combat outcomes. The development of a contractor theory would 
make the complex world of military contracting more intelligible by organizing contracting 
assumptions so that they can be tested. 
 
3.5 What Can Be Learned from this Chapter? 
 
This chapter sought to review the classical and contemporary literature on military 
contracting in relation to military effectiveness. Remarkably, the chapter found that the study of 
military contracting and military effectiveness is new relative to the fact that contractors have 
been used for millennia. Moreover, the chapter demonstrated that there is a non-material gap in  
the theoretical literature on military contracting. The work done since, while admirable, is 
limited in its theoretical focus and subsequent practical application causing the “state” of the 
military contracting literature to remain underdeveloped.  
The chapter’s other aim was to reveal the “gap” in the literature that this thesis intends to 
fill. It points out two problems with how the literature understands military contracting. First, the 
literature has yet to expand to include non-material resources in its analyses of military 
contracting and military effectiveness despite the inclusion of non-material resources in classic 
strategic literature Put simply, a theory of military contracting does not exist. The second 
problem is that although the military contracting literature assumes that military contracting 
enhances military effectiveness through manpower contributions, the assumption has not been 
empirically tested.  
The following chapter discusses the manpower perspective in relation to general war and 
military contracting more specifically. The purpose of the chapter is to analyse the manpower 
perspective to military effectiveness, which has been the key inflection point of both the general 
military and specific military contracting literature. Analyzing the manpower perspective to 
general war will provide the foundation to analyzing military contracting. Both analyses are 
critical to understanding whether military contracting increases military effectiveness and 
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exploring whether the manpower or force employment perspective is most effective in 
developing this understanding. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: THE MATERIAL APPROACH TO MILITARY AND 
CONTRACTOR EFFECTIVENESS 
 
A state develops its military in order to help it to achieve policy goals. Therefore, the 
more effective a military, the more likely a state is to achieve its goals. There are many ways to 
enhance military effectiveness, such as augmenting manpower and technology as well as 
improving skill and readiness through training. Since the end of the Cold War, a major trend 
towards enhancing military effectiveness has been using military contracting to boost manpower 
levels.  
As the previous chapter demonstrated, a theory of military contracting does not exist. The 
lack of a military contracting theory has caused the importance of non-material resources to not 
carry over from the general strategic literature. Consequently, the efficacy of military contracting 
is largely understood through material calculations, such as increasing the number of proverbial 
boots on the ground. This traditional focus on manpower, tangible resources concerns the “what” 
– “what military resources are employed to enhance military effectiveness in operations?” While 
valuable, a manpower perspective on military contracting is limited, problematic and cannot be 
used as a complete guide to understanding the impact military contracting has on military 
effectiveness. 
This chapter begins by describing and reviewing the manpower perspective to military 
effectiveness in general war. It teases out key the strengths and weaknesses of the perspective 
and applies them to the thesis’s topic – specifically, military contracting and the employment of 
contractors to boost military effectiveness. The chapter elaborates on the oft cited but lesser 
understood relationship between military contracting, military effectiveness, and manpower. This 
is a heuristic exercise.  
Thus far, the thesis has reviewed and complemented the canon of military contracting 
literature. This chapter critiques and strengthens existing manpower approaches to military 
effectiveness and then applies them to the military contracting literature. To frame, the chapter 
begins with a discussion on military effectiveness and contractor effectiveness ensues, 
concluding that both are contested concepts. In addition, the chapter elucidates and tests 
criticisms of the manpower perspective to general war. It then specifically applies these 
criticisms to military contracting.  
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The next chapter critiques and strengthens existing non-material approaches, with an 
emphasis on force employment, and then applies it to military contracting. The formula is 
simple: general, manpower understandings of military effectiveness are placed under the 
figurative microscope; strengths, weaknesses and practical examples of the perspective to 
military effectiveness are elucidated. Chapters Four and Five analyze two questions: Do the same 
assumptions on manpower in general war apply to more specific of military contracting? If so, 
how then can scholars and practitioners amend and improve the theory and practice of military 
contracting conducive to overall military effectiveness? The key lessons from Chapters Four and 
Five are then distilled and applied to the Chapter Seven case study. The following section begins 
by analyzing the relationship between general military effectiveness and the manpower 
perspective.  
 
4.1 Military and Contractor Effectiveness: Material and Non-Material Perspectives 
 
Considering the importance of military effectiveness and military power to the state, 
there is a substantial body of literature dedicated to understanding them. This section reviews the 
definitions of military effectiveness and military power. 
Military effectiveness is widely understood as a military’s ability to achieve its objectives 
through the use, or threatened use, of physical force. Military power refers to how much physical 
force a military can generate. It is a core component of military effectiveness. Military power can 
be used to achieve military objectives by inflicting physical losses on an enemy forcing them to 
capitulate.336 Thucydides enshrined the importance of military power in his timeless account of 
the Melian dialogue: “The strong do what they have the power to do and the weak accept what 
they must.”337 Thus, the more effective a military is at using its power, the more influence the 
state possesses to establish security and assert its will in the international system. Military power 
is essential to states because after all, international politics is “a struggle for power.”338  
                                                          
336 David A. Baldwin, “Power and International Relations,” in Handbook of International Relations, 2nd ed., eds. 
Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse, and Beth A. Simmons (Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, 2013), 273. 
337 Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, 403-404. 
338 “International politics, like all politics, is a struggle for power.” The proposition that this quote implies—that 
politics shapers power relations—is held as a defining characteristic of Realism. However, Wendt points out that 
this relationship is maintained in Neoliberalism, Marxism, Constructivism, and others. See, Alexander Wendt, 
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Scholarship has defined military effectiveness generally, in accordance with Thucydides, 
while others have focused more specifically. For example, Szayna et al., generally define 
military effectiveness simply as a military’s ability “to carry out its missions.”339 Gentry defines 
military effectiveness in a similar fashion by “characterizing it as the extent to which actors’ 
strategic political-military goals, including, but not restricted to, battlefield victory, are 
achieved.”340 These definitions are similar because they are general. However, when definitions 
become more specific, confusion begins to emerge. 
 
4.2 The Confusing Nature of Military Effectiveness 
 
When defined narrowly, no single definition or understanding of either term is produced. 
As such, there is confusion over what these terms mean. For instance, there are several notions of 
what military effectiveness means within the literature. According to Brooks, 
 
Some studies eschew a formal definition of military effectiveness ... Some 
political scientists analyze military effectiveness in terms of a military 
organization’s capacity to prevail over an adversary – in terms of victory 
or defeat ... Other scholars place greater weight on the degree to which 
military organizations and their personnel exhibit particular attributes 
essential to the planning and preparation for war . . . The term military 
effectiveness is also often used by military professionals and defense 
officials and analysts.  In this context it has a variety of different 
meanings.  Sometimes effectiveness is used to refer to the readiness of 
forces to deploy to the theater of war.  Sometimes it indicates a mission 
accomplished in a combat zone ... Sometimes it refers to the attributes of a 
particular military organization and the quality of its leadership, training, 
and systems, and the organization’s preparation for war. 341 
 
As Brooks indicates, defining military effectiveness “remains a matter of controversy”. 
This is a problem because that which cannot be defined cannot be measured. In a general sense 
military effectiveness and power can be understood as “the process by which armed forces 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 96-97. Hans Morgenthau, 
Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 5th ed. (New York, NY: Alfred Knopf, 1978), 29.  
339 Thomas S. Szayna, Kevin F. McCarthy, Jerry M. Sollinger, Linda J. Demaine, Jefferson P. Marquis, and Brett 
Steele, The Civil-Military Gap in the United States: Does it Exist, Why, and Does it Matter (Santa Monica, CA: 
RAND Corporation, 2007), 13. 
340 Gentry, How Wars are Won and Lost, 7. 
341 Brooks, “Introduction”, 7-8. This excerpt was also quoted in Dunigan, Victory for Hire, 29. 
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convert resources into fighting power.”342 The cause for the confusion is that scholars and 
practitioners understand resources in two different ways. They either ascribe importance to either 
material or non-material resources.   
Some scholars and practitioners define military effectiveness as a product of material 
resources, while others assert that it is a product of non-material resources, while others still 
assert that it is a combination of both. Material resources are tangible resources easily quantified 
like the number of troops or weapons, for example. Non-material resources are resources that are 
intangible and difficult to quantify like leadership, training and strategy. 343 Material and non-
material perspectives differ based on which is more central to determining military effectiveness. 
As a consequence, each perspective differs on how military effectiveness can be enhanced.   
 Purely materialist conceptions of military effectiveness often assume that the physical 
resources a military has are central to its ability to being successful. They hold that that “power is 
a possession or property of states” since it manifests from material resources.344 Materialists, 
therefore tend to determine military effectiveness based on the quantity and type of material 
resources a military possesses and argue that the size of a state’s defense budget, gross domestic 
product (GDP), military force, and technological sophistication relate to a military’s 
effectiveness. This approach to military effectiveness is a deeply seated concept within 
International Relations theory. For example, Mearsheimer argues that military power is a 
function of manpower in stating that militaries institute civilian drafts or develop more attractive 
military incentives to increase manpower levels in order to enhance military effectiveness.345 
Other definitions of military effectiveness focus on non-material resources. Non-
materialists argue that assuming material resources equate to military effectiveness is unsound. 
To non-materialists, military effectiveness is the outcome of the military’s ability to maximize its 
resources and pit personal strengths against enemy weaknesses. Therefore, military effectiveness 
concerns how a military employs the resources that it possesses, not what resources it possesses. 
Biddle, for example, explicitly states that non-material resources are critical to military 
power. Biddle writes that: 
                                                          
342 Millett et al., “The Effectiveness of Military Organizations,” 2-3. 
343 The definitions used here are based on the Merriam-Webster Dictionary’s definition of “material” as being 
“relating to or made of matter. ”Material.” Merriam-Webster.com (2011), accessed April 15, 2015, 
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/material.  
344 Baldwin, ”Power and International Relations,” 274. 
345 Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, 55-82. 
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Institutions that translate national wealth into military force with less 
waste, or balance logistical and combat elements more efficiently, make 
their effects felt via greater realized material preponderance. 
Organizations that promote creativity and innovation make their effects 
felt via a higher rate of new weapon introduction or faster operational and 
tactical adaptation. Organizations that learn more effectively make their 
effects felt via more appropriate force employment in the field. All are 
important, but their effects can be understood by considering their fruits in 
the more proximate factors of preponderance, technology, operations, and 
tactics. 346 
In a similar vein, Brooks also notes the limitation of material resource to understanding military 
effectiveness. Brooks writes that although military power is created, 
 
… from a state’s basic resources in wealth, technology, population size, 
and human capital…The creation of military power only partially depends 
on states’ material and human resources. Wealth, technology, and human 
capital certainly matter for state’s ability to create military power. Equally 
important however, are how a state uses those resources. 347 
Other scholars suggest that a combination of material and non-material resources 
comprise military effectiveness. For example, Beckley argues that “neither of these two views is 
entirely correct” writing that, “military power is not solely or even primarily determined by 
material resources,” however nor is it “a product of political and social factors.” Therefore, 
determining which resources are proximate to military power and military effectiveness is a 
contentious issue that means different things to different people. These conflicting definitions 
confound an understanding of military effectiveness.  
The theoretical confusion raises the question of which—material or non-material 
resources—are the core determinants of military effectiveness. In relation to this thesis, this is an 
important point to make because the same logic applies to the effectiveness of military 
contractors. The inability to agree on what determines military effectiveness makes it 
theoretically difficult to understand what type of resources make militaries more effective. 
Therefore, it is difficult to understand how military contracting impacts military effectiveness. 
The originality of this chapter and Chapter Five is to apply ideas about military effectiveness to 
military contracting. Does the same confusion in defining military effectiveness apply to 
                                                          
346 Biddle, Military Power, 193, 253. 
347 Brooks, “Introduction,” 1, 9-10. 
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contractor effectiveness? The answer is yes it does because understanding military contracting 
hinges on how military contractors impact the effectiveness of the contracting military.  
 
4.2.1 Applying the General Understanding of Military Effectiveness to Military 
Contracting 
 
The same confusion over general military effectiveness applies to understanding 
contractor effectiveness. Making sense of the confusion is critical to employing contractors in a 
way that enhances military effectiveness. Military contracting research today extends across a 
range of disciplines from sociology to law and from economics to public policy. In general, 
contractor effectiveness can be defined as the ability of military contractors and PMSCs to fulfill 
their contracts. However, because of the range of disciplines that cover military contracting, 
there is variance as to how military contracting is understood, ways of assessing its utility, and 
methods of maximizing military effectiveness using contractor resources. Such variance has led 
to competing ideas about the utility of military contracting.  
For example, sociologists focus on military contracting’s effect on promoting standards, 
education, and socialization. Sociologically, contractor effectiveness is premised on whether 
contractors conform to the national and international norms of armed conflict.348 The legalistic 
perspective to modern contracting finds that the inability to legally define contractors impinges 
on the legal system’s ability to hold contractors responsible for their actions. Consequently, legal 
scholars and practitioners find that military contractors are effective when they operate within 
the letter of the law and assert that military contracting will remain ineffective until contractors 
are dedicated to a system of law.349 From the economic and public policy perspectives, scholars 
and practitioners set out to analyze military contracting from a costs and benefits perspective. 
Economists tend to focus on military contracting’s effect on screening and selection, monitoring 
and sanctioning. Economists tend to analyze the effects of positive incentives like the effects of 
reputation on being awarded contracts. Economists gauge effectiveness based on the marginal 
gains and losses private resources produce in the military organization and in reducing 
                                                          
348 See, Thomson, “State Practices, International Norms, and the Decline of Mercenarism”; Thomson, Mercenaries, 
Pirates, and Sovereigns; Percy, Mercenaries. 
349 See, Alexandra et al., Private Military Companies: Ethics, Theory, and Practice; Carmola, Private Security 
Contractors and New Wars; Dickinson, Outsourcing War and Peace. 
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transaction costs.350 Alternatively, policymakers focus on whether contractors or military 
personnel are better equipped to conduct military operations based often on the material 
resources needed to achieve military objectives.  
Even within the narrow discipline of Strategic Studies, there is confusion over what 
contractor effectiveness means. For example, policymakers view contractor effectiveness from a 
financial perspective—contractors are effective when they save the government money. Other 
policymakers might suggest that contractor effectiveness is less a matter of money and more a 
function of putting more “boots on the ground”. Accordingly, this means more contractors equals 
more manpower which, in-turn, equals more effectiveness. In this case, contractor effectiveness 
is judged based on the amount of material it can provide the military. PMSCs themselves base 
their effectiveness off of whether or not they fulfill their contracts. Therefore, given the myriad 
approaches to defining contractor effectiveness, it is no surprise that there is confusion in 
specifically assessing the ability of military contracting to enhance military effectiveness. Similar 
to military effectiveness, contractor effectiveness is confusing. This confusion is a result of an 
epistemological gap.  
 
4.3 Material Resources as Determinants of General Military Effectiveness 
 
Material resources are necessary organizational inputs required to produce desired 
outputs. In business, some examples of material inputs are land, buildings, cash, equipment, 
materiel (e.g. wood, glass, or metal), and staff. These inputs are necessary to produce outputs 
like goods and services. Tracking the amount of material resources a company inputs helps 
predict anticipated outputs. Thus, material resource inputs suggest a company’s market value. 
For example, the number of personnel employed indicate an anticipated the level of output.  
In the same way as business, material resource inputs are also critical to the military. 
International Relations and Strategic Studies theory indicate the importance of material resources 
to understanding relations between states. IR’s three primary theories—Realism, Liberalism, and 
Constructivism—all have a material conception of military effectiveness. Each emphasizes that 
economic strength is a prerequisite to military effectiveness and that a decline in economic 
                                                          
350 Daniel B. Klein (ed.), Reputation: Studies in the Voluntary Elicitation of Good Behavior (Ann Arbor, MI: 
University of Michigan Press, 1997). 
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strength will lead to a decline in military strength.351 In other words, economic strength and 
military effectiveness are fungible. Viner illustrates this by suggesting:  
 
I believe that practically all mercantilists, whatever the period, country, or 
status of particular individual, would have subscribed to all of the 
following propositions: (1) wealth is an absolutely essential means to 
power, whether for security or for aggression; (1) power is essential or 
valuable as a means to the acquisition or retention of wealth; (3) wealth 
and power are each proper ultimate ends of national policy; (4) there is 
long-run harmony between these ends, although in particular 
circumstances it may be necessary for a time to make economic sacrifices 
in the interest of military security and therefore also of long-run 
prosperity.352 
The perception that money buys military power runs deep within the IR tradition.353 Even 
disparate theorists within the IR discipline, such as Adam Smith and Marx, and Engels, argue for 
the importance of economic strength to military effectiveness and the character of military 
operations in stating that “it is inevitable … that military power be built upon economic 
foundations.”354  
The common denominator between economic and military power is manpower. For 
example, the GNP of a state is commonly used to determine military power but a more detailed 
estimate of power is conducted by dividing total defense dollars by the number of personnel in 
the military.355 Thus, power is assessed by the capital expenditure per soldier and not just on 
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economic strength alone.356 This suggests that manpower, not economic resources, is the prime 
material determinant of military effectiveness. The following two sections weave through several 
vignettes to consider the strengths and then the weaknesses of the general manpower 
perspectives to military effectiveness. As noted, it aims to tease out the key lessons of the 
material perspective and – for the first time – apply them to military contracting.  
 
4.3.1 Arguments Supporting Manpower as a Guide to General Military Effectiveness 
 
Renowned practitioner-theorists on war from Sun Tzu and Napoleon to General Colon 
Powell (ret.) all express the importance of manpower to victory. In early modern warfare (1500-
1800), manpower was a prime determinant of military effectiveness because mass mattered in 
warfare. The bigger the army, the more effective it was. Manpower meant that larger militaries 
were stronger and more potent because they could inundate their enemy with superior numbers. 
This is illustrated by Napoleon’s famous early nineteenth-century-statement, “God is on the side 
of the big battalions.”357 In fact, Napoleon felt so strongly about the importance of manpower 
that he reorganized France’s military organization so that it could draw on the French citizenry in 
order to maximize its manpower level. Over the years, Napoleon’s appreciation for manpower as 
a key determinant of battlefield outcomes spread after the results of German Unification, the 
American Civil War, and World War I clearly indicated the dominance of larger forces. Perhaps 
mirroring the industrialization of society, military strategists became obsessed with manpower, 
and armies kept growing in size. In the First World War, for example, Russia mobilized 
12,000,000 personnel between 1914 and 1918.358  
However, in terms of size and scale, the classical example of the prescience of manpower 
is Operation Barbarossa (June 22, 1941 – December 5, 1941), the largest military operation in 
the history of warfare. The WWII battle took place between 3.8 million German invaders and 5.5 
million Soviet Union troops across a 1,800-mile (2,900 km) front.359 Barbarossa was also 
                                                          
356 See for example, Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, 55-82; Allan C. Stam III, Win, Lose, or 
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massive in the damage it did to the German army as ninety-five percent of all casualties between 
1941 and 1944 occurred in this battle. Although Germany won tactical victories and occupied 
strategically important positions in the Ukraine, the Red Army forced Germany into a war of 
attrition where the Soviet Union’s superior manpower led to the German defeat.360 Operation 
Barbarossa represented the turning point in WWII and the ultimate defeat of the Third Reich as 
numerically superior Russian forces overcame its German opponent.  
The importance of manpower to warfare continued. In the lead-up to the 1990-1991 Gulf 
War in Iraq, Gen. Powell argued for using overwhelming force, which later became a tenet of the 
Powell Doctrine. To create this doctrine, Powell drew on the Weinberger Doctrine, which was 
premised on the need for superior manpower. 361 The Powell Doctrine emphasized overwhelming 
strike capability with a focus on deploying numerically superior ground forces.362 Superior 
manpower meant that the force could inundate the defense when on attack and prevent the 
attacking force from penetrating by operating at defensive depth. The Powell Doctrine led to the 
overwhelming defeat of Iraq in record time. 
In the twenty-first century, manpower continues to be an influential policy as was seen in 
the emphasis coalition forces placed on “surge” capacity in both Operation Iraqi Freedom and 
Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan.363 Since at least 2006, the United States has sought 
to place “emphasis on the ability to surge quickly to trouble spots across the globe … ranging 
from homeland defense to irregular warfare and conventional campaigns.”364 The main advocate 
of the surge was Gen. David Petraeus (ret.). Petraeus argued that increasing personnel numbers 
would facilitate a larger, more dispersed presence enabling the US military to increase security in 
Iraq. In practice, the 2007-2009 surge amounted to a 30,000-troop increase to the US military’s 
presence in Iraq and a decrease in sectarian violence.365  Although the surge has its critics, many 
continue to assert that victory has always been a function of numbers. The key lesson for 
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proponents of the manpower perspective is obvious: more manpower means a larger, more 
lethal, and effective military force. 
 
4.3.2 Calculating the Material Advantage in Manpower  
 
Manpower has historically been the most important material resource across the broad 
history of war as more troops have been equated to more effectiveness. As such, manpower 
levels are directly related to battlefield outcomes; increasing manpower levels enhances military 
effectiveness because a force with higher manpower numbers can fight longer and more 
intensely. In addition, a numerically superior force is more easily able to control larger swathes 
of territory than its enemy thereby reducing the enemy’s ability to maneuver. Theoretically, 
manpower is also central to determining the military power and effectiveness of a state as 
preponderance theorists hold that manpower balances determine capability. The predominance of 
numerical preponderance and manpower in determining the outcome of war throughout the 
history has led to modern rules of thumb on that suggest troop ratios conducive to victory.  
This section introduces the popular metrics of calculating manpower advantages that are 
used to predict battlefield advantages in warfare. The metrics discussed below are important to 
expanding the military contracting literature. The metrics are employed in the Chapter Seven 
Operation Iraqi Freedom case study to test the impact contractor manpower levels had on 
military effectiveness. As described above, proponents of military contracting are also 
proponents of the manpower perspective. They argue that additional military contractor 
personnel yield increased manpower and therefore enhance military effectiveness.366 
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4.3.2.1 Force-to-Force Ratios  
 
The force-to-force ratio (FFR) measures numerical preponderance by comparing troop 
numbers. It holds that the military with the higher FFR is more likely to emerge from war 
victorious because it can undertake longer and more intense military operations, and occupy 
more of the battlefield thereby limiting the space the enemy has available to maneuver.367 In 
addition, superior manpower allows the attack to inundate the defense or the defense to establish 
a deeper, more impenetrable front line with a greater capacity to counterattack. Therefore, 
generally speaking, if military A has numerical superiority over military B, then military A has a 
particularly important advantage over military B.  
As such, capability can be determined by comparing the total manpower, or ration 
strength, of each belligerent. This is generally referred to as “bean counting” and is the most 
common method of predicting combat outcomes in history. More detailed FFR calculations 
suggest that the attacker requires a 1.5:1 theater-wide FFR to overcome fixed defenses.368 
Another rule of thumb suggests that the attacker must outnumber the defender by a 3:1 FFR at a 
specific point of battle to be successful.369 
 
4.3.2.2 Force-to-Space Ratios 
 
The force-to-space ratio (FSR) considers the number of troops relative to the size of a 
battlefield. The FSR is also referred to as troop density. The logic of troop density is that a 
defense with only a few troops per square kilometer leaves itself open to attack because it is 
spread thin. For example, a military with low troop density leaves itself vulnerable because the 
offense has more room to maneuver without coming into contact with the defense. Furthermore, 
low troop density means that the defense must cover more ground to concentrate its forces in 
order to support a point of attack, and that defensive weapons must defend more ground. As 
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such, force-to-space theorists suggest that the rule of thumb for a successful defense is 300-700 
troops per square kilometer for a conventional war.370  
The FSR is calculated by dividing the area of the battlefield by the number of troops 
within that area. Therefore, unlike the FFR, it is not necessarily concerned with theater-wide 
ratios, but area-specific ratios. For instance, military A may have theater-wide numerical 
superiority, but be numerically inferior at a specific location if military B has more troops in that 
local area. Proponents of force density claim that the higher the “force-to-space” ratio, the 
greater the advantage as local manpower superiority can be more significant  to the war’s 
outcome if the concentration of troops is in an area that is vital to the opposing military. Troop 
density calculations for unconventional war are made based on troop density by square units of 
area rather than by linear units of frontage.371  
 
4.3.2.3 Population Driven Ratios 
 
Theorists championing the manpower perspective also predict combat outcomes are 
based on population-driven ratios of troops to inhabitants.372 In other words, population-driven 
ratios consider the size of the fighting force vis-à-vis the size of the host nation’s population. The 
population-driven ratio was created by James Quinliven to help predict the outcome of 
insurgencies/counterinsurgencies since the goal of irregular war is to win the support of the 
population, not to physically destroy the enemy.373 According to Quinliven, counting rules for 
troop density in counterinsurgencies suggest a minimum rule of thumb of 20 counterinsurgents 
for every 1,000 residents in the area of operation’s population in order to “create an environment 
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orderly enough that most routine civil functions could be carried out.”374 Thus, population-driven 
force ratios are calculated relative to the population the force is attempting to control and protect 
rather than the number of insurgents they are trying to defeat.375  
 
4.3.3: Arguments Against Manpower as a Guide to General Military Effectiveness  
 
Despite support from practitioner-theorists, centuries of validation, and the inherent logic 
of “bigger is better” with reference to military power, manpower superiority may not be as 
reliable a guide to military effectiveness as is generally assumed. At first, the logic of bigger is 
better seems infallible. However, upon closer inspection one can see that using manpower as the 
key determinant of general military effectiveness is problematic. There are many instances where 
manpower has not proven to be the prime determinant of battle. For example, consider the 
victory of the Prussians in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870. In these cases, manpower did not 
decide the outcome of battle. There are, at least, four obvious reasons that cast doubt on the 
importance of manpower superiority in determining military effectiveness. 
First, a large military is only as good as its logistics. Logistics are responsible for 
planning and maintaining the force as decreed by Jomini.376 The larger the fighting force, the 
more logistical personnel, goods, and services are required to maintain the force’s readiness. 
Napoleon suggested that “An army marches on its stomach,” alluding to the simplistic necessity 
of logistics.377 A more recent example of logistical problems and force size is illustrated by the 
United States military in WWII. In 1940, the number of personnel in the US military was 
458,365. In 1945, it reached its height of 12,055,884 total military personnel.378 Taken at face 
value, the increase in manpower by more than a factor of five should have yielded enhanced 
military effectiveness comparable to the size increase. However, the expansion in numbers 
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exacerbated the division of labor and the segmentation of management responsibilities 
previously unknown in the American military hierarchy.379 Thus, higher numbers complicated 
organizational functions, which resulted in decreased military effectiveness. 
The second problem with the manpower perspective is that the value of a military, large 
and small alike, depends upon the circumstances in which it is used and the goals to which it 
seeks to accomplish. Warfare is multidimensional rather than monolithic and one-dimensional. 
The trouble with manpower on a material basis is that it conflates manpower with economic 
strength.380 Calculating capital expenditure per soldier is inaccurate because it biases armed 
forces who rely more heavily on their naval or air power because assessments premised on 
manpower misconstrue capital-intensive militaries regardless of technological sophistication.381 
This means that increases in manpower might not necessarily enhance military effectiveness 
because the utility of a large military may vary greatly from one operation to another. Deploying 
a large military overseas, for example, may be useful for conventional war but may be useless to 
prevailing in an internal civil war or counterinsurgency where a “small-footprint” force is 
preferred.382  
The most famous example explicating the importance of factors beyond manpower is the 
Battle of Thermopylae (August 20, 480 BCE) where geography and tactics played a critical role 
in combat.383 Battle was joined at the pass of Thermopylae between a Greek force consisting of 
approximately 7,000 against a force of 150,000 Persians. The Greeks sought to deny access to 
the only road by which the Persian army could attack the Greek city-states. Despite the Persians 
eventually outflanking and defeating the Greeks, the seven days of battle demonstrated the 
ability of geography and tactics to compensate for inferior manpower resources. 384 Therefore, 
military effectiveness is not just a sum of manpower. Rather, it is the alignment of a military’s 
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characteristics with the specific outcomes desired. Material does not automatically yield attained 
military objectives or the achievement of policy goals. 
Third, technology influences the impact numerically superior militaries have on the 
battlefield. Put simply, technology matters in war. In early modern warfare, numerical 
preponderance was a strong determinant of military effectiveness because each person that 
wielded a weapon made that military more effective by one person. This was important given 
that combat was characterized single combat as only one combatant could engage another at any 
given time. As such, a strong military was one that possessed superior manpower numbers where 
more than one person could pair off against an enemy fighter thus enhancing their likelihood of 
winning. However, the advancement of technology offset the dominance of manpower. For 
example, in WWI technology such as the machine gun made it possible for a few combatants 
(particularly defenders, but also attackers) to wipe out large troop formations. Advanced artillery 
also enabled militaries to attack their enemy from beyond where their enemy could attack them. 
These examples demonstrate how technology makes it possible for one soldier armed with 
modern technology to engage multiple enemies at once and win.385 Technology thus 
exponentially increased the relative strength of soldiers possessing modern technology and 
drastically diminished the relative effectiveness of superior numbers not in possession of 
sophisticated technology. These examples illustrate that manpower is not absolute and that 
manpower is decisive only when facing an enemy of similar technological sophistication.   
Fourth, while evidence abounds of preponderant militaries defeating numerically inferior 
opponents, historical data does not support the primacy of superior manpower to military 
effectiveness. For example, the Correlates of War (COW) dataset produced by the University of 
Michigan casts a shadow of doubt on the primacy of manpower.386 In wars between 1900 and 
1992, militaries that fielded superior personnel numbers were defeated more times than they 
were victorious as measures of military personnel have only successfully predicted forty-nine 
percent of the victories.387  
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In summary, manpower is not an absolute in determining battlefield outcomes despite the 
inherent logic of “bigger is better.” Anecdotal and empirical evidence suggest that logistical 
factors, battlefield circumstances, and technological sophistication all impact military 
effectiveness. Therefore, a military’s manpower level relative to its opponent is not an infallible 
determinant of military effectiveness. 
 
4.4 The Importance of Manpower to Contractor Effectiveness 
 
The previous analysis raises an important question: Do the same general patterns, logic, 
and criticisms of manpower specifically apply to military contracting and hiring PMSCs? In 
other words, do increases in contractor manpower equate to enhanced military effectiveness? Or, 
is contractor manpower just as infallible a determinant of battlefield outcomes as military 
manpower? This section addresses these questions casting doubt on the underlying policy 
assumption that employing additional contractors automatically yields enhanced military 
effectiveness. 
 
4.4.1 Arguments in Favor of Contractor Manpower as a Means of Enhancing Military 
Effectiveness   
 
 Military practitioners and private military and security industry representatives388 extend 
the “more manpower, more military effectiveness” assumption to military contracting. Military 
contracting policies are often supported by the argument that contractors provide additional 
personnel which equates to enhanced military effectiveness. Thus, the main reason behind the 
growth in the use of contractors seems obvious: Contractors make militaries bigger, which means 
that they are more effective.  
As described in the historical literature, contractor manpower has always been evaluated 
in aggregate with military manpower. Recently, the practice of hiring contractors for manpower 
fell under the broad heading of the surge. For instance, General David Petraeus (ret.), the main 
advocate of the surge, argued that a large military force would be more capable of achieving 
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military objectives in Iraq. Petraeus specifically extended this logic to military contracting in 
arguing that military contractors could act as a “force multiplier” by taking over logistic and 
security related military functions so that military personnel could be reallocated elsewhere.389 In 
other words, Petraeus sought to use military contractors as a source of manpower to fuel the 
surge strategy that he instituted in Iraq in 2007. In practice, military contractors were employed 
as a source of personnel. The logic caused the number of military contractors employed during 
the surge in Iraq to increase from approximately 30,000 contractors in 2007390 to 173,000 in 
December of 2008.391 The surge’s perceived positive effects caused the United States to pursue 
the same policy in Afghanistan from 2010-2012 where the number of contractors employed 
increased from 74,000 contractors in August 2009 to 114,000 contractors in August 2012.392 The 
emphasis on superior manpower in determining battlefield outcomes and the role of contractors 
in boosting manpower levels is the leading rationale behind assessing contractor utility. 
However, this is an untested assumption that appears to rest on weak theoretical foundations. 
 
4.4.2 Evidence Against Contractor Manpower as a Means of Enhancing Military 
Effectiveness   
 
The rationale behind military contracting policy is predicated on the primacy of 
manpower to military effectiveness. As such, evidence suggesting the infallibility of manpower 
to general military effectiveness would also cast doubt on the utility of contractor manpower to 
enhancing military effectiveness. Limited analysis on the theory and practice of military 
contracting means that it is unclear if increases in manpower – that is, more contractors – result 
in enhanced military effectiveness. To argue this point, this section applies the key lessons from 
the general section (above, at 4.3.3) to the specific use of military contractors. Similarly, it finds 
that the logistical burden of a large military, battlefield circumstances, the importance of 
technology to the battlefield and poor data all cast doubt on the belief that additional contractor 
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manpower creates a more effective force. Contractor manpower as an automatic boost to military 
effectiveness does not have scholastic support. Nor, curiously, does it have historical support.  
For the purposes of being chronologically exact, history is where this analysis begins, in 
the 17th century to be precise. The Thirty Years’ War (1618-1648) provides a long but valuable 
example when thinking of military contracting and effectiveness. In contrast to popular belief 
about manpower superiority in general war outcomes, the example confirms that contracting, or 
mercenarism as it was historically called, for manpower did not enhance the effectiveness of war 
machines. Bigger was proven not to have been better in the Thirty Years’ War. This is significant 
because historians strongly identify the Thirty Years’ War with the hiring and employment of 
mercenaries. In fact, some refer to it as “the pinnacle of mercenarism”. 393 Belligerents engaged 
in the Thirty Years’ War used military contracting as a source of manpower to gain an advantage 
over their comparably sized opponents. This factor combined with the war’s unprecedented 
length, geographical scale, and high rates of contractor employment provides a strong example 
that bigger is not always better in terms of military contracting and manpower.  
During the Thirty Years’ War, victory was pursued through continuous attritional warfare 
instead of decisive battle. Armies waging attritional war sought to exhaust the enemy whose 
resources were smaller and less organized by hiring more contractors.394 The key assumption 
was that military effectiveness hinged on a military’s logistical capacity to marshal the resources 
necessary to field and sustain vast armies that could wage prolonged wars often consisting of 
several campaigns against multiple enemies.  
States sought to enhance their military effectiveness by increasing the size of their 
military. When one state increased its size, competing states had to follow suit in an early 
manifestation of the security dilemma. The principle means of expansion was by hiring more 
contractors. For example, the Habsburg ruler Charles V mobilized the Imperial military to 
address the expansionary threat the unprecedented Ottoman Empire armies posed as well as to 
counter French military expansion geared towards fragmenting and undermining the Habsburg 
monarchy.395 Charles V sought to address these security threats by waging war in two separate 
theaters, which required the Habsburgs to increase the manpower available to its military. The 
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result was an increase in the size of the Imperial Habsburg Army and the dramatic increase in the 
number of mercenaries employed. In 1525, the military under Charles V numbered 
approximately 28,000 men396 but increased to more than 100,000 men by 1628-1629.397 As a 
reaction to increases in the Habsburg army, Sweden expanded its forces to number 150,000 
under Gustavus Adolphus in late 1631 also by employing a greater number of mercenaries.398 In 
addition, other European powers like Spain, France, and England also increased the size of their 
armies to ensure that they could compete on the battlefield.399 The enormous increases in the 
size, and by consequence expense, of armies by 1618 had major implications for the conduct of 
war. However, by the 1630s large, expensive armies were ineffective when pitted against 
smaller, more mobile and durable armies.400  
The last decade of the Thirty Years’ War saw smaller militaries gain victories against 
bigger and slower opponents. Larger armies fell prey to smaller forces that could operate behind 
enemy lines and expose larger armies’ vulnerabilities. Moreover smaller forces were more 
sustainable because they cost less.401 Smaller armies sought small cumulative engagements 
rather than large-scale decisive battles and time after time they showed themselves to be able to 
sustain rapid movement and maneuver, as well as repeated combat. The most significant change 
in warfare was the ability of smaller forces to wage winter battle and function while facing acute 
shortages of rations. 402 Mercenaries capable of waging winter battle were significant because the 
four or five months of winter had historically been a period of rest and recuperation and forces 
did not reassemble until April to begin the new fighting season in June. As such, those engaged 
in winter battle made considerable gains in operational success. According to Parrott, “the most 
spectacular example of this [winter battle] was provided by Bavarian mercenaries surprise and 
total defeat of the Franco-Weimarian army at Tuttlingen on November 24, 1643.”403 The 
Swedish army under Torstensson also engaged in winter battle as seen in their Winter Offensive 
of January 1645 against the Imperial Army. From 1645 until the close of the war, the ability to 
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maintain experienced military contractors that could engage in complex, mobile, flexible, and 
cost-effective campaigns became a hallmark military success. Well integrated mercenary armies 
were able to become disproportionally strong primarily because profit was integrated with an 
increase in military effectiveness and contractor means were coordinated with policy goals. 
Thus, mercenaries had incentives for being effective causing the attritional gridlock of siege 
warfare that had begun the Thirty Years’ War to break by 1631. 
The Thirty Years’ War is just one example indicating that contractor manpower 
superiority was a poor determinant of military effectiveness. Profound changes in the scarcity of 
resources during the Thirty Years’ War transformed the employment of military contractors and 
defined the problem of integration as the key issue of using military contracting to increase 
effectiveness. By the 1630’s, belligerents of the Thirty Years’ War had identified a common 
doctrinal solution that it fostered integration between mercenary means and political goals. 
Better integration transformed warfare from being characterized as “sterile,” “wasteful,” and 
“indecisive” into being “effective” and “strategic”.404 
Despite four hundred years of changes to warfare, the key lessons from military 
contracting in the Thirty Years’ War appear to apply to contemporary military contracting and 
military effectiveness. For example, in 1995 Executive Outcomes employed no more than 250 
contractors in its victory against thousands of Sierra Leone’s Rebel United Front (RUF).405 
Mercenaries were clearly integrated with a specific policy goal. Although EO employed superior 
technology against the rebels, such as helicopter gunships, planes capable of firing air-to-ground 
rockets as well as anti-aircraft guns, artillery, and radio interceptors,406 the link between 
operational success and contractors supplied was the alignment of contractor means with policy 
ends. As a result, the numerically inferior EO was able to overcome the RUF force at least five 
times the size.  
In analyzing other contractor operations, scholars have found that additional contractors 
do not necessarily mean an increase in military effectiveness. For example, although Singer 
states that PMSCs “possess capabilities that provide them greater effectiveness” he 
acknowledges that there is “significant variation” in the impact they actually have on military 
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effectiveness.407 According to Dunigan, the “variation” in the relationship between military 
contracting and military effectiveness is caused by the levels of integration between the military 
and PMSCs.408 In addition, several other scholars assert that PMSCs are a source of battlefield 
ineffectiveness as their actions have led to transgressions as well as instances of waste, fraud, 
and abuse.409 For example, Hammes writes that when insurgents “cut Allied supply lines from 
Kuwait … U.S. officials could not morally order unarmed logistics contractors to fight the 
opposition.”410 In addition, Isenberg notes that logistics are a particularly salient issue with 
contractors because they can refuse to work as was the case after contractors quit their jobs after 
two of their fellow employees were killed while repairing the power grid in Iraq.411 During 
instances like these, contractor manpower may appear to be significant assets on paper but the 
inability to order them to fight precludes the military’s ability to translate that manpower into 
enhanced military effectiveness.  
In summary, contractor manpower does not appear to be an absolute in determining 
battlefield outcomes. When the general military effectiveness lessons were applied to the 
specific military contracting context, not only were they validated but other problems – such as 
historical invalidation and an almost total lack of scholastic support – also began to emerge. As a 
result, the recent logic behind military contracting—that increasing military contractor 
manpower provides an automatic “force multiplier”—is called into question. Such practical 
evidence casts serious doubt on the utility of the manpower perspective in assessing the impact 
military contracting has on military effectiveness. In the broad general warfare sense and the 
specific military contracting sense, it can therefore be deduced that quantity may not equal 
quality.  
From the above discussion, the manpower perspective is inadequate for understanding the 
relationship between military contracting and military effectiveness. Moreover, the perspective 
provides a poor foundation for military contracting policies. Nevertheless, it remains the primary 
means to understanding military effectiveness and has yet to be empirically tested. The 
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assumptions of the manpower perspective lead to the hypothesis that military contracting will 
cause a net increase in military effectiveness by augmenting the manpower of a military force.  
 
H1: A military that employs higher levels of military contractors should perform 
more effectively on the battlefield than instances when it employs fewer 
contractors. 
  
If H1 is strongly supported by the data, it will indicate that increasing the number of 
military contractors employed will enhance military effectiveness. The hypothesis assumes that 
the more military contractors there are on the battlefield, the greater the military’s ability to 
generate power because contractors enable military personnel to focus on mission-critical tasks. 
Therefore, the power that contractor personnel engender should lead to improved battlefield 
performance. It is important to note however, that confirmation of this hypothesis does not imply 
that contractor manpower is the only factor impacting military effectiveness, it merely suggests 
that contractor manpower is one of the determinants of military effectiveness. A stronger claim 
would be that contractor manpower is the primary determinant of military effectiveness. 
According to this view, the development of force employment methods over the period of the 
war and its effect on military effectiveness is spurious. This claim is tested in the following 
chapter by addressing the force employment perspective.  
 Chapter Five develops, describes and explains the non-material force employment 
perspective to understanding military effectiveness. The analysis of the force employment 
perspective mirrors this chapter in that general force employment literature is analyzed and 
applied specifically to military contracting. The application of general non-material literature to 
military contracting provides the foundation for developing a new perspective to understanding 
the intersection between military contracting and military effectiveness. The chapter 
demonstrates that there is far more opposition against contractor manpower as a guide to military 
effectiveness than there is support.  
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CHAPTER FIVE: THE NON-MATERIAL APPROACH: TOWARDS A CONTRACTOR 
FORCE EMPLOYMENT THEORY 
 
The chapter challenges the manpower perspective by exploring, reifying and arguing the 
case for a non-material force employment approach to understanding effectiveness, in both a 
general war and in the specific military contractor context. The force employment perspective 
suggests that how resources are employed is crucial, arguably more so, than what resources are 
employed. The chapter elaborates on the lesser-discussed relationship between military 
contracting, military effectiveness, and non-material resources with specific emphasis on 
contractor force employment. Therefore, this chapter suggests that contractor manpower alone is 
a limited measure to understanding the impact military contracting has on military effectiveness 
and that the non-material force employment perspective is critical for more comprehensively 
understanding the relationship. The chapter concludes by situating then introducing its original 
contribution to the canon: a new, unique non-material theory conducive to military effectiveness 
called contractor force employment (CFE).  
In terms of structure, the chapter begins by defining the key terms non-material and force 
employment. Next, it reviews the force employment perspective in relation to general war, 
drawing out the central value of force employment to military effectiveness. Third, the chapter 
reviews the force employment perspective in relation to military contracting literature, focusing 
on strengths and weaknesses. One key weakness identified is that the military contracting 
literature has not addressed the role contractor force employment has in translating military 
contracting into enhanced military effectiveness. From this, the chapter builds a contractor force 
employment perspective (CFE) that emphasizes the importance of both contractor doctrine and 
contractor structures to military effectiveness. Specifically, the chapter explores the force 
employment perspective as applied to military contracting. The CFE perspective argues that 
force employment is the best way to understand military contracting in relation to contractor 
effectiveness and, therefore, military effectiveness. 
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5.1: Framing the Non-Material Approach  
 
Scholars have been interested in studying military effectiveness for centuries. As 
illustrated in the previous chapter, the focus of assessing military effectiveness has been on 
manpower. Following the Cold War, theorists began to expand the literature’s understanding of 
military effectiveness beyond material bounds to encompass non-material resources. In a general 
sense, the Oxford Dictionary defines non-material as “not consisting of physical objects.”412  
Non-material resources are necessary inputs to all organizations from sociology to 
physics to business. According to Nobel laureate for Economics Robert William Fogel, non-
material resources are required for organizational success. In business, non-material resources 
like intellectual property (patents, trademarks, copyrights) and brand recognition are critical to a 
company’s success. 413 The value of brand recognition, for example, is an incredibly valuable 
non-material resource critical to creating profits for companies such as Apple, McDonald’s, and 
Nike. Non-material resources are necessary inputs to many organizations.  
Non-material resources are also critical to military organizations. In this context, non-
material resources are concepts such as leadership, training, strategy, morale, and esprit de corps. 
They differ from material resources, such as bombs, guns, and manpower because they are 
intangible. Non-material concepts are critical because they guide the use of such material 
resources in that they prescribe how material resources will be used on the battlefield. Military 
staffs routinely consider non-material factors such as tactics, doctrine, skill, morale, and/or 
leadership in their net assessments and war plans.414   
There has been a theoretical shift away from the material understanding of military 
effectiveness in the International Relations and Strategic Studies literature. For example, since 
the Cold War, many studies – such as Graham Allison’s Essence of Decision (1971)415 – have 
placed emphasis on the importance of non-material resources to the military organization, and 
how they contribute to, or detract from, military effectiveness. For instance, research done on 
                                                          
412 Oxford Dictionary, ‘non-material,’ accessed April 12, 2014, 
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413 See, Robert William Fogel, The Fourth Great Awakening and the Future of Egalitarianism (Chicago, IL: The 
University of Chicago Press, 2000). 
414 Biddle, Military Power, 16. 
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skill has demonstrated the importance of training to producing military power and measuring 
military effectiveness.416 In addition, leadership research has indicated that leadership is critical 
to a military achieving its objectives because leaders determine how the military organization 
should use its material resources.417 The literature thus holds that the non-material resources of 
skill and leadership impact the ability of a military to achieve its objectives. Moreover, research 
in these non-material areas has helped the theoretical literature to progress to include non-
material resources when analyzing military effectiveness.  
A recent addition to this non-material way of understanding military effectiveness has 
been force employment. Generally, the term is self-evident – it relates to how the military 
organization and its different components employ force. However, force employment has not 
been rigorously applied to the focus of this thesis – military contracting. Before exploring this 
path, it is important to define force employment and how it contributes to military effectiveness 
in a general sense. Following this, force employment will be discussed in a specific military 
contracting sense.   
 
5.1.1 The Value of Force Employment as a Guide to General Military Effectiveness  
 
Force employment is defined by Biddle as the “the doctrine and tactics by which armies 
use their materiel in the field.”418 In simple terms, force employment methods are the operating 
instructions for using material resources in combat. These methods are critical to military power 
and effectiveness because they determine how material resources should be applied to achieve 
military objectives. Recent theoretical development of the force employment concept has 
historical and practical roots.  
Clausewitz, for example, writes in On War that force employment offers a more 
permanent means of understanding war than the “temporary” domain of numerical superiority.  
Numerical superiority was a material factor. It was chosen from all 
elements that make up victory because, by using combinations of time and 
space, it could be fitted into a mathematical system of laws. It was thought 
that all other factors could be ignored if they were assumed to be equal on 
                                                          
416 Brooks, “Introduction,” 12. 
417 Jonathan Shimshoni, “Technology, Military Advantage, and World War I: A Case for Military 
Entrepreneurship,” International Security vol. 15, no. 3 (Winter 1990/1992): 197-199. 
418 Biddle, Military Power, 2. 
112 
 
both sides and thus cancelled one another out. That might have been 
acceptable as a temporary device for the study of the characteristics of the 
single factor; but to make the device more permanent, to accept superiority 
of numbers as the one and only rule, and to reduce the whole secret of the 
art of war to the formula of numerical superiority at a certain time in a 
certain place was an oversimplification that would not have stood up for a 
moment against the realities of life.419  
 
The importance that Clausewitz placed on force employment has practical support today. For 
example, Andrew Marshall, the leading founder of net assessment and the sole director of the 
United States Department of Defense, Office of Net Assessment (OSD/NA), stresses the 
importance of “military doctrine and organizational concepts” to increasing military 
effectiveness.420 General Stanley McChrystal, former commander of the US Joint Special 
Operations Command and later the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in 
Afghanistan, asserts that using force employment methods is necessary to optimizing resources 
to achieve military objectives because it establishes high levels of connectivity, which is referred 
to as “single consciousness”. 421 
Practical support for force employment has recently been substantiated by theoretical 
explanation. Scholars assert that force employment relates to military effectiveness in addressing 
two questions: 1) What means will be employed?; and 2) How shall they be employed?422 Biddle 
and Posen, for instance, argue that force employment determines the winners and losers on the 
battlefield.  
 
5.2: Reviewing the Force Employment Literature in Relation to General War 
 
The most seminal text on force employment is Stephen Biddle’s Military Power.423 The 
text focuses on the importance of force employment to understanding combat outcomes. The 
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central argument of the text is that victory and defeat in warfare since 1900 are the function of 
force employment methods. This argument is made against the orthodox conception that victory 
is a function of numerical preponderance or technological sophistication.  
Biddle’s research is in response to the over-reliance of the Strategic Studies field on using 
static assessments of military power to determine the outcome of war. To Biddle, the set of force 
employment methods, which he refers to as the “modern-system,” is the key determinant of war 
outcomes. Offensive tactics such as “cover, concealment, dispersion, small-unit independent 
maneuver, suppression and combined arms integration” and defensive tactics such as use of 
terrain, deep positions, reserves, and counter attack are pivotal to victory or defeat because they 
determine a military’s ability to reduce its exposure to enemy fire while in-turn exposing the 
enemy to friendly fire.424 Consequently, Biddle’s extends the understanding of military outcomes 
beyond a material resource focus to encompass the non-material resource of force employment. 
Biddle makes his case through three case studies, a large-n study of past conflicts drawing on a 
number of sources, to include the Correlates of War project, as well as findings from computer 
simulations. In doing so, Military Power makes two related contributions to this thesis. 
The primary contribution of Military Power is its challenge to the widely held belief that 
numerical preponderance and technological sophistication determine military effectiveness. 
Biddle challenges this orthodox and long-held conception of power arguing that they “are 
actually no better than coin flips at predicting real military outcomes” and therefore “rest on very 
shaky foundations.”425 He proves that material resource holdings (like numerical preponderance 
and technology, for example) are poor determinants of battlefield outcomes because they can 
prove successful in one form of warfare such as conventional warfare, while those same 
resources may limit a military in another form of warfare like unconventional warfare. 
Therefore, Biddle concludes that, “Firepower alone—even twenty first-century firepower—is not 
enough to defeat an opponent who can exploit modern-system exposure reduction.”426 By 
casting doubt over the ability of material resources to determine military power, Biddle asserts 
that force employment is the most “proximate” determinant of military power. 
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The second main contribution that Biddle makes is the establishment of force 
employment as a prime determinant of military effectiveness. Although Biddle maintains that 
material resources remain important to military power assessments, he asserts that “relative 
economic, demographic, or industrial strength” matter only when they can be exploited through 
force employment.427 The argument that force employment is the prime determinant of military 
effectiveness has theoretical implications. It indicates that defense policy on military contracting 
may be misinformed. From a practical perspective, Military Power has implications for the 
development of strategy and doctrine, as well as acquisition and force structure. In relation to the 
focus of this thesis, force employment is of particular importance because military contracting is 
largely understood in terms of manpower resources and not force employment methods. Thus, if 
Biddle’s research applies to military contracting and contractor force employment is found to be 
an important indicator of contractor effectiveness, then military contracting policies based on 
manpower resources are flawed. Given this position, this thesis seeks to expand Biddle’s work to 
better understand the theory and practice of military contracting. To summarize, Biddle defined 
force employment as “the doctrine and tactics by which armies use their materiel in the field.”428 
Biddle’s research demonstrates that a military’s force employment methods are proximate 
determinants of its military effectiveness. Figure 5.1 illustrates this relationship below. 
 
Figure 5.1: Depicting Force Employment 
 
 
 
 
 
The contributions Biddle’s Military Power has made to the general literature cannot be 
overstated in understanding military contracting from a force employment perspective. It 
addresses questions vital to the understanding of military power and effectiveness that can be 
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applied to the military contracting literature. Biddle has improved the literature’s practical and 
theoretical understanding of the nature of land combat in the twentieth century and beyond.  
This thesis thus exploits this lacuna. Namely the thesis seeks to develop, complement, 
apply and amplify Biddle’s findings to the private militarily security industry, and to quote 
Newton once more, to stand on his proverbial shoulders. More specifically, and to remind the 
reader of the central question this thesis seeks to explore: Does a force employment perspective 
improve the literature’s theoretical, practical, empirical and policy understandings of the 
relationship between military contracting and military effectiveness? For theorists, this issue 
raises questions about fielding a powerful military and the relative value of military contracting. 
For practitioners, the issue is central to maximizing the private military resources a military 
acquires to enhance military effectiveness and achieve policy goals.  
As chapters Three and Four demonstrated, the theory and practice of military contracting 
tend to focus on material resources. Although some theoretical work in general war has focused 
on the non-material determinants of war and aspects of force employment methods have been 
evident in military contracting in practice, force employment is largely ignored in the theory of 
military contracting. The emphasis on manpower and ignoring force employment results in an 
incomplete understanding of contractor effectiveness. While manpower is important to 
understanding military effectiveness, it is not the sole determinant of military outcomes. To fully 
understand military contracting conducive to military effectiveness requires consideration of 
both material and non-material factors. In a non-material context, force employment is necessary 
in assessing whether a state can translate the acquisition of manpower into increased military 
effectiveness and the achievement of battlefield objectives.429 For this reason, the following 
section introduces the nascent literature that addresses military contracting and military 
effectiveness from a non-material perspective. 
 
5.3 From the Material to the Non-Material: Exploring Force Employment in a Military 
Contracting Sense 
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Force employment is central to a vast range of research questions in Strategic Studies, yet 
the majority of military contracting literature has focused on manpower. Recently, the military 
contracting literature has begun to expand to encompass aspects of force employment. However, 
only a handful of scholars have examined these force employment aspects in relation to military 
contracting. Table 5.1 below outlines the recent literature in relation to force employment and 
military contracting. Hammes (2011) argues that military contracting tactics often conflict with 
the military because the military lacks control over military contractors. Dunigan (2011) asserts 
that military-contractor integration is the most significant factor in how military contracting 
impacts military effectiveness. Bruneau (2012) asserts that developing a contractor doctrine that 
integrates military and PMSC groups can solve PMSC control problems. Finally, Parrott (2013) 
uses the early modern era to illustrate that well employed contractors can overcome larger 
opponents on the battlefield. While these works have been useful there are also weaknesses. The 
section now reviews this body of literature and summarizes its strengths and weaknesses.  
 
Table 5.1: The Military Contracting Literature Involving Aspects of Force Employment  
  Author Description 
Hammes (2011) PMSC tactics often conflict with the military because the 
military lacks control over PMSC  
Dunigan (2011) PMSCs impact military effectiveness positively or negatively 
depending on level of military-contractor integration 
Bruneau (2012) Establishing contractor doctrine increases military-contractor 
integration 
Parrott (2013) PMSC tactics (independent maneuver and combined arms 
integration) have been critical to PMSC impact on military 
effectiveness 
 
T.X. Hammes, a retired US Marine colonel, demonstrates the problems military 
contracting poses for the military. Hammes argues that battlefield “contractors create a number 
of significant problems from tactical to strategic levels” for the military.430 The primary problem 
is one of control. For Hammes, military contracting represents a loss of control in several areas 
of military operations. First, the military is unable to control the quality of personnel PMSCs 
hire. According to Hammes,  
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This lack of control usually means that we [the US government] may get 
poorly wired buildings, malfunctioning computer systems, and unfinished 
projects. However too often, it includes incidents of bullying, abuse, 
intimidation, and even killing of local civilians.431  
 
Thus, Hammes concludes that quality control problems directly and negatively impact battlefield 
operations. In fact, even in dealing with “quality” PMSCs, the military lacks the capacity to 
control their movements, activity, and behavior on the battlefield, which can also impinge on 
military operations. For example, the military was unable to control a child sex ring operated by 
a Dyncorp employee in the Balkans or the Baghdad Nisour Square murders at the hands of 
Blackwater guards or the detainee abuse at Abu Ghraib. The military is equally less poised to 
control lesser PMSC misconduct such as driving recklessly or pointing guns at civilians, which 
also detrimentally affect battlefield outcomes. Hammes views the lack of control over 
contractors as being a limiting factor in fighting and winning counterinsurgencies. Indigenous 
people do not differentiate between military personnel and contractors. Contractor misconduct 
can directly inhibit the military’s ability to achieve victory. More specifically, Hammes also 
outlines tactical problems. PMSC control problems are the result of PMSC tactics being 
incompatible with military objectives. Consequently, because tactics are a core component of 
force employment, and force employment is a prime determinant of military effectiveness, 
PMSC tactics impinge on military effectiveness. To rectify the problem, Hammes recommends 
developing contractor doctrine to foster military-contractor integration.432 In making this 
recommendation, Hammes notes the relationship between doctrine and tactics that Biddle 
expounded in defining force employment. As a consequence, Hammes demonstrates the 
relevance of what Biddle refers to as force employment to military contracting because 
deficiencies in control result in the inefficient employment of material resources. 
RAND Corporation researcher Dr. Molly Dunigan is the leading expert on the 
relationship between military contracting and military effectiveness. Her text Victory for Hire 
(2011) is the first and the most influential piece of literature to focus on the relationship between 
military contracting and military effectiveness. Her case studies range in time periods from the 
thirteenth to fifteenth centuries with the employment of condottieri fighting for the Italian city-
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states to the twenty-first century with the employment of private companies in Operation Iraqi 
Freedom. In making the case, Dunigan focuses on resource integration by analyzing how 
different contracting schemes impact military effectiveness. Dunigan asserts that there are three 
contracting schemes: 1) co-deployment of PSCs and state military; 2) substitution of PSCs for 
state military; and 3) integration of PSCs with a state military.433 
Dunigan produces two findings significant to the military contracting literature. First, she 
finds that the impact military contracting has on military effectiveness varies. Dunigan’s analysis 
finds that contractors co-deployed with national militaries tend to decrease military effectiveness 
due to a combination of integration and ethical issues.434 During substitution, “PSCs often 
increase the military effectiveness of host nation forces in situations in which they are deployed 
in place of intervening military forces.” In instances of the integration deployment type, 
contractors both increase and decrease military effectiveness when deployed with national 
militaries.435  
The cause of the variation between the contracting schemes, she argues, is due to levels 
of military-contractor integration. Dunigan finds that increasing tactical military-contracting 
integration enhances the likelihood of military effectiveness. For example, co-deployment is 
more complicated because contractors and militaries must integrate procedures and tactics. The 
integration and substitution schemes have a greater likelihood of enhancing military 
effectiveness because contractors are either closely integrated into the state military or do not 
require integration because they are not acting with a military. Therefore, Dunigan’s findings 
indicate that integration and cohesion between the military and contractors is critical to 
employing contractors in a way that increases military effectiveness.  
Dunigan’s second finding is that counterinsurgency strategies that adopt a ‘hearts and 
minds’ approach are more successful than a “draining the sea” approach.436 The finding is of 
general importance to this thesis because it demonstrates that how forces are employed impacts 
the outcomes of battle. This finding is significant when coupled with Dunigan’s argument that 
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there is a lack of doctrine between military and PMSC groups because it highlights the necessity 
of contractor doctrine for instructing PMSC on how to function.437 
Dunigan’s work is critical because it finds that contractor integration and employment 
practices are directly related to military effectiveness. Her research on military contracting 
produces findings similar to Biddle’s more general research on force employment. To reiterate, 
Biddle writes that force employment is the tactics and doctrine by which material is used in 
combat. Dunigan’s research indicates the importance of military-contractor integration to tactics 
and that more integration between the groups will result in better alignment between PMSC 
tactics and military objectives. Dunigan suggests that increases in manpower through military 
contracting may not automatically mean an increase in military effectiveness because the 
military organization must integrate contractor into the military in order for them to enhance 
military effectiveness. However, testing these findings empirically falls beyond the scope of 
Dunigan’s study.  
Bruneau’s Patriots for Profit (2012) is another example of recent analysis focusing on 
military contracting and on aspects related to force employment. Bruneau extends the military 
contracting literature by analyzing the impact of contractor defense reform initiatives on the 
ability of the US military to fulfill battlefield objectives. Bruneau makes two main arguments. 
First, he builds on Hammes’ work by arguing that there are control problems with PMSCs that 
will eventually lead to strategic paralysis. The second point Bruneau makes is that these 
problems can be solved, at least in part, by developing doctrine to integrate PMSCs with the 
military.  
In making these points, Bruneau significantly contributes to the military contracting 
literature by connecting control problems with defense reform initiatives, thus exploring the link 
between military contracting and military effectiveness. However, an analysis of how the 
development of contractor doctrine impacted battlefield outcomes is not conducted. Thus, 
although control is described as being a problem and doctrine is recommended as a solution, it is 
not empirically tested nor is a prescription of what doctrine should be created to restore 
organizational predictability, stability, and certainty is not made. Furthermore, Bruneau’s 
perspective does not address the prevailing notion of military contracting for manpower in 
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relation to his doctrine-integration thesis. Therefore, the text does little to inform policy on the 
most effective means of translating contractor material resources into military effectiveness, and 
does not increase the literature’s understanding of the impact contractors have on the battlefield 
or, as a consequence, how their employment can be improved. 
The most recent contribution to the military contracting body of literature comes from 
historian David Parrott (2013). Parrott’s book The Business of War analyzes military contracting 
in early modern Europe between the mid-fifteenth and mid-seventeenth centuries. In his analysis, 
Parrott argues that military contracting can be beneficial to states and contractors alike thus 
challenging conventional scholarly opinion, which suggests that mercenaries had predominately 
negative implications for states during this period.438 Parrott’s perspective is not just a simple 
reconfiguration of the importance of military contracting, but a reconceptualization of the impact 
military contracting had on military effectiveness from a strategic and non-material perspective.  
Parrott expands the military contracting literature by providing historical evidence that 
manpower superiority was not a key determinant of victory during the close of the Thirty Years’ 
War. Instead, Parrott argues that how contractors, or mercenaries as they were called at the time, 
were employed actually broke the gridlock of the Thirty Years’ War as the changes in practice 
are what actually enhanced the military effectiveness of several armies, not how many 
contractors were employed. Parrott thus reinforces Biddle’s more general force employment 
argument by describing how armies with fewer men, were more effective by exploiting the 
vulnerabilities of larger militaries evidencing “dramatic tactical, organizational and strategic 
progress.”439 Parrott argues that smaller armies and better tactics resulted in armies that “were 
arguably some of the most successful and cost-effective military forces of the early modern 
period.”440 Parrott’s findings are limited to the early modern period because of the text’s 
historical focus. Another factor limiting the generalizability of the findings to contemporary 
contracting is that manpower was the most proximate determinant of military effectiveness in the 
seventeenth century. Therefore, the concepts of military contracting, military effectiveness, 
manpower, and force employment are not explored in the contemporary military contracting 
literature and may not even apply to contracting today. Exploring these findings with respect to 
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contemporary military contracting is critical to determining if contractor employment methods 
are still relevant today. 
 In summary, these four authors have demonstrated that the analysis of military 
contracting from a non-material perspective is embryonic. Although these authors have applied 
some general force employment aspects more specifically to military contracting, there are still 
outstanding issues relating to the employment of contemporary military contractors that have yet 
to be explored and developed. The major problem with the research is the gap in testing and 
exposing the deficiencies with the prevailing manpower perspective and then advancing a 
competing non-material perspective. Therefore, while aspects of contractor force employment 
have been discussed, there has yet to be a rigorous analysis of the competing perspectives with 
real-life battlefield outcomes. That is, no study has advanced a framework that explores force 
employment from a military contracting perspective. Thus, while there is some evidence that 
Biddle’s force employment argument applies to military contracting, in that the real answer to 
translating contractor resources into enhanced military effectiveness lays in force employment, it 
has yet to be formally applied to military contracting.  
This gap in the literature raises several questions: What might a contractor force 
employment perspective look like? What purpose might it serve? Might it add to existing 
understandings of how military contractors can be used to enhance military effectiveness? Can a 
deeper understanding of contractor force employment explain the impact military contractors 
have on military effectiveness? Could developing contractor force employment methods have a 
positive impact on military effectiveness? To answer these questions, the thesis turns to 
developing a contractor force employment perspective. 
 
5.4 Towards a Contractor Force Employment Perspective  
 
Rigorous force employment research in Strategic Studies and less rigorous military 
contracting research has demonstrated the potential utility of contractor force employment. The 
thesis now takes the concept a step further by directly applying the idea of force employment to 
contractors and military effectiveness in a more specific sense. This section situates, defines, and 
justifies the importance of a new way of understanding the interaction between military 
contracting and force employment called Contractor Force Employment (CFE). It then expands 
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on the benefits of this approach in terms of understanding military contracting, contractor 
effectiveness, and military effectiveness.  
To date, it is assumed that the solutions to military effectiveness problems lay in hiring 
manpower from the private military and security industry. However, this assumption ignores the 
possibility that more contractors may not enhance in military effectiveness, as described in 
Chapter Four. The solution to translating PMSC resources into enhanced military effectiveness 
may actually be contractor force employment. The CFE perspective is constructed to test this 
possibility. 
CFE borrows heavily from Biddle’s understanding of force employment. Biddle writes 
that force employment is “the doctrine and tactics by which the military uses its private material 
resources.”441 Contractor force employment, therefore, is the doctrine and tactics by which the 
military uses its private military and security resources. CFE is a non-material perspective to 
military contracting. It is interested in how contractor resources are employed as opposed to what 
or how many contractor resources are employed. Inherent within the CFE perspective is 
effectively leveraging contractor skill in combat. Figure 5.2 below illustrates the perspective. 
 
Figure 5.2: Depicting Contractor Force Employment 
 
 
 
CFE helps describe, explain, and predict the continuities and evolutions in military 
contracting both practically and theoretically. Furthermore, CFE develops, filters, and processes 
information about military contracting. Thus, this thesis represents the first time that the general 
force employment literature is explicitly applied to the specific field of military contracting. 
CFE, therefore, is the first step to better understanding how PMSC resources can be translated 
into military effectiveness. It analyzes all contractor doctrine the contracted military has 
produced and all the tactics employed by contractors hired by that military with respect to a 
particular operational environment. 
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CFE is beneficial because it provides a perspective that enhances the understanding of 
how the military can enhance military effectiveness through non-material means. As such, it 
suggests that how contractors are employed is an equally strong, if not stronger, means of 
assessing military contracting than by focusing on what resources are employed. CFE is also 
beneficial because it deepens the literature’s understanding of military. CFE articulates the gaps 
in the employment of military contractors and subsequently filling those gaps in with novel facts 
about the impact military contracting has on military effectiveness. In addition, it differentiates 
contractor effectiveness from military effectiveness enabling scholars and policymakers to think 
of contractor output as a distinct type of effectiveness. These benefits are derived from the three 
central tenets that comprise CFE. 
 
5.4.1 The Three Tenets of CFE  
 
5.4.1.1 Relation of PMSCs to General Military  
 
 CFE recognizes that there is a difference between military and PMSC groups. The 
military is composed of voluntary and/or conscripted forces that function in different functional 
capacities within the organization. Each of the components performs its own specific task yet the 
outputs of each group are accumulated towards the overall military goal. Doctrine facilitates the 
joint operations of individual components to advance the military organization towards its goal. 
 PMSCs, on the other hand, are not a natural component of the military organization. 
PMSCs are private, civilian entities that operate for profit. Unlike the military, the primary 
purpose of PMSCs is to fulfill their contract to generate profit, not necessarily to contribute to 
the achievement of a military objective. Therefore, doctrine is particularly important for military 
contracting because PMSCs are an add-on force, which means that they are attached to the 
military organization instead of grown within the military organization. Doctrine is essential to 
creating a common understanding of military and PMSC actions to be undertaken when 
necessary, and to produce a cohesive military-contractor workforce capable of working towards 
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a common objective despite having organizational and motivational differences.442CFE provides 
a framework for understanding military contracting from a doctrinal perspective. It suggests that 
contractor doctrine is an important, if not the most important, determinant of how military 
contracting impacts military effectiveness. 
 
5.4.1.2 Contractor Effectiveness is Not the Same as Military Effectiveness 
 
Military effectiveness is different from contractor effectiveness. Military effectiveness is 
the military organization’s ability to combine the efforts of these components to achieve its 
overall objective. Contractor effectiveness is the ability of military contractors and PMSCs to 
enhance a military’s ability to achieve that objective. Military contracting is thus a component 
part of the military organization and factors into its effectiveness. The sole purpose of hiring 
military contractors is to increase a military’s output. Contractors contribute to a military’s 
ability to achieve its objective, not the other way around. A military can be effective without its 
contractor component being effective. However, contractors cannot be considered effective if the 
military is not effective.  
Complications emerge in the relationship between military effectiveness and contractor 
effectiveness when contractors confuse the fulfillment of a contract with military effectiveness. 
Although they are not mutually exclusive, they are two different concepts. Consequently, by 
placing the contract at the center of a contractor’s effectiveness analysis, it divorces contractor 
activity from the achievement of the military objective thus making it the military’s task to 
ensure that the fulfillment of the contract leads to the achievement of the military’s objective. 
The focus on contract fulfillment instead of focusing on the provision of outputs conducive to 
achieving a military objective complicates the ability of military contracting to enhance military 
effectiveness at the tactical and operational levels.  
Tactically, for example, a PMSC would positively impact military effectiveness if it fulfills 
its contract and complies with the military organization’s tactical requirements. On the other 
hand, a PMSC might negatively impact military effectiveness if it fulfills its contract and does 
not comply with the military organization’s tactical requirements. To illustrate, a PMSC tasked 
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with interrogation may fulfill its contract but have a negative impact on military effectiveness if 
the PMSC uses tactics, such as detainee abuse, that run counter to the achievement of military 
objectives.  
Operationally, whether PMSCs contribute to military effectiveness is dependent on 
whether the contract outcomes are tied to the achievement of overall objectives. For example, a 
PMSC would positively impact military effectiveness if it fulfills a contract and produces an 
output that is valuable to the achievement of the military objective. On the other hand, a PMSC 
might not impact military effectiveness if it fulfills its contract but the contract is not tied to the 
achievement of the military objective. To illustrate, a PMSC tasked to build a school might fulfill 
its contract successfully. However, if the contract called for the school to be built in a village of 
little relevance to the military objective, then the fact that the contract was fulfilled will not 
impact military effectiveness. Thus, contractor effectiveness and military effectiveness are two 
different concepts. Therefore, in order for contractor effectiveness to translate into military 
effectiveness, PMSCs and the military must be integrated at the tactical and operational levels. 
CFE helps frame this integration by emphasizing the importance of contractor force employment 
methods to ensuring that contractor manpower resources contribute not only to the fulfillment of 
contracts but also to enhancing military effectiveness.  
 
5.4.1.3 The Benefits of the CFE Perspective versus the Manpower Perspective 
 
The manpower perspective to military effectiveness, as discussed in Chapter Four, 
suggests that manpower is the key determinant of military effectiveness; that what resources are 
employed correspond to military effectiveness. A military that has more manpower resources is 
more likely to vanquish a numerically inferior opponent. In relation to military contracting, the 
manpower perspective holds that contractor manpower contributions to a force are the most 
significant means in which contractors contribute to military effectiveness.  
In the non-material PMSC context, how resources are employed more closely 
corresponds to military effectiveness. For example, a smaller, better-employed force can 
overcome a numerically superior force. In relation to military contracting, the force employment 
argument asserts that what resources the PMSC contributes to the military matter less than how 
those resources are employed. For example, a well-equipped PMSC might contribute more 
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manpower to a military but may not enhance military effectiveness if it employs methods that 
run counter to the military’s strategic requirements. Alternatively, a poorly equipped PMSC 
might contribute a minimal number of contractors to a military but enhance military 
effectiveness by employing its resources in a way that complies with the military’s objective. 
Therefore, CFE provides a better way of assessing military contracting as the material 
perspective might overestimate the efficacy of hiring high numbers of contractors that are poorly 
employed and underestimate the efficacy of hiring smaller numbers of contractors that are well 
employed.  
 
5.4.2 Contractor Force Employment and Doctrine 
 
 The three tenets of CFE demonstrate the importance of contractor doctrine to force 
employment. Contractor doctrine is the set of instructions the military uses to employ PMSC 
resources in order to achieve its objectives. It concerns how the military employs its contractor 
manpower.  In revisiting Military Power, Biddle asserts that:  
… doctrinal adaptation is increasingly credited with hastening the end of 
the war [WWI] by restoring maneuver to the battlefield in 1918; 
conversely, the absence of 1918-type methods in 1915-17 is increasingly 
seen as a central contributor to the great statement on the western front. 
Doctrine—force employment—is thus receiving greater explanatory 
weight relative to the material factors that have dominated earlier accounts 
of the war.443 
 
In addition, Biddle writes that for over a century, militaries have responded to changes in warfare 
through developing doctrine.444 Military organizations, like any organization be it a corporation 
or government entity, undertake organizational changes to improve effectiveness. However, 
innovations can have negative effects on military organizational control, predictability, stability, 
and certainty. Doctrine is critical to a military because it integrates its component parts and 
ensures that the outputs of each component can be added together to make progress towards the 
                                                          
443 Biddle, Military Power, 196. 
444 Biddle, Military Power, 197. 
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military goal.445 As such, doctrine prevents military contractors from elevating their narrow 
contract requirements above military objectives.446  
The importance of doctrine can be applied to contractor doctrine and developed in 
relation to contractor force employment. Contractor doctrine seeks to help the military establish 
organizational order between itself and PMSCs thus ensuring that contracts are being fulfilled 
and are being fulfilled by using practices conducive to achieving the military objective. 
Contractor doctrine does so by instructing the military on how to coordinate with PMSCs and 
employ them on the battlefield. Contractor doctrine “knits-together” military and PMSC 
processes by fostering coordination between the two groups.447 Therefore, the primary goal of 
contractor doctrine is to coordinate between military and PMSC groups. 
Military-contractor coordination is a critical function because it translates contractor 
manpower into military effectiveness. Heightened levels of coordination negate the natural 
tendency of PMSCs to elevate the fulfillment of the contract and the earning of profits above the 
military objective by employing methods that serve to fulfill the contract but impinge on the 
accomplishment of the military goal. One way developing contractor doctrine improves 
coordination is by encouraging specific PMSC tactics, behaviors, and structures that align with 
strategic requirements. PMSC tactics that conform to the military’s strategic requirements 
maximize military control and limit PMSC transgressions. The result of increasing control is the 
decline of transgressions that hurt overall military effectiveness. 
Another way contractor doctrine improves coordination is by fostering information flows 
between the military and contractor groups. In this way, greater coordination can reduce the 
frequency of military-contractor friendly fire incidents. Thus, coordination is key to ensuring that 
the military employs PMSC resources within the organization effectively. Doctrine reduces the 
likelihood that PMSC tactics satisfy military requirements and that the military employs them 
effectively within the organization. The result is that there is a higher likelihood that PMSCs 
fulfill contracts with tactics that help the military achieve its objective. CFE acknowledges that 
tactical issues are a function of coordination between military and PMSC groups. Therefore, it 
focuses on developing contractor doctrine to integrate PMSCs into the military organization to 
                                                          
445 Posen, Sources of Military Doctrine, 25. 
446 Posen, Sources of Military Doctrine, 53. 
447 Posen, Military Doctrine, 13. 
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reduce the negative effects of military contracting and to translate material resources into 
military effectiveness. 
PMSCs are important because they add resources to the military organization allowing 
for faster, more agile movement and enhanced military effectiveness. Yet, those resources do not 
automatically translate into increased battlefield performance. Militaries require these resources 
to be properly allocated and that PMSC tactics conform to military requirements. In order for 
PMSCs to enhance military effectiveness, tactics need to be tied to the military organization. The 
contractor force employment perspective asserts that developing contractor doctrine can aid the 
translation process by coordinating between the military and PMSC groups.  
 So far, this thesis has developed four key arguments. To summarize, general Strategic 
Studies’ literature has found that using manpower to assess military effectiveness is problematic. 
To fully understand military effectiveness, a force employment perspective is required. The logic 
of the force employment perspective to military effectiveness can be applied to specific sub-
divisions of military effectiveness, such as contractor effectiveness. The application of the force 
employment logic to military contracting suggests that understanding military contracting based 
exclusively through the manpower perspective could also be problematic. The military 
contracting literature has yet to explore the force employment perspective in relation to 
contractor effectiveness. Therefore, the literature is under-developed as the value of force 
employment to military contracting is untested. This thesis seeks to fill this gap by advancing 
CFE to understand military contracting from a non-material employment perspective. The 
remainder of this thesis is thus concerned with three questions: 
1. Which perspective is more useful to understanding and enhancing military effectiveness, 
the contractor manpower or contractor force employment perspective? Why? 
2. What is the best way to test these hypotheses?  
3. What insights are discoverable by applying the new CFE perspective? 
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5.5: CFE Hypotheses 
 
 In contrast to H1 and the manpower perspective to military contracting, the contractor 
force employment perspective asserts that the contractor force employment perspective 
correlates more closely with military effectiveness than manpower. This perspective has 
scholarly and practitioner support. In a broad International Relations sense, Biddle and Posen 
argues that force employment methods are the prime determinants of military effectiveness. 
Within the field of military contracting, research suggests that the emphasis Biddle places on 
force employment should apply to military contracting. For example, Dunigan, Bruneau, and 
Parrott suggest that the lack of contractor doctrine may be a key factor to how military 
contracting impacts military effectiveness. The implication is that contractor force employment 
should enhance military effectiveness by improving military-contractor integration.448  
 Furthermore, the military contracting literature suggests that military-contractor 
integration is linked to control. Hammes, for example, attributes PMSC control problems to lack 
of integration. In addition, the US government also recognizes the importance of doctrine to 
translating PMSC employment into enhanced military effectiveness.449 Therefore, there is a tacit 
line of argument suggesting that improved military-contractor integration results in better PMSC 
control, which combines to enhance military effectiveness.  
 Such support leads to the general hypothesis that contractor force employment is a prime 
determinant of military effectiveness. More specifically, CFE enhances military effectiveness by 
integrating PMSC material resources with military objectives. Thus CFE hypothesizes that: 
 
H2: PMSCs should cause a net increase in military effectiveness, when: 
• Contractor force employment methods integrates military and 
PMSC groups 
 
 If H2 is strongly supported by the data, it will indicate that improving contractor force 
employment methods will enhance military effectiveness. The hypothesis assumes that militaries 
will continue to develop their contractor doctrine and that the developments will yield future 
                                                          
448 Dunigan, Victory for Hire, 42. 
449 US Army, Urgent Reform Required: Army Expeditionary Contracting (Report of the Commission on Army 
Acquisition and Program Management, November 1, 2007), 1-5, 13. 
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improvements to military effectiveness. Improved contractor employment methods will foster 
military-contractor integration helping to translate PMSC material resources into enhanced 
military effectiveness. Figure 5.3 illustrates the relationship between integration and military 
effectiveness when contractor force employment methods are improved. 
 
Figure 5.3: Depicting Hypothesis Two 
                       
                                                                            +                     
 
 
 A third hypothesis is that military contracting hurts military effectiveness. Changes in 
contractor force employment may cause integration problems as new operating procedures are 
adopted. In this case, PMSCs cause a net decrease in military effectiveness by creating 
integration problems between military and PMSC groups. 
 
H3: PMSCs should cause a net decrease in military effectiveness, when: 
• Contractor force employment methods do not integrate the 
military and PMSC groups 
 
 If H3 is strongly supported by the data, it will indicate that changing contractor force 
employment methods will decrease military effectiveness. The hypothesis assumes that military 
effectiveness will cause military-contractor integration problems that result in increased coalition 
and civilian deaths. The logic is illustrated below in Figure 5.4. 
 
Figure 5.4: Depicting Hypothesis Three 
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Lastly, the thesis must leave open the possibility that military contracting has no discernible 
impact on military effectiveness. The thesis’ null hypothesis is: 
H0: PMSCs have no discernible effect on military effectiveness for one of two 
reasons. First, they do not impact military effectiveness in a way that is measured 
by this thesis. Second, positive or negative effects of military contracting will 
balance each other resulting in no impact. 
 
 The thesis’ material and non-material hypotheses guide the case study conducted in 
Chapter Seven. The case study tests the manpower perspective that underlies military contracting 
policy. In addition, it seeks to build on the force employment research, as well as the non-
material military contracting literature. In particular, the thesis aims to apply, extend, and 
synthesize upon the works of Biddle and Dunigan. However, the complete development of a 
contractor force employment theory is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
 
5.5.1: Manpower versus Contractor Force Employment Hypotheses  
 
 Thus far, this thesis has done three things. First, it has demonstrated theoretically and 
practically that military contracting impacts military effectiveness. Second, the thesis has 
provided a conception of the competing manpower and force employment perspectives. Third, it 
has provided an understanding of the differences between military and contractor effectiveness, 
and how each fits into the military contracting literature.  
Now, the purpose of this thesis is to determine the merits of the manpower and force 
employment perspectives with respect to military contracting and military effectiveness. It does 
so by testing the hypotheses derived from each perspective. The contractor manpower 
perspective asserts that more military contractors equates to enhanced military effectiveness. The 
contractor force employment perspective asserts that the impact military contracting has on 
military effectiveness is a function of how contractors are employed. The hypotheses are 
summarized in Table 5.2 below. 
The thesis makes two assumptions in the hypotheses and the subsequent tests because of 
the absence of direct measurements of key variables. First, the thesis assumes that contractor 
force employment improves over time. Therefore, where specific force employment methods are 
132 
 
not enshrined in doctrine, the thesis assumes that time can be used as a proxy for improvements 
in contractor force employment. Second, the thesis assumes that contractor force employment is 
weakly correlated with contractor manpower levels and that manpower levels do not drive the 
development of contractor force employment methods. The reason for this assumption is that 
force employment choices driven by political, social, and organizational factors cannot be 
observed directly. As a consequence, the thesis assumes that the choices are not correlated with 
contractor manpower. 
 
Table 5.2: Summarizing the Hypotheses 
 
  Civilian Deaths   Coalition Deaths 
  (iCasualty.org)   (Iraq Body Count) 
PMSC Manpower  Material  
 
Material  
(FFR) 1a. Deaths decrease 
with respect to 
contractor manpower 
 
2a. Deaths decrease 
with respect to 
contractor manpower 
      
 
1b. Deaths decrease 
with respect to 
contractor and coalition 
manpower 
 
3b. Deaths decrease 
with respect to 
contractor and coalition 
manpower 
PMSC Manpower  Material    Material  
(FSR) 3a. Deaths decrease 
with respect to 
contractor FSR  
4a. Deaths decrease 
with respect to 
contractor FSR 
      
 
3b. Deaths decrease 
with respect to 
contractor and coalition 
FSR  
4b. Deaths decrease 
with respect to 
contractor and coalition 
FSR 
PMSC Manpower  Material    Material  
(Population 
Density) 
5a. Deaths decrease 
with respect to 
contractor population 
density  
6a. Deaths decrease 
with respect to 
contractor population 
density 
      
 
5b. Deaths decrease 
with respect to 
contractor and coalition 
population density  
6b. Deaths decrease 
with respect to 
contractor and coalition 
population density 
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 In summary, there is one major observable divergence between the contractor manpower 
perspective and the contractor force employment perspective. The manpower perspective holds 
that manpower levels (FFR, FSR, and population-density) should be inversely proportional with 
levels of violence as measured by coalition and civilian deaths. The manpower perspective will 
be disconfirmed should manpower levels and coalition and civilian deaths be directly related. A 
direct relationship will corroborate the CFE perspective so long as the development of contractor 
force employment has not taken place. An inverse relationship will support the CFE perspective 
if the changes observed are more closely related to the changes in contractor force employment 
methods rather than the change in the level of contractors employed. 
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CHAPTER SIX: METHODOLOGY 
 
 Thus far this thesis has focused on the ontology and epistemology behind military 
contracting in order to lay the foundation required to test the manpower and CFE perspectives. 
Chapters Two and Three focused on ontology by describing that the fundamental purpose behind 
the practice of military contracting is to boost military effectiveness. Chapters Four and Five 
explored the body of knowledge on the nature of war, military effectiveness, and military 
contracting and categorized the literature into material and non-material groupings. This chapter 
focuses on methodology.  
Methodology is especially important to analyzing the manpower and CFE perspectives, 
and to the thesis more generally, for three reasons. First, methodology is critical to testing and 
reinvigorating older paradigms in order to build rigorous new paradigms such as CFE. Second, it 
is necessary to dwell on methodology in this thesis because there are no extant studies that 
provide a mixed method design that seek to analyze, measure, and enhance military effectiveness 
through military contracting. In Chapter One, this was one of the key problems this thesis aimed 
to address: To clarify confusion about whether military contracting increases military 
effectiveness and why. Thus, a rigorous methodology is required to theorize on this new topic. 
Third, methodology is necessary because CFE is an original approach to understanding military 
contracting. As such, the process of enquiry into military contracting must be backed up by solid 
methodological foundations in order for it to be valid and the design of enquiry must be 
rigorously described so that it can be replicated in future research. 
 The chapter establishes a solid methodological foundation by drawing on the thriving 
body of literature that exists outside of the International Relations and Strategic Studies fields on 
methodology. This chapter surveys this literature, elucidates its key tenets and applies them to its 
analysis of military contracting. To do so, the chapter first discusses the research paradigms that 
underpin both the material manpower and non-material CFE perspectives. Next it discusses the 
design of the enquiry and then provides a detailed outline of the data collection process and the 
specific quantitative and qualitative analysis methods employed. The chapter concludes by 
discussing the limitations of the thesis. Overall, the aim of this chapter is to strengthen the 
validity of this research by showing consistency amongst the research purposes, questions, and 
methods it employs.  
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The thesis employs a mixed method, case study approach to test its core hypotheses. More 
specifically, the mixed method case study design is used to test the relationship between the two 
independent variables—manpower and contractor force employment methods—with the 
dependent variable—military effectiveness. The mixed methods approach is located in two 
paradigmatic domains because it employs quantitative and qualitative research methods. A 
discussion of relevant research on the research paradigms provides an overview of this approach.  
 
6.1 Research Paradigms: A Pre-Requisite to Perception 
 
 The purpose of this thesis is to test the manpower and force employment perspectives in 
relation to military contracting. The manpower perspective represents a material approach to 
understanding military contracting. It maintains that a military’s capability can be objectively 
quantified based on the number of contractors employed. The manpower perspective suggests 
that the relationship between military contracting and military effectiveness is premised on what 
and how many military contracting resources are employed. 
 The CFE perspective represents a non-material approach to understanding military 
contracting. It maintains that a military’s capability is more strongly related to the way military 
contractors are employed. Thus, since force employment consists of instructions for employing 
resources, CFE hypothesizes that the relationship between military contracting and military 
effectiveness is closely linked to contractor force employment. To reiterate, CFE asserts that 
contractor effectiveness is a sub-component of military contracting and that how and why 
contractor resources are employed is as, if not more, critical to military effectiveness than what 
resources are employed. In order to test the material and non-material hypotheses, it is important 
to focus on the underlying perceptions of each paradigm. The material and non-material 
discrepancies between the manpower and CFE perspectives cause each to fall within two 
different methodological paradigms.  
 Research paradigms are important to effective research because they establish how social 
reality is perceived. According to Thomas Kuhn, paradigms are “universally recognized 
scientific achievements that for a time provide model problems and solutions to a community of 
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practitioners” which Kuhn believes is a “prerequisite to perception itself.”450 Gioia and Pitre 
defined the term “paradigm” as “a general perspective or way of thinking that reflects 
fundamental beliefs and assumptions about the nature of organizations.”451 There are four 
research paradigms: (1) functionalist (positivist); (2) interpretive (post-positivist); (3) radical 
humanist; (4) radical structuralist (see Figure 6.1, below).  
 
Figure 6.1: The Paradigms of Research452 
 
RADICAL CHANGE 
 
  
SU
B
JE
C
T
IV
E 
Radical 
Humanist 
Radical 
Structuralist OB
JE
C
T
IV
E 
Interpretive Functionionalist 
 
CONTINUITY 
  
Each of these paradigmatic approaches to social enquiry differs based on its understanding of 
social reality; specifically, on fundamental assumptions about the nature of organizational 
phenomena (ontology), the nature of knowledge about these phenomena (epistemology), and the 
nature of ways of studying these phenomena (methodology).453 Burrell and Morgan resolve these 
differences amongst the four paradigms along objective-subjective and regulation-radical change 
dimensions.454  
                                                          
450 Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 2nd ed. (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1970), 
vii, 113. 
451 Dennis A. Gioia and Evelyn Pitre, “Multiparadigm Perspectives on Theory Building,” The Academy of 
Management Review vol. 15, no. 4 (1990): 585. 
452 Gibson Burrell and Gareth Morgan, Sociological Paradigms and Organisational Analysis (Aldershot, England: 
Ashgate, 1979), 22. 
453 Gioia and Pitre, “Multiparadigm Perspectives,” 585. 
454 Burrell and Morgan, Sociological Paradigms and Organisational Analysis, 22. 
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Functionalists, for example, perceive social reality as objective, and have an orientation 
towards the stability or maintenance of the status quo. Interpretivists adopt a subjectivist view, 
believing that social reality is how individuals make sense of the external world and is concerned 
with regulation. The radical humanist paradigm is also characterized by a subjective view, 
however, with an ideological orientation toward radically changing constructed realities. Finally, 
the radical structuralist paradigm is typified by an objective view coupled with the desire to 
radically change the status quo.455 
 
6.1.1 The Functionalist-Interpretivist Approach 
 
The functional-interpretivist approach is used for the purpose of this thesis. The 
functional approach aligns with the manpower perspective in perceiving the social phenomenon 
of war as being a function of numerical balances between opponents. In other words, it asserts 
that the what and the how many in terms of the number of military contractors, guns, and bombs, 
for example, are strong determinants of military effectiveness. The interpretivist approach aligns 
with the non-material CFE perspective in perceiving war as being subjective and qualitatively 
related to how resources are employed. The CFE perspective and interpretivist paradigm closely 
align by emphasizing that how militaries make sense of material resources and employ them is 
the most proximate determinant of military effectiveness.  
As illustrated in Chapter Four, Strategic Studies has traditionally been guided by 
functionalism because of its material objective and theory-based approach to understanding the 
causes, conduct, and consequences of war. However, while the use of a singular paradigm 
produces valuable data, it is incomplete because a single paradigm is predicated on only one way 
of understanding organizational phenomenon. Therefore, the use of only one paradigm cannot 
account for the multifaceted nature of organizational phenomena, and consideration of theories 
from alternative paradigms is needed.456 
                                                          
455 See, Susan Gasson, “Rigor in Grounded Theory Research: An Interpretive Perspective on Generating Theory 
from Qualitative Field Studies,” in Handbook for Information Systems Research, eds. Michael E. Whitman and Amy 
B. Woszczynski (Hershey, PA: Idea Group Publishing, 2003), 79-102.  
456 John Hassard, “Multiple Paradigm and Organizational Analysis: A Case Study,” Organizational Studies, vol. 12, 
no. 2 (1994): 278. 
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Scholars and practitioners argue about whether material or non-material resources are 
more important to military effectiveness. As such, because military contracting is but one 
component of a complex multifaceted military organization, a plural approach is required in 
order to understand the organization, its individual components, its outputs, and to test both 
material and non-material perspectives. For this reason, the present research adopts a multi-
paradigmatic approach.  
A multi-paradigmatic approach alleviates the concerns of narrowness by applying the 
tenets of more than one paradigm to understanding organizational phenomenon. According to 
Gioia and Pitre:  
… multi-paradigm approaches offer the possibility of creating 
fresh insights because they start from different ontological and 
epistemological assumptions and, therefore, can tap different facets 
of organizational phenomena and can produce markedly different 
and uniquely informative theoretical views of events under 
study.457   
 
Hence, using a multi-paradigmatic approach to studying disparate issues is a better way of 
fostering a more comprehensive understanding of complex organizational phenomena like 
military contracting. Accordingly, this thesis employs a multi-paradigmatic approach by bridging 
two paradigms instead of synthesizing them. Such an approach is epistemologically possible 
because paradigmatic dimensions (subjective/objective and stability/change) are actually 
continua, making it difficult, if not impossible, to establish exactly where one paradigm ends and 
another begins.458 Thus, the paradigms are permeable to a limited, but conceptual extent, 
allowing them to be bridged. However, despite the possibility of bridging across boundaries, it is 
confined to the boundary areas, or transition zones, of the paradigms. Hence, as one moves away 
from the border areas, the theoretical tenets become incompatible with alternative views offered 
by other paradigms. Accordingly, the multi-paradigmatic approach used in this thesis operates 
along the functionalist-interpretivist boundary of objectivity-subjectivity. Neither paradigm 
represents radical change to which militaries have historically been averse.459 
                                                          
457 Gioia and Pitre, “Multiparadigm Perspectives,” 591. 
458 Gioia and Pitre, “Multiparadigm Perspectives,” 596. 
459 See, Posen, Sources of Military Doctrine. 
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While functionalist, or positivist, views have dominated International Relations and 
Strategic Studies, there have been several challenges to functionalist science from notable 
thinkers including Karl Popper, Stephen Toulmin, Thomas Kuhn, and Paul Feyerbend.460 These 
philosophers collectively destabilized the functionalist notions of absolute truth, provable 
hypotheses, and unbiased value-free research.461 In relation to this thesis, subjectivist views and 
the transformational change associated with military contracting call into doubt ontological, 
epistemological, and methodological functionalist assumptions of the existence of socially 
quantifiable “facts”.462 As such, this thesis adopts a functionalist-interpretivist approach to 
provide a comprehensive understanding of the relationship between military contracting and 
military effectiveness with respect to the ontological, epistemological, and methodological 
ordering principles.  
Ontologically, functionalism’s assumption of objectivity, that real-world phenomena and 
relationships exist independently of an individual’s perceptions, cannot be assumed when 
analyzing social constructs and organizational phenomena present in war. Instead, subjective 
criteria need to be established before an objective assessment can be made. The reason for this is 
that using an immutable objectivist framework makes understanding war and military 
contracting difficult since it is driven by the social phenomenon of power. Thus, in order to make 
inferences based on objective data (i.e. battles won, contractors employed, etc.), subjective 
interpretations of how each contributes to indicators of power, such as “winning” and 
“effectiveness”, need to be made. Therefore, the ontological assumptions of functionalism that 
relate to the material approach only make sense after the meanings of social constructs are 
defined by the interpretivist paradigm related to contractor force employment. 
 Epistemologically, the study of military contracting cannot rely solely on the functionalist 
paradigm, natural laws, and the application of models, theories and ratios because they do not 
relate to contextual factors associated with employing military contractors to boost military 
effectiveness. CFE asserts that understanding military contracting requires more than just a 
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manpower perspective so that interpretivist descriptions, insights, explanations of events, 
interpretations, and meanings of military effectiveness are accurately associated with the 
employment of military contractors. In doing so, the CFE perspective facilitates a more nuanced 
analysis of the effects of military contracting.  
Methodologically, functionalist researchers seek to examine regularities and relationships 
that lead to generalizations and hypotheses about the “organizational world”. These pervade 
conceptions of the causes, conduct, and consequences of war. However, CFE argues that 
examining the regularities and relationships involved in military contracting without taking 
contextual factors into account fails to address the ability of the state and military to translate 
contractor resources into increased military effectiveness. An interpretivist approach 
supplements the functionalist approach by accounting for these contextual factors enabling a 
richer, more complete understanding of social phenomena like war and the understanding of the 
relationship between military contracting and military effectiveness. Therefore, the application of 
both the interpretive and functionalist paradigms enable a more complete understanding of 
military contracting and its effects on military capability. Consequently, both functionalist and 
interpretivist paradigms have been significant influences on the modern mixed methods 
movement. There use underpins the reasoning for employing qualitative methods to add to the 
findings of quantitative methods or vice-versa.463 
The need for this multi-paradigmatic approach stems from the shortcomings inherent in 
both the functional and interpretivist paradigms. This study bridges these paradigms to provide a 
more nuanced understanding of military effectiveness through testing the manpower perspective 
and building, applying, and testing the force employment perspective to military contracting. The 
functional-interpretivist approach allows practitioners and theorists alike to recognize the 
limitations in materially defining constructs like military effectiveness while maintaining that 
war can be studied objectively.464 In employing a multi-paradigmatic approach, the thesis can 
test and employ both the materially oriented functionalist and non-materially-oriented 
interpretivist approaches to assessing military contracting. Hence, the thesis weaves the 
functional notion of structure with the interpretive conception of structuring produces a more 
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comprehensive understanding of military contracting as functionalist relationships and 
consequences are explored sequentially with the interpretivist paradigms focusing on meaning 
and context.465 The findings from both functionally driven material analyses of contractor 
manpower and interpretive analyses of contractor force employment methods are used to 
understand the relationship between military contracting and military effectiveness. 
 
6.2 Case Study Design: Military Contracting in Operation Iraqi Freedom 
 
The functionalist-interpretivist approach to understanding the complex relationship 
between military contracting and military effectiveness is situated within a case study design. 
Robert Yin, a world-renowned case study scholar, defines the case study approach as an 
empirical enquiry that “investigates a contemporary phenomenon in depth and within its real-life 
context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly 
evident.”466 Stake adds to this definition stating that the case study approach is also preferred 
when the relevant behaviors cannot be manipulated.467 The case study, according to Goode and 
Hatt, “is a way of organizing social data so as to preserve the unitary character of the social 
object being studied.” As such, the case study is a methodological source of all four-research 
paradigms and can be applied to descriptive, explanatory, or exploratory studies.468 Schramm 
(1971) states that: 
The essence of a case study, the central tendency among all types of case 
study, is that it tries to illuminate a decision or set of decisions: why they 
were taken, how they were implemented, and with what result.469 
 
This thesis explores Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) as its case study. The OIF case study 
represents the unprecedented employment of military contracting, as it was the first 
contemporary conflict where contractors outnumbered traditional military personnel. Given this 
discussion, the case study approach is a valuable tool for understanding military contracting by 
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illuminating the set of decisions surrounding it in a wartime context. The OIF case enables the 
specific analysis and collection of data in a detailed manner. It does so by focusing analyses on 
military effectiveness and binding it to a specific time period of military contracting. For this 
reason, the case study can answer “how” and “why” research questions, which explore, in-depth 
and within context, the boundaries of military contracting and military effectiveness. The case 
study is also ideal for addressing “what” questions involved with studying phenomena and 
developing pertinent hypotheses and propositions for further inquiries.”470  
The case study approach also enables the use of multiple disciplines, including both 
functionalist and interpretivist approaches that utilize quantitative and qualitative data.471 The 
multiple sources of evidence, the exceeding numbers of variables to data points in war, and the 
two opposing perspectives of contractor manpower and contractor force employment make the 
case study an ideal approach to analyzing the relationship between military contracting and 
military effectiveness. Furthermore, the case study approach can yield useful generic knowledge 
about military contracting by allowing explanations to be drawn from the phenomenon and 
applied to theory.472 
The United States’ military contracting experience during OIF is the focus of the case 
study. The scope of the analysis is limited to the US because it is the largest military contractor 
in the world and has reoccurring debates on the utility of military contracting. The purpose of the 
analysis is to determine the impact American military contracting had on the achievement of 
American military and political objectives. Therefore, the information analyzed by this thesis is 
limited to only those military contractors hired by the US Department of Defense. Contractors 
hired by a different US agency, other states, businesses, and/or non-governmental organizations 
are not analyzed by this thesis for two reasons. First, contractors employed by these entities have 
little bearing on US military effectiveness and American contracting policy. Second, data on 
these contractors is so inaccurate that findings from analyses are not meaningful. Therefore, the 
DoD military contracting experience in OIF is the sole focus of this thesis. 
OIF is used as a single case study because military contracting during the conflict 
represents a critical test to the existing contractor manpower perspective and the emergent 
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contractor force employment perspective. The single case study represents a critical test because 
not only does OIF represent the highest instance of military contracting in history, but it also 
encompasses the development of contractor force employment methods in the contemporary era. 
Process tracing is used to increase the generalizability of the study’s findings and increase the 
richness of conclusions drawn about theoretical propositions.  
Process tracing is defined as “attempts to assess the possibility of a causal relationship 
between independent and dependent variables by identifying intervening steps, or cause-and-
effect links, between them.”473 This approach is applied to the OIF case by assessing the 
relationship between contractor manpower and contractor force employment methods with 
coalition and civilian deaths. The analysis uses multiple data points to make strict comparisons 
and orderly cumulation in order to increase the reliability of the findings while mitigating the 
weaknesses associated with using a single historical analogy. The use of multiple data points 
within the broader Iraq conflict makes the findings more compelling and more robust.474  
OIF is used to analyze contractor manpower and force employment in order to build 
theory. Theory building is used in this research because it is inductive and corresponds with the 
study’s exploratory purpose and mixed methods design. First, it seeks to test the manpower 
perspective because a review of the theoretical literature and historical evidence indicates that 
there is not a link between observable empirical facts on contractor effectiveness and military 
contracting policy. Thus, the policy of using military contracting to boost manpower levels in 
order to enhance military effectiveness may rest on weak foundations.  
In addition, the new CFE perspective is developed and tested to provide a competing 
perspective to the manpower perspective and to discern whether the general force employment 
theory can be applied more specifically to military contracting. Theory building is conducted in 
this research because it determines if propositions drawn from theoretical research on military 
contracting and CFE correspond with battlefield outcomes in real life. The case employs a mixed 
method design to ensure that the thesis procedures are well documented and that quantitative and 
qualitative lines of enquiry converge in a coherent manner. The mixed method case study design 
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addresses criticisms that argue that case study findings are not scientific in nature because 
replication is not possible, and therefore, the results are not widely applicable in real life. 
 
6.3 Mixed Methods: Employing Quantitative and Qualitative Methods 
 
 The case study design enables a combined functionalist and interpretivist approach to 
perceiving social reality. In turn, the relationship between functionalist and interpretivist 
paradigms lends itself to mixed method research because of the traditional association of 
functionalism with quantitative methods, and interpretivism with qualitative methods.475 
Consequently, mixed method research benefits this study by enabling it to utilize both 
quantitative and qualitative data in the study of military contracting.476 
Mixed methods approach can be defined as the blending of quantitative and qualitative 
approaches.477 According to Bescuides et al.: 
A mixed-methods approach strengthens evaluation research, because no 
single method is without weakness or bias. Quantitative data, for example, 
may be objective, but they often lack the depth needed to elucidate how 
and why a program works. Qualitative data can enhance understanding of 
program implementation and operation, but are considered less objective. 
By combining the two, research can be both objective and rich.478   
 
Mixed method is a research approach in which qualitative and quantitative data collection 
and analysis strategies are combined to answer research questions within a single project.479 
Mixed methods were first employed in 1959 in the field of psychology480 but expanded as more 
researchers became interested in converging or triangulating different quantitative and qualitative 
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data sources.481 Mixed methods converges and triangulates by complementing the strengths of 
qualitative (words, context, meaning) and quantitative (numbers, trends, generalizabilty) 
approaches while offsetting their shortcomings.482 Incorporating a mixed methods design into a 
case study approach increases rigor and generalizability by offsetting the shortcomings of the 
case study approach with the strengths of statistical analysis.  
The primary reason researchers employ the mixed methods strategy is to better 
understand complex social phenomena. Both qualitative and quantitative methods are utilized 
within the mixed method strategy because complex social phenomena, such as war, cannot be 
fully understood using either purely qualitative or purely quantitative techniques. Instead, both 
qualitative and quantitative methods are used to expand an understanding from one method to 
another and confirm findings from different data sources.483 Consequently, combining qualitative 
and quantitative research methods provides a menu of various data sources and analytical tools 
that help to make inferences about these social phenomena.484 The design is also useful to 
explore phenomena by expanding on qualitative findings by allowing inferences produced at the 
qualitative phase to be explained, elaborated, and refined at the quantitative phase.485  
This thesis adopts a two-phase mixed methods approach in order to use qualitative and 
quantitative data to test the manpower and CFE perspectives. Quantitative methods are used in 
the first phase to analyze the relationship between contractor manpower and military 
effectiveness. The second phase uses process tracing to add nuance to and generalize themes.486 
Taken together, the mixed method design uses the strengths of quantitative and qualitative 
research to obtain two different complementary types of data.487 This is termed triangulation, 
which is employed to increase validity and enable generalization by converging lines of inquiry. 
According to Creswell, triangulation is used when researchers want to compare qualitative and 
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quantitative information in order to present well-corroborated conclusions.488 Triangulation 
collects and analyzes quantitative and qualitative data and then merges together the results of 
each to produce an interpretation.489  
The qualitative phase of the sequence is guided, in part, by the results of the quantitative 
phase so that quantitative results can be more comprehensively developed, increasing the 
understanding of social phenomena.490 Researchers employ the design when they need additional 
qualitative information to explain interesting quantitative findings. In this thesis, qualitative 
analysis of the CFE perspective follows a quantitative analysis of manpower to deepen an 
understanding of the literature on military contracting. 
The straightforward nature of the mixed-method design is one of its main strengths. It is 
easy to implement because the stages fall into two distinct phases. This feature also makes it easy 
to describe and report.491 The main challenge of this design is the amount of time involved in 
developing expertise in both quantitative and qualitative methods, as well as collecting data for 
each of these phases.  
 
6.4 Sources of Data Collection 
 
Yin states that there are six sources of evidence in the case study: documents, archival 
records, interviews, direct observations, participant observations, and physical artifacts.492 In 
studying the relationship between military contracting and military effectiveness, this research 
uses three key sources of evidence: archival records, interviews, and documents. The other 
sources of evidence are not relevant to this study because direct and participant observations are 
not possible when the phenomenon being studied is military contracting, and there are no 
physical artifacts associated with the study.493 The use of three qualitative methods also enables 
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triangulation to occur within the qualitative stage of the study as each method is used to 
corroborate the other. 
 
6.4.1 Archival Records 
 
Archival records are used to support this thesis. Archival record analysis is the secondary 
analysis of public use files, records, and data or private documents, such as letters and emails.494 
Some examples of archival records are census reports and other statistical data made available by 
federal, state, and local governments, service records, such as those showing the number of 
clients served over a given period of time, survey data such as data previously collected about a 
site’s employees, residents, or participants, or organizational records, such as budget or 
personnel records.495 This thesis uses archival records from the US Department of Defense 
(DoD), icasualties.org, and Iraq Body Count (IBC). The records are accessed through public 
domain websites. 
The DoD records the number of contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan. Since August 2008, 
contractor numbers have been published in the CENTCOM Quarterly Contractor Census Report. 
The census does not distinguish between types of contractors or whether they are armed or 
unarmed. However, if the PMSC manpower logic applies, then even contractors serving in non-
combat roles should produce an aggregate increase in military effectiveness since they allow 
military personnel to concentrate on war fighting. It is used by this thesis to establish contractor 
manpower levels, which is one of the independent variables.  
The dependent variable, military effectiveness, is measured using two proxy variables: 
coalition and civilian deaths. Data is collected on these proxy variables from the IBC databases 
and icasualties.org. Measuring military effectiveness this way produces continuity given that the 
contractor manpower perspective is premised on General Petraeus’ comments on military 
contractors being force multipliers.496 The IBC database reports the number of coalition deaths in 
Iraq. The icasualties.org data is used as a measure of civilian deaths. “The levels of coalition and 
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civilian deaths serve as proxies to military effectiveness based on General Petraeus’ criteria in 
gauging the efficacy of the surge in terms of reducing “security incidents” and “curbing sectarian 
violence” as seen in decreases in the number of coalition and civilian deaths.”497 
These three archival records are useful to this thesis for a number of reasons. For 
instance, data can be reviewed repeatedly, is unobtrusive, inexpensive, and time-effective to 
collect, encompasses long spans of time, and makes removed populations accessible. However, 
there are also weaknesses associated with archival records. For example, data sets may have 
biased selectivity. In relation to the databases used in this analysis, the reporting of contractor 
numbers, coalition and civilian deaths is likely to be incomplete. In addition, there may be a 
reporting bias as the organization collecting and reporting the data might have ulterior 
motives.498  
In the case of the DoD records on military contractor numbers, these biases cannot be 
reduced through cross-referencing since it is the only complete and publically available data set 
on contractor numbers. While other reports exist, their figures vary widely due to different 
reporting criteria thereby making the Contractor Census Report the most stable. Therefore, 
general statistical analysis of the data could be potent to uncovering particular trends involving 
military contracting and military effectiveness. Unfortunately, detailed statistical analysis is 
unlikely to be statistically sound given the incomplete data in the set and the potential selectivity 
bias. In other words, the dataset’s quality does not support high-level statistical analysis, which is 
the reason for the analysis adopting a simple regression (6.5.2 below). The thesis uses third party 
data on coalition and civilian deaths to mitigate any selection biases. In addition, the weakness 
inherent in archival records is further mitigated through the qualitative phase of research.  
 
6.4.2 Semi-Structured Face-to-Face Interviews  
 
Semi-structured face-to-face interviews were conducted with scholars, military personnel, 
policymakers, and private contractors to collect qualitative historical information. The interviews 
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represent an important source of information on military contracting. The semi-structured, face-
to-face interview technique was used to control the line of questioning in order to enable the 
research to focus directly on military contracting in OIF. As such, the interviews followed a 
certain set of questions derived from the interview protocol.499 Questions pertaining directly to 
the topic were asked outright to elicit relevant explanations and causal inferences enabling the 
data gathered to reflect actual experiences of military contracting. This interview method is 
preferable because of the limited time each interviewee had available. Interviewing is 
particularly critical to the study of military contracting because gaining access to directly observe 
military or contracting groups was not possible.  
Interviews took place either in public places or in an office environment that was 
comfortable for the participant. The interviews were conducted to enable a level of detail about 
participant experiences in order to become involved in the actual experiences associated with 
military contracting. Specifically, semi-structured face-to-face interviews were conducted to 
disprove the findings of archival records and document analysis. General open-ended questions 
were asked to assume a conversational manner and to garner the participants’ views and 
opinions. The general questions that framed and fostered consistency between the interviews 
were, “What specific experiences have you had with military privatization in relation to your 
occupation?” and  “What were your initial impressions when the United States began to heavily 
use private security contractors during Operation Iraqi Freedom?” for example. See Appendix A, 
page 247. 
The interview protocol also helped to alleviate the weaknesses inherent in collecting data 
through interviews. For example, the interview protocol helped to corroborate theoretical and 
practical propositions that had previously been established to cover for any inaccurate 
information collected due to lapses in the participant’s memory or any desire to give the account 
they believe the interviewer wants to hear. The specific questions listed on the protocol helped to 
root out response bias by posing similar questions in different ways.500 The content gained from 
the interviews corroborated data collected through documentation. 
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6.4.3 Documentation 
 
In the context of military contracting and military effectiveness, historical documents 
have an important role. The documentation used by this thesis consists of primary and secondary 
material, both personal and public in nature. The focus of documentation analysis provides 
breadth and depth. Primary documents include public documentation like transcripts of 
Congressional hearings and interview notes taken during the semi-structured face-to-face 
interviews. Secondary documents consisting of administrative documents (progress reports and 
other internal government documents), formal studies, news clippings and other articles 
appearing in various newspapers and media outlets are also used as points of evidence. In 
particular, administrative documents from United States agencies such as the Congressional 
Budget Office (CBO), General Accounting Office (GAO), Special Inspector General for Iraq 
Reconstruction (SIGIR), the Commission on Wartime Contracting (CWC), and hearings from  
Congressional Committees501 are heavily relied upon to capture the US interpretation of military 
contracting in Iraq.  
Both primary and secondary documents are used to corroborate and augment evidence 
from archival records analysis and interview analysis. The purposes of using document analysis, 
similar to that of archival records, is to allow the analysis of a stable, convenient and unobtrusive 
source of information that spans long periods of time. In addition to these strengths, 
documentation has the ability to obtain the language and words of participants, which helps to 
characterize the topics under study. Some weaknesses are also similar to archival records, such 
as the documents may be difficult to locate or gain access to and may be incomplete.  
Overall, collecting multiple sources of evidence enables data source triangulation. 
Triangulation suits the mixed method case study design and enables it to test prior development 
of theoretical propositions on military contracting.502 The result of using multiple types of 
evidence is to increase the validity of the process by crosschecking evidence with different forms 
of evidence. 
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6.5 Data Analysis Using Mixed Methods 
 
Data collected through archival records, interviews, and documentation are used to 
develop multiple inferences that confirm or complement each other.503 They provide the 
foundation for data analysis. Data analysis is undertaken using the two-phase mixed method 
design. The purpose of analysis is to use quantitative and qualitative methods to enable 
triangulation and complementarity. This section first describes the purposes of analysis in detail 
and then discusses the quantitative and qualitative procedures employed. 
Data analysis is guided by theoretical propositions related to the military contractor 
manpower perspective and the contractor force employment perspective. These theoretical 
propositions aid the analysis by focusing on certain data and ignoring others. Contractor 
manpower is tested using statistical regression analysis. Case descriptions of military contracting 
such as process tracing and pattern matching techniques are used to test CFE qualitatively. Both 
tests provide the framework for organizing the description of the relations between manpower 
and CFE perspectives, military contracting, and military effectiveness and are conducted within a 
single case study.  
 
6.5.1 The Purpose of Analysis 
 
Competing explanations are used when explaining if key theoretical propositions are 
articulated in the empirical findings. Competing explanations are analyzed by comparing the 
initial theoretical propositions and hypotheses of the manpower perspective against that of force 
employment.504 This research uses the CFE perspective as an alternative to the manpower 
perspective by seeking to explain the impact military contracting has on military effectiveness. 
Research tests both perspectives to discover what makes military and private military actors 
operate and perform the way they do. The rival theories are tested using complementary methods 
(statistical analyses, process tracing, and pattern matching) to enable triangulation of results and 
the prospect of greater confidence than either form of analysis could provide alone. The 
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competing explanations technique will be used in this research when determining if manpower or 
CFE propositions are more useful in explaining empirical findings. 
Each perspective’s hypotheses are compared and contrasted within the case study. What 
results is an evaluation of whether the observed outcomes in military effectiveness were the 
result of increased manpower, as in the case of the manpower perspective, or the development of 
force employment methods as supported by CFE. The two perspectives are unique in that they 
interpret the impact military contracting has on military effectiveness differently. Therefore, the 
competing explanation would be that the observed outcomes were in fact the result of the other 
perspective’s predicted influence. It is important to note that the findings of this thesis will be 
significant if CFE has an impact on military effectiveness because it would not only indicate the 
relevance of contractor force employment but also demonstrate that the contractor manpower 
argument is incomplete. 
In analyzing the rival theories, the data collection, as mentioned above, consists of 
evidence supporting each perspective’s hypotheses. Concentration, however, is placed on 
manpower perspective to stack the deck against the proposed CFE. The OIF case study selected 
vigorously supports the contractor manpower perspective because of the unprecedented military 
contracting that occurred. Stacking the deck in favor of the manpower perspective is done to 
prove the potency of the CFE perspective without biasing the new perspective.505 
Taken together, the multiple data sources, data collection and analysis procedures, and 
research methods enable the thesis to triangulate findings on military contracting. Triangulating 
data leads to convergence of research findings which mean stronger, more defensible knowledge 
claims with more validity or credibility and less known bias. Therefore, triangulation is an 
advantage to using both quantitative and qualitative methods in this thesis because it tests the 
reliability of findings obtained by crosschecking one method against the other.506 Consequently, 
even if the quantitative and qualitative findings produce unexplainable divergence, it can still 
help develop stronger knowledge claims about military contracting by leading to a falsification 
of previous manpower assumptions.507  
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Complementarity is another advantage of the mixed methods research design. 
Complementarity is when one method provides clarification with the use of another method.508 
In this case, qualitative interpretations of CFE are used to complement quantitative data on 
contractor manpower by describing the contractor force employment methods behind the raw 
manpower numbers. As such, the results from one method help to complement the other to guide 
and shape subsequent steps in the research process, which can generate new comprehension of 
military contracting.509 In this way, complementarity is advantageous to research because it 
provides richness and detail to military contracting beyond the use of either quantitative or 
qualitative methods alone.510 The major strength of the two-phase mixed methods design is the 
opportunity to use many different sources of evidence. Drawing on multiple sources of evidence 
allows this thesis to explore a broader range of historical and behavioral issues, which is central 
to establishing validity.511 
 
6.5.2 Phase One Quantitative Approach: Statistical Analysis  
 
 Phase One quantitative analysis involves analyzing the statistical data on military 
contracting and military effectiveness to determine the impact of contractor manpower numbers 
have on military effectiveness. Statistical regression is used to discern larger trends about the 
contractor manpower perspective as they relate to quantitative rules of thumb, such as the 
recommended force-to-force ratio (FFR), force-to-space ratio (FSR), and population density in 
the OIF case study. These measures are employed to determine if the number of military 
contractors combined with military personnel elicit the same values as general manpower. In 
other words, FFR, FSR, and population density are used to test the manpower perspective. A 
standard Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression with logarithmic transformations is 
employed. OLS requires normally distributed variables and is the most basic and transparent 
regression. It determines if there is a correlation between the number of contractors and the 
number of coalition and civilian deaths. In addition, the measure tests the basic claim that 
military effectiveness is increased as it employs more contractors.  
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 To reiterate, the purpose of the quantitative analysis is to test the explanatory power of 
the contractor manpower perspective. The hypothesis concerns the relationship between 
continuous variables such as the variation in violent activities with manpower levels. For these 
hypotheses, the most powerful tool to employ is regression analyses.512 Phase I analysis is a six-
step process: 
 
1. Contractor manpower is compared to coalition and civilian deaths.   
2. Total force manpower is compared to coalition and civilian deaths.  
3. Contractor manpower is compared with the size of Iraq in square kilometers. 
4. Total manpower is compared with the size of Iraq in square kilometers. 
5. Contractor manpower density is compared with Iraqi national census statistics. 
6. Total force manpower density is compared with Iraqi national census statistics. 
 
6.5.3 Phase Two Qualitative Approach: Process Tracing 
 
Phase Two qualitative analysis tests the ability of CFE to explain the relationship 
between military contracting and military effectiveness. Contractor force employment is absent 
from military effectiveness datasets. Consequently, statistical analysis would be insufficient to 
analyze the relationship between military contracting and military effectiveness. As such, it must 
be analyzed indirectly via enabling assumptions. The enabling assumptions are provided by 
formal theory (Biddle’s force employment theory). The points of analysis are provided through 
the theoretical survey of the military contracting and military effectiveness literatures as well as 
the three qualitative methods of archival, interview, and document analysis. 
Phase Two of the mixed method design analyzes the qualitative data on contractor force 
employment to determine if there is a correlation between the establishment of contractor force 
employment with military effectiveness as suggested by the broader force employment literature. 
The qualitative phase conducts a “generalizing” analysis to add nuance to the qualitative 
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“particularizing” analysis.513 The qualitative phase uses archival records, semi-structured 
interviews, and policy documentation to triangulate qualitative data in order to add the requisite 
nuance. Part of the triangulation process is using process tracing and pattern matching.  
Process tracing is used to determine if the development of contractor force employment 
enhanced the effectiveness of military contractors. It traces the development of contractor 
doctrine in order to determine if Biddle’s force employment perspective can be applied to 
military contracting. After significant developments in contractor force employment methods are 
uncovered using process tracing, pattern matching compares them to measures of military 
effectiveness, despite doctrine not being quantifiable. Pattern matching is useful for explaining 
and describing the patterns that emerge theoretically against empirical patterns. For instance, the 
development and implementation of a contractor doctrine might help explain a shift in military 
effectiveness despite no change taking place to contractor numbers. Therefore, pattern matching 
illustrates the value of contractor doctrine to wider measures of military effectiveness. 
Analyzing and triangulating archival records, interviews and documentation using 
process tracing and pattern matching within a case study has specific limitations. First, the in-
depth and time-consuming process of process tracing makes it impossible to conduct multiple 
case studies. Second, the lack of rigor in the case study approach limits the ability of findings to 
be generalized, which is mitigated by the thesis’ employment of highly generalizable  
quantitative methods. These limitations of the qualitative analyses are offset by the mixed 
method design as qualitative methods are used to support phase one quantitative analysis and 
vice versa. In addition, the limitations are also offset by the employment of multiple qualitative 
methods to enhance generalizability. As mentioned, using one method to cover the weaknesses 
of the other is the primary reason behind using the mixed method design. 
 
6.6 The Limitations Associated with the Thesis 
 
 The research design methods used in this thesis raise a number of issues in relation to the 
problems and limitations. The first limitation of this study is the failure of the data collected from 
archival records and documents to account for all of the contractors hired and employed during 
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the period of analysis. Maintaining a database on the number of contractors employed is the 
responsibility of the US Department of Defense (DoD) Office of Deputy Assistant Secretary of 
Defense (Program Support). Although there is a clearly delineated reporting process available 
through the DoD, often times reports are not filed due to contractors subcontracting work to 
lesser known entities such as third party nationals or host party nationals.514 For these 
contractors, filing a report may be difficult due to the lack of knowledge of the English language 
and limited computer access.515 As a result, the CENTCOM Quarterly Contractor Census 
Reports, the metric used to account for manpower numbers are close approximations of the total 
population.  
Military contracting involves numerous variables. Statistical analysis in this thesis 
focuses on contractor manpower figures with respect to measures of coalition and civilian deaths. 
However, there are other variables that influence how military contracting interacts with military 
effectiveness such as state sponsorship of insurgent groups or changes in the opposition 
sentiment, as seen in the “Sunni Awakening”. These uncontrollable factors are too numerous to 
note, not to mention the permutations and combinations associated with them. A such, statistical 
analysis is limited in accounting for confounding variables and interaction effects because 
military contracting is too complex. Therefore, to test the relationship between military 
contracting and military effectiveness, it uses means that are more easily measured, like 
contractor manpower numbers and violence, than variables that are more difficult to quantify. 
The solution to simplify reality facilitates analysis but has significant implications. 
One of the implications of simplifying reality is instability. Instability threatens the 
internal validity of this study by not allowing the control of potential effects of other agents of 
change. For instance, findings cannot be absolutely definitive because of the presence of 
unaccounted for confounding variables could be the cause of the effects attributed to the 
independent variable in this study. The mixed method design employs qualitative methods to 
limit the impact of unobserved variables and effects and inherent instability by focusing on 
changes in contractor force employment. Yet, even the inclusion of qualitative methods in no 
                                                          
514 Interview with Gary Motsek, August 19, 2011. 
515 Ibid. 
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way accounts for all confounding variables and interaction effects. Instability is important 
because tests of significance are only relevant relative to the threat instability poses. 516 
Another threat to internal validity is that of regression. This limitation primarily affects 
the validity of the findings as the number of military and contractor personnel increases while 
levels of military effectiveness decrease. Data verifies that military contractors are hired to 
increase military effectiveness and that hiring contractors to increase manpower is inherent in the 
decision to contract out in the first place. Therefore, it must be assumed that as time passes and 
the number of contractors increase, the likelihood will increase that returns of added manpower 
will reach a point of stabilization or a point of decreased utility. In this event, the effectiveness of 
contracting resources is specious.517 
This chapter has argued for the adoption of a two-phase mixed method design to analyze 
the relationship between military contracting and military effectiveness. The chapter presented 
specific methods used in the data collection and analysis. These methods were archival records, 
documents, and semi-structured interviews. In addition, the chapter provided a description of the 
techniques used in analyzing the data, which included statistical analysis and case description 
using process tracing and pattern matching. 
This methodological design provides a research strategy that avoids the shortcomings of 
employing quantitative and qualitative methods alone through the use of triangulation and 
complementarity. The design is rigorous which is fundamental to capturing aspects of military 
contracting from combat environments, theorizing on those aspects and then using them to 
inform policy. As mentioned above, the design generates quantitative results that are expanded 
on through qualitative analysis. The following chapter proceeds in operationalizing the mixed 
method design through analysis of the gathered data in relation to the Operation Iraqi Freedom 
case study. As such, Chapter Seven’s employs quantitative and qualitative methods to test the 
relevance of the material contractor manpower perspective and the non-material CFE 
perspective. 
 
 
                                                          
516 D.T. Campbell, “Reforms as Experiments,” American Psychologist, 24 (April 1969), 409-429. 
517 Campbell, “Reforms as Experiments,” 412. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN: OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM 
 
This chapter tests the hypotheses developed in this thesis and applies the unique 
methodology proposed in the previous chapter to analyze Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) case 
study. Quite simply, it seeks to answers two broad yet specific questions: 1) How does military 
contracting impact military effectiveness? 2) How effective are the manpower and contractor 
force employment perspectives at determining the relationship between military contracting and 
military effectiveness? 
As a case study, OIF is valuable for several reasons. First, it spans the beginning of the 
incursion in May 2003 to the close of the war in August 2010 and thus represents hostilities 
between Coalition forces and radical insurgent groups. Second, OIF permits analysis on how 
both manpower and contractor force employment (CFE) perspectives of military contracting 
correlate with actual battlefield outcomes. The manpower perspective predicts that the use of 
military contractors to increase manpower should lead to enhance military effectiveness. In 
contrast, the non-materialist CFE perspective predicts a decrease in military effectiveness as 
contractor manpower increases when contractor employment methods are not applied. Third, 
OIF provides special leverage to the manpower perspective since the number of contractors 
employed during the conflict was the highest in history. The findings thus represent a more 
significant contribution to the literature beyond what would typically be possible for a single 
case study.  
In terms of structure, the chapter first explains why OIF was selected as a case study and 
how the selection process mitigated any selection bias. Second, it addresses the background of 
OIF in general and with specific relevance to the manpower trends associated with military 
contracting. Third, the chapter develops values for the independent variables associated with the 
two competing perspectives of military contracting. Finally, each perspective’s predictions are 
compared to the actual outcomes of OIF in order to assess the fit between predictions and real 
life observations.  
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7.1 Why Operation Iraqi Freedom? 
 
 Harry Eckstein’s “crucial-case method” informed the case selection process of this 
thesis.518 According to Eckstein, a crucial case is one “that must closely fit a theory if one is to 
have confidence in the theory’s validity, or, conversely, must not fit equally well any rule 
contrary to that proposed.”519 The crucial-case method encourages cases that have values 
favoring or disfavoring the independent variables selected. Creating favorable and unfavorable 
conditions for the independent variables produces situations where theories should be at their 
strongest or weakest in predicting outcomes.520 Much can be learned about a theory that fails to 
perform as expected in circumstances that favor its predictions or that performs as expected in 
circumstances that do not favor its predictions. There are two types of crucial cases: most-likely 
and least-likely. 
A most-likely critical case is one that circumscribes a situation where the theory is best 
able to predict the outcome. If the theory fails to accurately predict the outcome in favorable 
circumstances, there will be a lesser degree of confidence in that theory than in conditions that 
are less favorable. A least-likely case is one that circumscribes a situation where the theory is 
highly unlikely to predict the outcome. If the theory accurately predicts an outcome under 
unfavorable conditions, the result would warrant a greater degree of confidence in the theory 
than under less extreme conditions. While both most-likely and least-likely tests are informative, 
Popperian insight suggests that the most-likely case represents the most significant knowledge 
gain because disconfirming an inference is easier than confirming one (which Popper doubted 
was even probable and the reason for his preference for the term corroborate).521 
The OIF case represents a valuable theory-testing case study and constitutes a tough test 
for both the contractor manpower perspective and the contractor force employment perspective 
of military contracting.522 OIF serves a heuristic purpose by addressing the “need for new theory 
                                                          
518 See, Harry Eckstein,  “Case Studies and Theory in Political Science,” in Handbook of Political Science, Vol. 7, 
eds. Fred Greenstein and Nelson Polsby  (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1975). 
519 Eckstein, “Case Studies and Theory in Political Science,” 18. 
520 John Gerring, Case Study Research: Principles and Practices (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 
116. 
521 Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery, 248-282. 
522 George and Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development, 75. 
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in neglected areas” 523 by applying the force employment theory ot military contracting., OIF 
provides both a most-likely case for the manpower perspective and a least-likely case for the 
CFE perspective.  
The OIF case is useful because the number of contractors employed was the greatest in 
history and provided Coalition forces with high levels of manpower preponderance. These 
conditions place an emphasis on military effectiveness outcomes and created a condition that put 
the manpower perspective at its strongest. If military contracting was to enhance military 
effectiveness in accordance with the manpower perspective, it should have been in OIF. If the 
manpower perspective’s hypotheses fail to predict the outcomes of military contracting under 
such favorable conditions, then the single case challenges the validity of the extant, dominant 
contractor manpower perspective and the policies it supports. 
The OIF case also offers a least-likely critical case for the contractor force employment 
perspective. It is a least-likely case because the extreme values in favor of the manpower 
perspective of military contracting make the CFE perspective less likely to succeed. Arguably 
then, military contracting during OIF did not enhance military effectiveness because contractor 
employment methods were not adequately applied to integration. An overreliance of theory and 
practice on contractor manpower numbers caused the development of employment methods to be 
largely ignored, and because employment methods were ignored, it should be reasonable to 
assume that contractor manpower has a larger impact on military effectiveness than contractor 
force employment. Therefore, it would not be surprising if the dominant manpower perspective 
for military contracting overcame the CFE perspective.  
The case study findings should corroborate the contractor manpower perspective and 
disconfirm the CFE perspective. What would be surprising is if CFE proved to be a key 
determinant of contractor effectiveness even under unfavorable conditions as apparently adverse 
as those in OIF from 2003-2010 when contractor manpower was at its height. If any 
development in CFE has an impact on military effectiveness when it is predicted that it will not, 
the results will disconfirm the orthodox manpower perspective and corroborate the CFE 
perspective more strongly than it would if the CFE perspective were under more favorable 
conditions. Moreover, its inability to predict the expected outcome may indicate that other more 
                                                          
523 Eckstein, “Case Studies and Theory in Political Science,” 99. 
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valid explanations are more suitable for predicting military contracting outcomes. In this 
formulation, the OIF case provides the strongest sort of evidence possible in a single case 
setting.524 
OIF is also intrinsically interesting for understanding contemporary military contracting 
in general. It was a watershed moment for the US military amongst its long history of military 
contracting, as indicated in Table 1 below. 
 
Table 7.1:525 Presence of Contractor Personnel During U.S. Military Operations 
 Estimated Personnel (Thousands)  
Conflict Contractor Military Ratio 
Revolutionary War 2 9 1 to 5 
War of 1812 n.a. 38 n.a. 
Mexican-American War 6 33 1 to 6 
Civil War 200 1,000 1 to 5 
Spanish-American War n.a. 35 n.a. 
World War I 85 2,000 1 to 24 
World War II 734 12,000 1 to 16 
Korea 156 393 1 to 2.5 
Vietnam 70 550 1 to 8 
Gulf War 9 500 1 to 55  
Balkans 20 20 1 to l 
OIF (Early 2008) 190 200 1 to l 
Note, n.a. = not available 
 
OIF is significant on a historical and global level as well as at a national level as the US 
spends more on defense than the next eleven countries combined.526 More specifically, the DoD 
is the largest federal purchaser of service contracts527 spending more on federal contracts than all 
other federal agencies combined.528 The level of military contracting in the DoD, and the US 
                                                          
524 Gerring, Case Study Research, 119. 
525 Table 7.1 is reproduced from, Frisk and Trunkey, “Contractors’ Support of US Operations in Iraq,” 9. Two 
changes have been made to the original table: 1) The original table had 5.4 million men serving in WWII. It has 
been changed to reflect 12 million; 2) Peak strength during Vietnam was 550,000 not 359,000. 
526 Samuel Perlo-Freeman, Carina Solmirano, Neil Ferguson, Noel Kelly, ”SIPRI Military Expenditure Database,” 
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, accessed October 14, 2014, 
http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/milex_database. 
527 Walker,  “DoD Needs to Reexamine Its Extensive Reliance on Contractors and Continue to Improve 
Management and Oversight,” 4. 
528 Moshe Schwartz, Wendy Ginsberg, Daniel Alexander, “Department of Defense Trends in Overseas Contract 
Obligations,” Congressional Research Service (July 22, 2011), 1. 
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more generally indicates the importance of the American experience with military contracting in 
OIF.  
The US has been at the forefront of military contracting. Understanding how contractor 
manpower and the development of contractor force employment methods effected the US 
military’s ability to achieve its objectives in OIF will inform how the US plans to structure its 
forces in a time of fiscal pressure (the defense budget is projected to decrease by $1 trillion over 
the next nine years), and a shrinking Army (it will lose 110,000 troops from its current 490,000 
and transport aircraft), while maintaining its 1989-2001 trend of intervening abroad on average 
of every sixteen months will be critical for future force planning.529 In addition, the recent 
American experience with contracting has global ramifications. Understanding the US 
experience and relationships between military contracting and military effectiveness will be 
critical to other militaries seeking to increase military power and/or reduce costs. Consequently, 
while the primary purpose of the chapter is to use practice to inform the theoretical literature, it is 
also an opportunity to use the literature to inform the practice of military contracting. 
 
7.2 Overview of Operation Iraqi Freedom 
 
Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) was fought from March 20, 2003 to August 31, 2010.530 
According to US policy at the time, the reason the US intervened in Iraq was to remove “a 
regime that developed and used weapons of mass destruction, that harbored and supported 
terrorists, committed outrageous human rights abuses, and defied the just demands of the United 
Nations and the world.”531 The initial goal was to remove the Saddam Hussein regime from 
power and build a government capable of securing, governing and developing Iraq.532  
                                                          
529 “Military Power: The Use of Force,” The Economist (November 23, 2013): 9. 
530 Barbara Salazar Torreon, “U.S. Period of War and Dates of Current Conflict,” Congressional Research Service, 
(December 28, 2012), 7. 
531 The United States Department of State, “Winning the War on Terror,” (September 11, 2003): 1, accessed 
November 22, 2014, http://2001-2009.state.gov/documents/organization/24172.pdf; See also, Thomas E. Ricks, 
Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq (New York, NY: Penguin, 2006). 
532 Williamson Murray and Major General Robert H. Scales Jr., The Iraq War: A Military History (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 2003), 44. Some benchmarks for the Iraqi government were: neutralize the insurgency; 
ensure the continuation of support for Iraq’s elector process; create jobs and providing essential services; establish 
the foundations for a strong economy; establish good governance, rule of Law; maintain international engagement 
and support. See, United Sates Department of State, “Iraq Weekly Status Report,” (February 16, 2005). 
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The Coalition took Baghdad on April 9, 2003 signaling the end of Saddam’s twenty-four 
year rule. Removing Hussein‘s Baathist party from power was accomplished with relative ease. 
Rebuilding Iraq proved to be a more difficult task. 96.5% of Coalition casualties occurred in the 
post-Saddam environment,533 which suggests that the 120,000-strong occupying force was 
inadequate to quell an insurgency.534 The number of troops was further deemed inadequate once 
the decision to disband the Iraqi Army left the Coalition without local Iraqi support. 535 The 
George W. Bush Administration, however, remained averse to increasing a military presence and 
risking casualties. Instead the administration preferred low-risk solutions to maintain popular 
support for the war.  
 In an effort to increase manpower levels, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld told the 
Senate Armed Services Committee in September 2004 that he intended to increase the manpower 
available to the military by hiring military contractors. Rumsfeld suggested that military 
contractors could take over for uniformed personnel tasked at “doing what are essentially non-
military jobs” so that military personnel could take on more war fighting roles.536 These words 
set into motion a policy that relied heavily on private military and security contractors to perform 
tasks previously performed by the military in order to meet high demands on manpower. 
Furthermore, the dramatic use of military contracting in OIF set the precedent for high levels of 
military contracting in other US conflicts such as Afghanistan. 
 The high demand for manpower in Iraq caused the US to employ contractors to work in a 
range of functions. These functions, for example, included training Iraqi army and police forces, 
weapons system support, site security, and logistics.537 The multiple functions contractors 
performed caused the number of contractors employed in Iraq to increase from around 10,000 in 
the beginning of 2003 to over 30,000 during 2004.538  
Hiring military contractors was seen as a politically and financially viable policy. 
Politically, the US could draw upon a vast number of non-uniformed personnel that did not 
                                                          
533 iCasualties.org, “Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom”. 
534 Lionel Beehner, ”U.S. Military Strategy in Iraq,” Council on Foreign Relations (April 12, 2006), accessed 
November 16, 2014, http://www.cfr.org/iraq/us-military-strategy-iraq/p10434. 
535 Krause, “Troop Levels in Stability Operations,” 1; Sepp, “Best Practices in Counterinsurgency,” 8-9.  
536 United States Congress, Senate Committee on Armed Services. Prepared Testimony of U.S. Secretary of Defense 
Donald H. Rumsfeld  108th Cong., 2nd sess. (September 23, 2004), 4, accessed October 7, 2014, 
http://www.dod.mil/dodgc/olc/docs/test04-09-23Rumsfeld.pdf. 
537 Deborah D. Avant, “The Privatization of Security: Lessons from Iraq,” ORIBIS (Spring 2006): 337. 
538 Isenberg, Shadow Force, 11. 
164 
 
appear on official casualty reports. Military contracting enabled the escalation of the American 
troop presence in Iraq without negatively impacting popular support for the war. Consequently, 
military contractors provided the Bush Administration with the low-risk solution it sought. 
According to Gary Motsek, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Program Support), 
contractors were financially viable because they could be disbanded after the war ended whereas 
military personnel hired to fight in Iraq would remain on the government payroll beyond the 
cessation of the conflict.539 
 Despite the perceived political and financial viability of military contracting, an increase 
of approximately 10,000 personnel and a contractor increase of approximately 15,000 in 2005, 
insurgent violence still continued to spread throughout Iraq.540 Terrorist attacks on US forces 
rose from 34,131 in 2004 to 62,456 in 2005 where an average of seventy attacks occurred per 
day.541 By August 2005 civilian casualties averaged more than 1,500 a month.542 As has been 
well documented, such politically motivated violence thwarted Coalition efforts to restore peace 
and threatened to destabilize the region.543 These efforts were further compounded by the 
emergence of an Iraqi al-Qaeda cell named al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). 
Coalition and civilian deaths also spiked during this period as illustrated by the Figures 7.1 and 
7.2 below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
539 Interview with Gary Motsek, August 9, 2011 
540 Michael E. O’Hanlon, Ian Livingston, Iraq Index: Tracking Variables of Reconstruction and Security in Post-
Saddam Iraq (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, January 2011), 18; Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense 
(Program Support) “CENTCOM Contractor Census Report”. 
541 Biddle et al., “Testing the Surge: Why Did Violence Decline in Iraq in 2007?,” 7. 
542 Ricks, Fiasco, 436. 
543 The six phases of OIF combat operations are: 1) Liberation of Iraq( March 19, 2003 to May 1, 2003); 2) 
Transition of Iraq (May 2, 2003 to June 28, 2004); 3) Iraqi Governance (June 29, 2004 to December 15, 2005); 4) 
“National Resolution”; December 16, 2005 to January 9, 2007); 5) The Surge (January 10, 2007 to December 31, 
2008); 6) Iraqi Sovereignty (January 1, 2009 to August 20, 2010). See, 
https://www.hrc.army.mil/tagd/afghanistan%20campaign%20medal%20or%20iraq%20campaign%20medal 
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Figure 7.1: Coalition Deaths in Iraq544 
 
 
 
Figure 7.2: Civilian Deaths in Iraq545 
 
 
 
                                                          
544 O’Hanlon and Livingston, Iraq Index, 18. 
545 Iraq Body Count, accessed December 12, 2013, http://www.iraqbodycount.org/analysis/numbers/warlogs/. 
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As a response to the increasing levels of violence, General George W. Casey 
Commander, Multinational Force-Iraq (MNF-I) (July 1, 2004 – February 10, 2007) and US 
Ambassador to Iraq Zalamay Kholizad (June 21, 2005 – April 17, 2007) made establishing 
security and curbing sectarian violence the primary goals of OIF in December 2006.546 In order 
to quell violence, the US devised a plan of “clear, hold, and build.” The plan required expanding 
the troop presence in Iraq further. According to then Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, “Our 
political-military strategy has to be to clear, hold and build: to clear areas from insurgent control, 
to hold them securely, and to build durable, national Iraqi institutions.”547 The plan first sought 
to establish security, or “clear”, by training Iraqi security forces and concentrating military 
operations on reducing Shi’a and Sunni sectarian violence.548 However, establishing and holding 
security was problematic as cleared and held territory forced insurgents to operate in other areas 
creating a “balloon-squeezing phenomenon” that prevented security from improving overall.549 
To make the “clear, hold, build” strategy work, the leadership again sought an increase in 
manpower. Specifically, General David Petraeus argued that increasing personnel numbers was 
fundamental to enhancing security. Petraeus advocated a surge strategy whereby the military 
dramatically increase the number of troops it had in Iraq. Petraeus reasoned that more manpower 
in Iraq would allow the Coalition greater dispersion to help them increase security.550  
The 2007-2009 surge amounted to approximately a 30,000-troop increase to the US 
military’s presence in Iraq.551 However, despite dramatic increases in manpower the US 
government was still shorthanded. According to US comptroller general David M. Walker, there 
was both a shortage in the number of “authorized full-time equivalent positions” the military 
workforce could draw from and the “unavailability of certain capabilities and expertise among 
federal employees.”552 Once more, the US turned to the private military and security industry.  
                                                          
546 General David H. Petraeus, Report to Congress on the Situation of Iraq (September 10-11, 2007), accessed 
November 22, 2014, http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/petraeus-testimony20070910.pdf. 
547 Secretary Condoleezza Rice, Opening Remarks before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (October 19, 
2005), accessed November 22, 2014, http://www. State.gov/secretary/rm/2005/55303.htm. 
548 Interview with Richard Fontaine, August 15, 2011; Interview with Gen. Stanley McChrystal, August 19, 2011. 
549 Biddle et al., “Testing the Surge?,” 22. 
550 United States Senate, “The Nomination of General David Petraeus.” 
551 O’Hanlon and Livingston, Iraq Index, 18. 
552 Walker, “DoD Needs to Reexamine Its Extensive Reliance on Contractors and Continue to Improve Management 
and Oversight,” 4-5. 
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The reemphasis on military contracting cause the number of contractors employed to 
dramatically rise from approximately 86,000 contractors at the beginning of the surge in 2007553 
to 160,000 contractors at the end of the surge in December of 2008.554 The increase was due to 
expanding roles contractors were expected to perform beyond “non-military jobs”. For example, 
the number of armed contractors increased from 7,121 in August 2008 to 9,863 in November of 
the same year as contractors began to serve in more security functions in Iraq.555 Overall, armed 
and unarmed military contractors combined trebled the Coalition force by nearly a factor of 2 
and alone accounted for a force twenty-seven times larger than all non-American forces 
combined.556  
The increase in military manpower enabled the Coalition to command numerical 
preponderance on the battlefield, which is believed to have reduced violence and contribute to 
the success of the “clear, hold, build” plan.557 However, it is also widely acknowledged that the 
US military was unprepared to deal with the issues that arose from significant increases in 
military contracting. Therefore, the overall effect of boosting personal levels by dramatically 
employing more contractors is unclear. 
 
7.3 The Manpower Perspective and Military Contracting  
 
Military contracting in Iraq helped the Coalition to further increase the numerical 
superiority it had over Iraqi insurgents. The general manpower literature advances the assertion 
that overwhelming numerical superiority wins wars.558 This assertion is used as the primary 
explanation for US military contracting policy during OIF in that the more contractors that are 
deployed, the more effective the military. As Figure 7.3 illustrates, military contractors were 
heavily employed during OIF not only to increase numerical superiority, but to also maintain 
superiority levels as increasing contractors numbers offset decreasing Coalition numbers from 
late 2007 to early 2009. 
                                                          
553 Miller, “Contractors Outnumber U.S. Troops in Iraq,” A9. 
554 Lee, “U.S. Contractors Lose Immunity in Iraq Security Deal.” 
555 Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Program Support), CENTCOM Quarterly Contractor 
Census Reports, accessed October 16, 2014, http://www.acq.osd.mil/log/PS/CENTCOM_reports.html. 
556 O’Hanlon and Livingston, Iraq Index, 18. 
557 See, Biddle et al., “Testing the Surge?” 
558 See section Chapter Four section 4.3.  
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Figure 7.3: Contractor and Coalition Numbers in Iraq559 
 
 
 
Throughout OIF, hundreds of thousands of contractors were employed to provide 
additional manpower in order to increase military effectiveness.560 The reasoning behind this 
manpower logic was threefold. First, contractors yield increased military effectiveness because 
higher levels of manpower can more easily hold larger swathes of territory and reduce the 
enemy’s ability to maneuver. Second, military contracting increases military effectiveness by 
providing additional personnel, often-specialized personnel, to the force. Third, military 
contractors act as a force multiplier by performing non-critical tasks.561 Implicit in these 
arguments is the belief that manpower is the most proximate determinant of military 
effectiveness. Aggregate increases in the number of contractors employed, regardless of where 
they are working in theater or in what capacity, should increase the effectiveness of the military. 
This assertion has some consistency with the evidence. 
                                                          
559 “Coalition Personnel” refers to military personnel from the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, 
Poland, the Iraqi National Congress, and the Peshmerga. CENTCOM Quarterly Contractor Census Reports; 
O’Hanlon and Livingston, Iraq Index, 18. 
560 CENTCOM Quarterly Contractor Census Reports. 
561 Dunigan, Victory for Hire, 8; See also, US Army, Urgent Reform Required; Moshe Schwartz, “Department of 
Defense Contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan,” Congressional Research Service (July 2, 2010); United States Senate, 
“The Nomination of General David Petraeus.” 
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OIF provides a test for the manpower and force employment perspectives of military 
contracting. To test each perspective, it is important to characterize the key independent 
variables of manpower and force employment. This section characterizes contractor manpower 
in terms of the rules of thumb addressed in Chapter Four such as the force-to-force ratio (FFR), 
the force-to-space ratio (FSR), and population-density. These metrics are employed to test the 
manpower perspective; if a correlation exists between contractor manpower levels and military 
effectiveness. The FFR measures manpower superiority by comparing troop numbers. The FSR 
measures numerical preponderance by comparing the number of troops in relation to the size of 
the battlefield. The population-density ratio measures numerical preponderance by comparing 
the number of troops in relation to the population of the country where the combat is taking 
place. In the following section, each of these variables is tested against the OIF case study.  
According to the manpower thesis, military contracting should significantly increase 
military effectiveness by contributing to manpower. As such, attaining the levels of manpower 
required to meet each measure’s rule of thumb should enable that military to produce the 
battlefield outcomes it desires. Short of that, gains in each rule of thumb should correspond 
positively to gains in military effectiveness as measured by reductions in the number of Coalition 
and civilian deaths. Yet, as the following section details, although military contracting in OIF 
provided the American-led Coalition force with numerical superiority over Iraqi insurgents in 
each of these measures, battlefield outcomes were not always correlated. 
 
7.3.1 Military Contracting and the Force-to-Force Ratio (FFR) 
 
The FFR compares the total manpower, or ration strength, between belligerents. The 
number of troops that invaded Iraq on March 20, 2003 totaled 120,000. The private military and 
security industry contributed an additional 9,000 contractors to the force.562 Iraq’s troop strength 
was estimated between 375,000563 and 424,000.564 This data indicates that the Coalition had a 
FFR ratio of approximately 1:3. By May 23, 2003 the FFR shifted in the Coalition’s favor as the 
                                                          
562 Adebayo Adedeji, Daniel Frisk, Carla Tighe Murray, and R. Derek Trunkey, “Logistics Support for Deployed 
Military Forces,” Congressional Budget Office (October 2005): 46. 
563 Toby Dodge, ”Iraqi Army is Tougher than US Believes,” The Guardian, November 15, 2002, accessed October 
17, 2014, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2002/nov/16/iraq. 
564 Anthony H. Cordesman, “If We Fight Iraq: Iraq and the Conventional Military Balance,” Center for Strategic 
and International Studies (June 28, 2002): 3.  
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Iraqi military was dissolved and the conventional military operation shifted from conventional 
warfare to unconventional counterinsurgency operations. When the insurgency began, the 
Coalition had a theater wide FFR of 8:1 in traditional manpower terms and 9:1 with the 
contribution of military contractors. 
Analyzing the FFR in post-Saddam Iraq is problematic because the exact number of 
insurgents and Iraqi allies are unknown and the battlefield is not clearly defined.565 Estimates of 
the size of the insurgency have varied widely since the beginning of the conflict, ranging from 
figures as low as 3,500 “full-time” insurgents to figures as high as 15,000 – 40,000 fighters and 
another 160,000 in supporters.566 For the purpose of this thesis, however, the exact figure is 
largely irrelevant. The only figures that are relevant are the official US government estimates 
upon which the defense policy was based. Therefore, the manpower logic sought to achieve 
numerical superiority based on official figures, which estimated insurgent numbers to be 
approximately 20,000.567  
With a combined FFR of 9:1, the Coalition force was in excess of any normally applied 
standard for offensive adequacy (see Figure 7.4 below). The theater-wide FFR for Operation 
Iraqi Freedom with contractors alone is more than five times the value of the typical 1.5:1 rule of 
thumb and more than twice that of the local 3:1 rule of thumb. At the end of the surge in the 
fourth quarter of 2008, the total number of military contractors employed by the US Department 
of Defense (DoD) in Operation Iraqi Freedom reached 163,446.568 The role of military 
                                                          
565 One reason for the variation in insurgent estimates is the difference in how the term “insurgent” is defined. For a 
discussion on the definitional impact on estimate variance see the discussion by the Iraq Body Count, accessed 
December 12, 2013, http://www.iraqbodycount.org/analysis/numbers/warlogs/. The analysis does not include 
contributions from Iraqi militias, such as the Sons of Iraq, to the Coalition force. These figures are not included for 
two reasons. First, the data on militia numbers is incomplete and inaccurate and would therefore render the statistical 
analysis invalid. Second, omitting local Iraqi support further stacks the deck in favor of the manpower perspective as 
the lower troop strengths as measured by  FFR, FSR, population density will be viewed as having a larger impact 
than actually exists. 
566 Anthony Cordesman, Iraq’s Evolving Insurgency (Center for Strategic and International Studies, December 9, 
2005), 90. 
567 In 2004 the US estimated the insurgent strength being approximately 3,000 before raising its estimate to 5,000 
and then to 20,000. In 2005, official estimates were between 16,000 and 20,000. In 2006, the United States military, 
stated that Sunni insurgent groups had between 10,000 and 20,000 fighters and that Shi’a fighters numbers in the 
“low thousands”. Gentry, How Wars are Won and Lost, 115, 116, 151-152. 
568 The number of military contractors employed is higher as the contractors employed by other Coalition states and 
American government agencies, like the Department of State and US Agency for International Development 
(USAID), are not included in these figures. Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Program Support) 
CENTCOM Quarterly Contractor Census Report; Michael E. O’Hanlon and Jason H. Campbell,  “Iraq Index: 
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contracting is significant as the addition of contractors to the force shifted the FFR of the total 
military force from 8:1 to 16:1. This means that contractor contributions caused the Coalition to 
exceed the FFR rule of thumb ten times over, as illustrated below in Figure 7.4. In relation to the 
contractor manpower perspective, the data is compelling because the dramatic increase in 
contractors should have resulted in equally dramatic increases in military effectiveness. 
 
Figure 7.4: Contractor and Coalition Personnel in Iraq: Troops to Insurgent Force-to-Force 
Ratio569  
 
  
 The military contracting FFRs in OIF exceed that of other twentieth century insurgencies. 
In terms of total manpower, for example, the Palestine Insurgency (1945-1948) between the UK 
and Jewish separatists had an FFR of 1:2, the Malayan Emergency (1948-1960) between the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Tracking Variables of Reconstruction and Security in Post Saddam Iraq” (Washington DC: Brookings Institution, 
2012).  
569 CENTCOM Quarterly Contractor Census Reports; O’Hanlon and Livingston, Iraq Index, 18. 
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United Kingdom (UK) and the Malayan Communist Party had an FFR of 3:1, and the Algerian 
Revolt (1954-1962) between France and the National Liberation Front had an FFR of 1:13.570 
The fact that contractors alone had a theater-wide FFR of 8:1 in terms of total contractor 
manpower in 2008 versus 20,000 total insurgents demonstrates the crushing numerical advantage 
military contracting provided Coalition forces. As a consequence of military contracting in OIF, 
manpower theorists have seen decreases in the number of Coalition and civilian deaths as the 
number of military contractors increased.  
 
7.3.2 Military Contracting and the Force-to-Space Ratio (FSR) 
 
 The force-to-space ratio (FSR) represents the total number of troops per square units of 
area. FSRs indicate a military’s relative strength or vulnerability vis-à-vis their opponent in 
relation to the size of the battlefield. For instance, the fewer troops a military has per square unit, 
the more thinly spread a force and the more freely an opponent can maneuver without coming 
into contact. In addition, the FSR indicates a military’s ability to cover ground to support a point 
of attack. A military with a higher FSR is better able to shift troops to support other operations. 
Defenses with low FSRs are unable to control attacker maneuvers within the gaps in their 
defenses. Defenses with high numbers of troops per square unit are held to favor defenders.571 
 During OIF, the 20,000 Iraqi insurgents had an FSR of roughly 1 troop per 25 square 
kilometers. By contrast, as depicted below in Figure 7.5, in November 2008 the Coalition had 
154,350 troops (148,000 American) deployed in Iraq’s 438,317 square kilometer area. The 
Coalition FSR during this period was approximately .36 troops per square kilometer. The 
addition of 163,446 contractors doubled the FSR to .72 troops per square kilometer providing the 
Coalition with a more pronounced numerical advantage helping it to achieve the greater rates of 
dispersion that Petraeus sought.  
 
                                                          
570 Andrew R. Molnar, Undergrounds in Insurgent, Revolutionary, and Resistance Warfare (Washington, DC: 
Special Operations Research Office, 1963), 13-16; Sepp, “Best Practices in Counterinsurgency,” 8-9. 
571 Biddle, Military Power, 118; Liddell Hart, “Ratio of Troops to Space,” 3-14. 
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Figure 7.5: Coalition and Contractor FSR Averages in Iraq572 
 
 
 
Military contractors contributed to producing a more favorable FSR for Coalition forces. 
Figure 7.5, above, illustrates that the Coalition FSR remained relatively unchanged throughout 
the duration of OIF at roughly .4 troops per square kilometer. The addition of contracting 
manpower to the force accounted for more than a fifty percent increase in the FSR at the end of 
the surge in 2008. Thus, the manpower logic of the force-to-space argument should favor the 
Coalition. Moreover, given the gains to the FSR, military contracting should translate into an 
increase in military effectiveness as more personnel enabled the force to control territory. 
Accordingly, this should correspond with lower Coalition and civilian fatalities, thus supporting 
the manpower perspective of military contracting.  
                                                          
572 CENTCOM Quarterly Contractor Census Reports; O’Hanlon and Livingston, Iraq Index, 18; Department of 
Commerce, US Census Bureau, “International Data Base,” 
http://www.census.gov/population/international/data/idb/informationGateway.php (accessed December 14, 2013). 
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7.3.3 Military Contracting and the Population-Density Ratio 
 
For unconventional conflicts, such as counterinsurgencies (COIN), some manpower 
theorists, such as Quinliven, use the quantity of manpower to predict battlefield outcomes using a 
troop-to-population density ratio. The population-density ratio measures manpower by 
comparing the number of troops to the population of the country where the combat is taking 
place. Population-driven force ratios are calculated relative to the population the force is 
attempting to control and protect rather than the number of insurgents they are trying to defeat.573 
Counting rules for troop density per population suggest a rule of thumb of approximately 20 
counterinsurgents for every 1,000 residents. High population densities facilitate the levels of 
control a military has over territory and influence over the population thereby enabling the 
establishment of security and civil functions required for governance and development.574 
Figure 7.6 illustrates that military contractors increased population-driven force ratios in 
OIF. During OIF, the Iraqi population ranged from 24,688,000 in 2003 to 29,673,000 in 2010.575 
The population ratio in November 2008 was 5.5 troops to 1,000 of the population for Coalition 
forces alone.576 The addition of 163,446 military contractors doubles the number putting the ratio 
at 11 troops per 1,000 inhabitants. According to the manpower perspective, the increase in the 
population-density ratio is significant to the ability of a force to achieve its military objectives as 
the number gets closer to the recommended rule of thumb. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
573 Krause, “Troop Levels in Stability Operations,” 2. 
574 Quinlivan, “Force Requirements in Stability Operations,” 59-69. See also Field Manual 3-24, 
“Counterinsurgency,” 1-13; Goode, “A Historical Basis for Force Requirements in Counterinsurgency,” 45-57. 
575 Department of Commerce, “International Data Base”.  
576 Department of Commerce, “International Data Base”. 
175 
 
Figure 7.6: Coalition and Contractor Population Density Averages577 
 
 
Although the population density total fails to meet the 20 per 1,000 inhabitants, the 
population density of 11 troops per 1,000 inhabitants in OIF is similar to other historical 
counterinsurgencies. For example, in Northern Ireland there were 18.4 troops per 1,000, the 
Malay Emergency consisted of 12.7 troops to 1,000 inhabitants, Algeria had 46 per thousand, 
and the Palestine insurgency had 21 per thousand inhabitants.578 More recently, the Tamil 
Insurgency (1983-2002) in Sri Lanka had 8.8 troops per 1,000 population and approximately 20 
per 1,000 for operations in Bosnia and Kosovo.579 As such, the addition of military contractors to 
the Coalition in OIF should significantly impact military effectiveness as they greatly bring the 
force closer to the recommended rule of thumb for population density. Therefore, like the FFR 
and FSR, if the manpower perspective of military contracting is correct, then military contractor 
contributions to the force should result in enhanced military effectiveness as measured by 
                                                          
577 CENTCOM Quarterly Contractor Census Reports; O’Hanlon and Livingston, Iraq Index, 18 
578 Sepp, “Best Practices in Counterinsurgency,” 9. 
579 Goode, “A Historical Basis for Force Requirements in Counterinsurgency,” 52. 
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Coalition and civilian deaths. Alternatively, if contractor numbers do not affect the number of 
deaths the manpower perspective will be contradicted. 
 
7.4 The Results of Military Contracting and Numerical Imbalance in OIF  
 
After being identified, the variables can now be apply applied to OIF in order to 
determine the impact each has on the relationship between military contracting and military 
effectiveness. Statistical analyses took into account the twelve observations of numerical 
imbalance from the manpower perspective as depicted in Table 7.2 below. 
 
Table 7.2: Summary of Hypotheses 
  Civilian Deaths   Coalition Deaths 
  (iCasualty.org)   (Iraq Body Count) 
PMSC Manpower  Material  
 
Material  
(FFR) 1a. Deaths decrease 
with respect to 
contractor manpower 
 
2a. Deaths decrease 
with respect to 
contractor manpower 
      
 
1b. Deaths decrease 
with respect to 
contractor and 
Coalition manpower 
 
3b. Deaths decrease 
with respect to 
contractor and 
Coalition manpower 
PMSC Manpower  Material    Material  
(FSR) 3a. Deaths decrease 
with respect to 
contractor FSR  
4a. Deaths decrease 
with respect to 
contractor FSR 
      
 
3b. Deaths decrease 
with respect to 
contractor and 
Coalition FSR  
4b. Deaths decrease 
with respect to 
contractor and 
Coalition FSR 
PMSC Manpower  Material    Material  
(Population 
Density) 
5a. Deaths decrease 
with respect to 
contractor population 
density  
6a. Deaths decrease 
with respect to 
contractor population 
density 
      
 
5b. Deaths decrease 
with respect to 
contractor and 
Coalition population 
density  
6b. Deaths decrease 
with respect to 
contractor and 
Coalition population 
density 
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Figure 7.7 below depicts a graphical representation of the key variables under study. The 
manpower perspective expects that increases in contractor manpower, as seen in FFRs, FSRs, 
and population densities, should cause the number of coalition and civilian deaths to decrease. In 
Figure 7.7 below illustrates the relationship between Coalition and civilian deaths to Colaition 
and contractor personnel numbers. The figure depicts a lag between the July 2007 increase in 
contractors with the decline in Coalition and civilian deaths. However, statistical analysis of the 
relationship between contractor numbers and measures of violence throughout OIF indicates that 
there was a weak relationship between the variables. 
 
Figure 7.7: Coalition and Contractor Numbers in Relation to Coalition and Civilian Deaths580 
 
 
                                                          
580 CENTCOM Quarterly Contractor Census Reports; O’Hanlon and Livingston, Iraq Index, 18; Iraq Body Count. 
org.; iCasualties.org, “Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom”. 
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The analyses finds that only four of the twelve relationships were statistically significant 
as per customary levels of significance. There are three arguments in support of this assertion. 
First, three of the four tests found contractor manpower (FFR, FSR, and population-density) to 
be correlated with Coalition deaths. Second, the relationship between total contractor and 
Coalition personnel numbers and civilian deaths was also found to be statistically significant. 
Third, the results indicate that contractor manpower is correlated with Coalition deaths. 
Therefore, the manpower perspective is only weakly correlated with the military contracting-
military effectiveness relationship. 
 
7.4.1 Coalition Death Predictions 
 
Table 7.3, below, presents a series of regression analyses using DoD and IBC.org data. 
The results offer general, if not overwhelming, support for the manpower perspective of military 
contracting. The relationship between contractor numbers and Coalition deaths is significant at a 
customary level. Increases in contractor manpower are correlated to decreases in coalition 
deaths. The p-values for the combined Coalition and contractor personnel numbers relating to 
Coalition deaths fall below the customary level of p.=05 and are insignificant. The full results of 
each of the six tests can be found in Appendix B, page 251-266. 
 
Table 7.3: Correlating Contractor Manpower with Coalition Deaths with Coalition Deaths 
 
Number FFR FSR Population-Density 
Contractor p=0.00011 p=0.00011 p=0.0004 
Coalition and Contractors p=0.19939 p=.4630 p=0.6511 
 
Figures 7.8, 7.9, 7.10 below depict the manpower claims of contractor numbers on 
Coalition deaths based on FFR, FSR, and population-density, respectively. Coalition numbers, as 
expressed by FFR, FSR, and population-density, display significance for the manpower 
predictions. In each measure, an increase in contractor numbers resulted in a decrease in 
Coalition deaths.  
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Figure 7.8: Coalition Deaths by Contractor FFR581 
 
 
Figure 7.9: Coalition Deaths by Contractor FSR582 
 
 
                                                          
581 CENTCOM Quarterly Contractor Census Reports; O’Hanlon and Livingston, Iraq Index, 18. 
582 CENTCOM Quarterly Contractor Census Reports; O’Hanlon and Livingston, Iraq Index, 18; Department of 
Commerce, “International Data Base”. 
y = -5.3826x + 73.776 
R² = 0.1641 
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Co
al
iti
on
 D
ea
th
s 
Contractor Force-to-Insurgent Ratio 
y = -117.21x + 72.557 
R² = 0.1561 
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
0 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3 0.35 0.4
Co
al
iti
on
 D
ea
th
s 
Contractor Force-to-Space Ratio 
180 
 
Figure 7.10: Coalition Deaths by Contractor Population Density583 
 
 
 
Therefore the results only somewhat corroborate the contractor manpower perspective’s 
predictions. The Coalition death effects of FFR, FSR, and population-density support its 
predictions. However, despite the significance of results from contractor numbers with Coalition 
deaths, the relationship between Coalition and contractor total numbers with Coalition deaths is 
insignificant. While the figures do not contradict the military contracting manpower perspective, 
they call into question why contractor numbers alone were significant when contractor and 
Coalition numbers were not.  
The relationship between contractor numbers and Coalition deaths was found to be 
extremely significant. By contrast, Coalition and contractor totals were found to be unrelated to 
Coalition deaths. The results indicate that increasing military personnel increased Coalition 
deaths. This is logical given that the more military personnel put in harm’s way, the higher the 
likelihood of their death. However, if the force multiplier assumption is correct—that contractors 
replace military personnel at performing non-war fighting task thus enabling uniformed 
personnel to concentrate on war fighting tasks—then an increase in contractors deployed should 
                                                          
583 CENTCOM Quarterly Contractor Census Reports; O’Hanlon and Livingston, Iraq Index, 18; Department of 
Commerce, “International Data Base”. 
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also increase the number of Coalition deaths as uniformed personnel transitioned to jobs that put 
them  in harm’s way. 
In seeking to clarify these results, the thesis determined that although contractors were 
included in the number of troops deployed, they were not included in Coalition death counts 
despite the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) naming them an official part of the 
Coalition work force.584 The omission of contractors from the Coalition death count could cause 
the results to be unreliable as contractors are considered in the number of personnel deployed but 
not in the number of personnel killed. Without counting contractor deaths, contractors could be 
absorbing Coalition deaths by shifting the deaths of uniformed Coalition personnel to contractors 
that have taken their place in operations. Therefore, the finding of a significant relationship 
between contractor numbers and  Coalition deaths could overstate the actual effect contractors 
have on the force’s fatality rates.  
In actuality, when contractor deaths were accounted for in Coalition death totals, the 
correlation between the death rate and Coalition numbers became more significant.585 Table 7.4 
below illustrates the more significant p-values returned by including contractor deaths in values 
of contractor FFR, FSR, and population-density. Taken together, the results of military 
contracting in OIF support the manpower perspective. Ceteris paribus, the contractor perspective 
is supported outright by the results in Coalition deaths.  
 
Table 7.4: Comparing Contractor Numbers and Coalition Deaths to Coalition and Contractor 
Deaths 
 
Measures of Manpower 
Coalition 
Deaths Coalition and Contractor Deaths 
Contractor FFR p=0.00011 p=0.000019 
Contractor FSR p=0.00011 p=0.000019 
Contractor Population Density p=0.0004 p=0.000090 
 
                                                          
584 Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report (February 6, 2006), 74. 
585 It is important to note that exact data on contractor deaths is incomplete. For the reasons see, SIGIR, “SIGIR 
Special Report Number 2: The Human Toll of Reconstruction or Stabilization Operations During Operation Iraqi 
Freedom,” (July 27, 2012), 3, accessed September 20, 2014, 
http://cybercemetery.unt.edu/archive/sigir/20131001100723/http://www.sigir.mil/files/lessonslearned/SpecialReport
2.pdf. 
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7.4.2 Civilian Death Predictions 
 
Table 7.5 presents the results of a series of regression analyses that used DoD and 
icasualties.org data. The p-values for the combined Coalition and contractor numbers and FFR 
and FSR fall below the customary p=.05 level and are thus insignificant and do not support the 
manpower perspective of military contracting.  
 
Table 7.5: Correlating Contractor Manpower with Civilian Deaths  
 
Number FFR FSR Population-Density 
Contractor p=0.5631 p=0.5631 p=0.8107 
Coalition and Contractors p=0.3088 p=0.1640 p=.03741 
 
The combined total of contractors and Coalition personnel is significant in relation to 
population-density. This means that Coalition population-density is directly related to civilian 
deaths. As illustrated in Figure 7.11, the total population density increases; the rate of civilian 
death also increases. Therefore, the relationship contradicts the general manpower perspective 
because as coalition and contractor numbers increased, so too did the number of civilian deaths. 
As such, the results deflect support for the contractor manpower perspective. Each of the six 
civilian death analyses can be found in Appendix B, page 251-266. 
 
Figure 7.11: Civilian Deaths by Coalition and Contractor Population Density 
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7.4.3 The Impact of Military Contractors on Military Effectiveness is Mixed  
 
How do the results of military contracting in OIF correspond with the characteristics of 
the contractor manpower perspective? Have statistical analyses proven the hypothesis that a 
military that employs higher levels of military contractors should perform more effectively on 
the battlefield than during instances it employs fewer contractors? The summary of findings 
listed below in Table 7.6, depict the results of the quantitative tests.  
The results from OIF are mixed. Three conclusions can be drawn from the data. First, the 
relationship between contractor numbers to civilian deaths was found to be insignificant. Second, 
the relationship between combined contractor and Coalition numbers and civilian deaths was 
significant in relation to population density. Third, the relationship between combined coalition 
and contractor manpower and civilian deaths was insignificant in relation to the FFRs and FSRs. 
Therefore, contractor manpower helped to decrease Coalition deaths but failed to decrease 
civilian deaths which were also a primary military objective of OIF.586 The manpower 
perspective’s failure to achieve significance with civilian deaths weakens its predictive value. 
The hypothesis is that a military employing higher levels of military contractors should perform 
more effectively on the battlefield than during instances when it employs fewer contractors is 
therefore rejected. 
 
Table 7.6: Results for the Contractor Manpower Perspective 
Coalition Deaths 
Number FFR FSR 
Population-
Density 
Contractor Supported  Supported  Supported  
Coalition and 
Contractors Insignificant Insignificant Insignificant 
Civilian Deaths 
Number FFR FSR 
Population-
Density 
Contractor Insignificant Insignificant Insignificant 
Coalition and 
Contractors Insignificant Insignificant Contradicted 
                                                          
586 Petraeus, Report to Congress on the Situation of Iraq. 
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While it is clear that there is a correlation between contractor manpower and the number 
of Coalition and contractor deaths, it is difficult to understand how the overall results impact the 
ongoing debate over whether military contracting enhances military effectiveness or not. For 
example, the impact of hiring more contractors on Coalition deaths could be used to support pro-
military contracting arguments by citing that contracting has lowered Coalition and contractor 
deaths. On the other hand, because of the lack of evidence that military contractors decrease 
civilian deaths, the data support an argument against military contracting by indicating that 
military contracting has no proven benefit of helping the military achieve its ‘hearts and minds’ 
strategy. Despite these results, it still is unclear whether military contractors strengthen the 
argument for using military contractors as a force multiplier or verify the pessimism leveled at 
military contracting by its critics. 
In search of an answer, the following section advances and analyzes the CFE perspective 
to gain a more nuanced understanding of the results. The section employs a qualitative analysis 
of contractor force employment methods to reveal deeper meanings within the relationship 
between military contracting and military effectiveness. The two remaining hypotheses are 
analyzed: H2) PMSCs should cause a net increase of military effectiveness, when contractor 
force employment methods integrate military and PMSC groups; H3) PMSCs should cause a net 
decrease in military effectiveness, when contractor force employment methods do not integrate 
the military and PMSC groups.  
 
7.5 The Contractor Force Employment Perspective and Military Contracting 
 
Statistical analysis has an implicit advantage to uncovering the internal logic between 
complex claims. However, despite its precise nature, statistical analysis is poorly suited for 
understanding a particular series of events. Statistical analysis is an ineffective means to account 
for potential confounding effects of third variables that are beyond the scope of mathematical 
tractability. This section of the case study employs three qualitative methods (archival records, 
interviews, and documentation) to provide rich descriptions that permit the depth required to 
characterize variables, such as contractor employment, which are presently unaccounted for in 
datasets.  
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Violence in Iraq reached a watershed in early 2008. The surge of approximately 30,000 
American troops and the hiring of approximately 160,000 contractors caused some supporters of 
military contracting to conclude that military contracting was indeed a viable mechanism to 
increase military effectiveness. Others, however, pointed out that the injection of military 
contractors did not result in a battlefield turnaround. Insurgent violence remained high even after 
increased contractor employment. Although statistical analysis was useful to determining the 
general impact of military contracting on military effectiveness, it was not able to resolve this 
debate. The thesis now turns to qualitatively analyzing the CFE perspective to provide further 
insight. 
 
7.5.1 Lost In Translation: The Problems of Translating Contracting into Effectiveness   
 
An increase in contractor manpower does not automatically mean an increase in military 
effectiveness. Archival records, documentation and discussions with key military contracting 
stakeholders substantiate the quantitative results by highlighting the critical need for military-
contractor integration in order to translated contractor resources into military effectiveness. 
Military-contractor integration is critical because the fundamental difference between the 
financial motivations of the contractor and the goal-oriented motivations of the military caused 
three major obstacles to translating contractor resources into military effectiveness during OIF. 
The three major obstacles were a lack of information flow, an incomplete operational concept, 
and the continued overemphasis on manpower. Each of these three obstacles explain the impact 
contractors have on military effectiveness to include why contractor numbers helped decrease 
Coalition deaths but failed to have an effect on civilian deaths.  
The first obstacle is a lack of information sharing between military and contractor groups. 
In OIF, military contractors failed to communicate information such as the number of personnel 
employed and their movements on the battlefield.587 This was problematic because without being 
aware of contractor size and movement patterns, battlefield commanders could not integrate 
                                                          
587 Interview with Dr. T.X. Hammes, August 3, 2011. 
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contractors into military plans or operations.588 Thus, the lack of information available on 
military contracting precluded the DoD’s “ability to obtain reasonable assurance that contractors 
are [were] meeting contract requirements efficiently and effectively at each location where work 
is being performed.”589 Consequently, commanders were not able to employ contractors to the 
full extent in pursuing military objectives, nor could commanders replace military personnel with 
contractors and then reallocate military personnel to combat positions as is argued by 
policymakers in support of the manpower perspective.590  
The lack of information sharing between the two groups in OIF exacerbated 
disintegration. The military leadership began to elevate their control of the battlefield over 
working with contractors. In describing the siguation General Ricardo Sanchez, former Ground 
Forces Commander in Iraq from June 2003 to June 2004, states that:  
 …. there was a mind-set that was almost unexplainable about maintaining 
this separation with the military assets on the ground that permeated just 
about everything that was going on in the country [Iraq] from the building 
of security forces to the actual combat operations and initiatives.591  
 
As Sanchez alludes, the withholding of information bifurcated military and contractor resources 
further compounding the issues of integration.  
Policymakers, analyst, scholars, and industry leaders involved with military leaders agree 
that there is an integration problem inhibiting the military from maximizing contractor resources. 
These leaders agree that training would improve information flows between contractors and 
military personnel. Former Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and 
Logistics (1997-2001), Dr. Jacques Gansler, highlights the need for a more streamlined flow of 
information in stating the importance of the military training to use military contractors. Gansler 
says that, “The military shouldn’t deploy without having initially trained for using contractors on 
the battlefield.”592 Moshe Schwartz, the lead military contracting analyst at the Congressional 
Research Service, simply argues that improving the military’s awareness of military contractors 
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on the battlefield will enhance the military’s ability to manage them which, in turn, will help 
ensure that contractor activities contribute to military objectives.593 Renowned military 
contracting scholar David Isenberg, emphasizes that training will help create “standards of 
contractor employment” which will create a baseline upon which information can flow.594 Doug 
Brooks, the founder of the International Security Operations Association (ISOA), worked to 
provide “direction and clear guidelines” for contractors by establishing ISOA.595 Each of these 
individuals reinforces the importance of non-material information flows in translating military 
contracting manpower into military effectiveness.  
The second source of disintegration with military contracting was the lack of a complete 
operation concept. The initial operational concept used by the US military was that contractors 
would perform non-critical tasks allowing uniformed personnel to focus on more critical tasks. 
This concept was incompatible in that it failed to consider the operational and tactical levels.  
Operationally, the concept failed to tie contractors to the achievement of policy 
objectives such as securing, governing, and developing Iraq. According to General McChrystal 
(ret.), the explosion in the number of contractors employed made it impossible for the military to 
write the specific contracts needed to align contractor outputs with the achievement of policy 
goals.596 Consequently, contractors performed and fulfilled contracts that did very little to further 
these goals. Furthermore, the government did not track contractor functions and therefore could 
not reallocate military personnel accordingly after contractors replaced them. Therefore, 
although contractors were hired to replace military personnel, the lack of integration between the 
military and contractor groups precluded the reallocation necessary for military contracting to 
become an effective force multiplier. 
The concept was also incomplete at the tactical level. Insufficiently specific contracts 
impacted the tactical level as many contractors conducted themselves in an unprofessional way. 
McChrystal states that unprofessional contractor techniques, tactics, and procedures (TTPs), such 
as reckless driving and overly aggressive rules of engagement, had “intangible negative effects ...  
that caused the indigenous population to hate Americans which made doing counterinsurgency 
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operations difficult because we [the US military] couldn’t win over the population as easily.”597 
Moshe Schwartz of the Congressional Research Service substantiates McChrystal’s comments 
by adding that although contractor structures had been established to oversee military contracting 
and hold military contractors accountable, an incentive structure was not created to motivate 
contractors to bring their TTPs in line with the operational concept.598 According to the Deputy 
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Program Support), Gary Motsek, contractor TTPs were never 
called into question because “they [contractors] fulfilled their contract.”599 Motsek’s statement 
further indicates the operational and tactical disconnect between military personnel, contractors, 
and the policy objectives. The combination of operational and tactical deficiencies prohibited the 
establishment of an operational concept that aligned the more numerically superior force with the 
achievement of military objectives. 
Translating contractor manpower into military effectiveness in OIF was also problematic 
because of the policy focus on manpower. According to Motsek, “The United States has no 
choice in contracting because it only has a fixed number of personnel in the military. Contractors 
enable the military to put the bulk of its people in combat positions.”600 The need for more 
personnel forced policymakers to focus first on generating the numbers that they needed during 
OIF. Policymakers, like Gen. Petraeus (ret.), began to think that producing a numerically 
superior force was the best way to achieve policy goals rather than creating a force capable of 
achieving those goals. They could not conceive of military contracting resources as not being the 
main criteria for assessing the efficacy of military contracting. In focusing on creating a larger 
force, policy overemphasized the importance of a numerically superior military and 
underemphasized the importance of non-material resources such as force employment methods. 
The result was the belief that a larger military with contractors would be more effective.  
These three problems - information flows, developing a complete operational concept, 
and an overemphasis on contractor manpower - made translating military contracting into 
military effectiveness difficult. Even McChrystal acknowledges that contractors can successfully 
impact the battlefield so long as their employment does not outpace the military’s ability to 
control them. Closer analysis of military contracting in OIF, acknowledges that military 
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contracting can be used a as tool to enhance military effectiveness.  Developing contractor force 
employment methods would allay McChyrstal’s concerns by integrating contractors into the 
military organization by establishing command guidance over them.601 
The deficiencies in information flows, the establishment of an operational concept and an 
overemphasis on manpower clearly indicate that the only viable means of understanding military 
contracting is by analyzing contracting from a CFE perspective in order to provide a nuanced 
understanding of the divergent results between contractor manpower levels and Coalition and 
civilian death rates.  
 
7.6 Employing CFE to Understand Contractor Effectiveness 
 
During OIF, the DoD developed contractor force employment methods comprising of 
contractor doctrine and force structure. Contractor doctrine endeavors to instruct the military on 
how to employ contractors. Contractor force employment structures establish institutions 
required to carry out these instructions. Combined, doctrine and force employment seek to 
reconcile the military contractor’s financial motivation with the military’s motivation of 
achieving specific battlefield objectives. Doctrine and structure help ensure that military 
contractors do not elevate their financial goals above the battlefield objective or the policy goal 
and instead fulfill their contracts in line with them. In short, contractor force employment 
methods were established to help translate contractor resources into gains in military 
effectiveness by fostering military-contractor integration. 
Integration, as seen in section 7.5, is necessary to align contractor outputs with military 
and policy objectives. The contractor doctrine and structures that the US established in OIF are 
the reason for contractor numbers being correlated with decreases in Coalition deaths. The lack 
of specific contractor doctrine and structures explains why increased contractor levels did not 
have an impact on civilian deaths. OIF demonstrates that contractor force employment methods 
are critical to integration, and integration is critical to improving the translation of contractor 
manpower into enhanced military effectiveness in the future. 
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7.6.1 Contractor Force Employment Methods Focus Manpower on Specific Goals 
 
At the beginning of the Iraqi insurgency, contractor employment methods were largely 
absent. According to Motsek, “The US didn’t think about a doctrinal focus because it never 
anticipated the number of contractors needed and for how long they would be needed.”602 The 
US military only had seven points of contractor doctrine.603 These seven points instructed the 
military on the process for acquiring private material resources but largely ignored the 
employment of those resources once acquired. Initial doctrine did not alleviate the informational 
flow, operational concept, or overemphasis on manpower problems. This failure inhibited 
military-contractor integration. However, as the doctrine was established, progress was made in 
integration the military and contracting groups.  
The first point of doctrine was the 1985 Army Regulation 700-137. AR 700-137actually 
ran counter to integration by concentrating on generating more manpower through military 
contracting. It concerned the process for preparing and awarding LOGCAP contracts.604 The 
1998 US Army Pamphlet 715-16 was an improvement as it effectively outlined military-
contractor battlefield interactions which laid the foundation for military-contractor integration. 
However, it fell short by not prescribing how these interactions should take place, or stating how 
to align contractors with military objectives.605 The 1999 Army Regulation 715-9 “prescribes 
policies, procedures, and responsibilities for a disciplined approach to managing” contractors, 
however, the lack of contractor structures to provide oversight inhibited the Army’s ability to 
actually adhere to the policies, procedures, and responsibilities.606  
FM 100-10-2 (1999) made steps toward integration by recognizing the importance of 
information flows and a complete operational concept. It described how commanders could 
maintain centralized control over military contractors within the chain of command. However, 
FM 100-10-2 omitted a discussion of the lengthy process of command and control between 
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military and contractor command hierarchies as well as the importance of decentralized mission 
control to unconventional operations such as counterinsurgencies.607 
The AMC Pamphlet 715-18 established in 2000 also sought to expand material contractor 
resources without working to integrate them. It asserted that “contracting is an effective combat 
service support force multiplier that can increase existing capability, provide a new source of 
supplies and services and bridge gaps in the deployed force structure.”608 In other words, it 
prescribed a framework for recognizing gaps in material capabilities that the military required 
but omitted a strategic framework for how those material resources would be used to achieve 
military objectives once they were procured.  
Even in 2003 with FM 100-21, Contractor Support on the Battlefield  was superficial and 
only paid lip-service to the importance of integration. For example, it states that, “Planning for 
contractor support is an integral part of the planning for any operations.”609 As such, it is 
primarily focused on the procurement and acquisition of material resources and ignored 
prescribing how to employ the contracted resources. Consequently, although it acknowledges the 
importance of an integrated force, it does not make any steps to improve it. 
The review of FM 100-21 described processes for military planning, deploying, 
managing, supporting, and employing military contractors.  FM 100-21 is the first document to 
prescribe employment methods as it has a chapter dedicated to force protection. It defines force 
protection as the “actions taken to prevent or mitigate hostel actions against DoD personnel, 
resources, facilities and critical information.”610 FM 100-21 does not possess any instruction on 
aligning contractor output with military objectives such as “winning hearts and minds”. This is 
illuminating because the doctrine concentrated specifically on force protection and contractor 
manpower levels assuming that contractor levels were directly correlated with military 
effectiveness. No contractor doctrine specified the importance of civilians, which resulted in 
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there not being a correlation with military contractors in the quantitative analysis. This finding 
means that contractor doctrine caused a decrease in Coalition deaths by shifting from enabling 
the military contracting process to take place to recognizing the critical need for acquired 
resources to be integrated into the force. The doctrine fell short of lowering civilian deaths 
because it did not include civilians in its policies and recommendations which resulted in 
disintegration between military objectives and contractor actions. 
The establishment of contractor structures also had problems similar to doctrine. For 
example the Army Materiel Command (AMC) and the Defense Contracting Management 
Agency (DCMA) were established at the beginning of OIF but they were unprepared to 
accommodate the dramatic increase in military contracting. Both the AMC and DCMA were 
unable to oversee contracting and foster integration between the military and contractors. The 
inability of these institutions to expand at the same pace as military contracting rendered 
government institutions incapable of sufficiently controlling military contractors and preventing 
contractor waste, fraud, and abuse. The result of the US institutional incapacity was the risk that 
military contracting began to increase the “overall cost, schedule and performance of DoD 
activities in Iraq”.611 These problems provided the impetus for more institutions to be created 
that were better able to oversee military contracting in OIF.  
The government’s first step in creating contractor force employment structures was to 
establish the Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR). In October 
2004, SIGIR was established to address waste, fraud and abuse issues.612 SIGIR’s mandate was 
to oversee Iraq reconstruction programs and operations, to include contractors, by performing 
audits and investigations, working to prevent and detect waste, fraud and abuse. SIGIR 
operations were an important means for uncovering the underlying problems of military 
contracting.613 In its first reports to Congress, the Secretary of State, and the Secretary of 
Defense, SIGIR reported both the magnitude of contractor problems as well as the scope and 
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scale of military contracting. The description of the central role that military contracting played 
for US military operations caused the DoD to list contractors as being a part of the Defense 
Department’s Total Force in the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) which was a positive 
step for military-contractor integration.614  
According to Director William Solis, of DCMA, the military needed “an institutional 
change that accepts the reality of contractors as a vital part of the total force and fundamental 
change in how DoD thinks about, plans for, and executes its use of contractors to support 
deployed forces.”615 In recognizing the need for an institutional change, the US government took 
several measures to provide additional oversight in order to improve military contracting 
transparency in Iraq as well as foster informational flows, a complete operational concept, and 
acknowledge the need for contractor resources to be integrated into the military force.616 The 
government began to attune itself to the necessities of contractor force employment methods.  
In 2007, Congress wrote legislation placing military contractors under the authority of the 
Secretary of Defense.617 Congress also directed the Congressional Research Service (CRS) to 
undertake extensive reporting, directed the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) to assess 
budgets and analyze the PMSC contracts, and required the Government Accountability Office 
(GAO) to study “all relevant aspects of the contracting phenomenon.”618 CRS, CBO, and GAO 
reports reinforced that the level of reliance the US placed on military contracting, the role of 
military contracting played for US operations, and the need to improve practice of military 
contracting was critical to mission effectiveness.619 
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 The US Army also sought to improve its military contractor practices. The Army 
commissioned a 2007 inquiry into military contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan, commonly 
referred to as the Gansler Commission, to better attune the insitution to military contracting. The 
Gansler Report found that the US Army had not yet fully recognized the impact of contractors on 
mission success. Specifically, it found that contractor employment methods were non-existent, 
outdated, or poorly suited for military contracting in counterinsurgencies. Those employment 
methods that did exist at the time focused on instructing military and contractor personnel on the 
importance of preserving the force, but did not instruct military personnel on how to integrate 
and employ contractors in unconventional operations such as counterinsurgency (COIN). Thus, 
military and contractor personnel employed practices supporting Coalition survivability but did 
not employ practices that supported winning over the Iraqi population. 
The Gansler report recommended that the Army make organizational changes to foster 
integration such as improving training, career development, and doctrine related to military 
contracting.620 Furthermore, the Gansler Report recommended that the Army “obtain legislative, 
regulatory, and policy assistance to enable contracting effectiveness in expeditionary 
operations.”621 These findings and recommendations demonstrate the importance of contractor 
force employment to translating contractor resources into enhanced military effectiveness.  
 Following the Gansler Commission Report, the United States redoubled its efforts to 
develop contractor force employment methods in order to integrate contractors with military 
goals. In December 2007, Congress created the Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and 
Afghanistan (CWC) to specifically assess the utility of contracting, examine waste, fraud, and 
abuse and prepare recommendations to improve the military contracting process.622 The CWC 
held a number of hearings and filed several reports to Congress from June 2009 to August 2011. 
Throughout these reports, the CWC consistently argued for improved contractor doctrine and 
structures.  
 Establishing the CWC structure was proving an impact to creating more and better 
contractor doctrine. As such, structure and doctrine converged to foster integration between the 
military and contractor groups. One result of CWC reports was the production of two Joint 
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Publications for military contracting: Joint Publication 4-0, Joint Logistics and Joint Publication 
4-10, Operational Contract Support.623 Joint Logistics provided direction on planning and 
execution by stressing “the importance of fully integrating into logistics plans and orders the 
logistics functions performed by contractors along with those performed by military personnel 
and government civilians …”624 Operational Contract Support addressed contract support 
integration and management. In addition, doctrine also evolved with the production of The 
Interim Final Rule on Private Security Contractors (PSCs) Operating in Contingency 
Operations in 2009. The document establishes military contracting policy and assigns 
responsibilities in regulating contractors on the battlefield. This doctrine is evidence of the 
development of the CFE perspective as it describes the procedures for regulating the selection, 
training, equipping and conduct of military contracting personnel.625 The development of 
employment methods caused improvements on the battlefield. They gave battlefield commanders 
more control over the battlefield better enabling them to control the movements of contractors in 
their battle space.626 SIGIR reports, for example, indicate that contractor employment methods 
aimed at improving control and coordination were effective at reducing the number of instances 
where contractor actions were inconsistent with ongoing military operations.627 Notably, 
however, contractor employment methods did not explicitly name reducing civilian casualties as 
a goal. Nor did any doctrine make explicit mention of preserving civilian life. This finding, along 
with the Army emphasis on preserving the force instead of instructing military personnel how to 
integrate and employ contractors in counterinsurgency, adds nuance to the quantitative findings. 
Combined, these points explain why increases in military contractors decreased contractor deaths 
but did not decrease civilian deaths. Taken together, this suggests that CFE is critical for a 
military to optimally employ military contractors. 
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7.7 Summary of Findings 
 
The qualitative analysis finds that contractor force employment is critical to translating 
contractor material resources into enhanced military effectiveness. The findings from the chapter 
tend to corroborate the evidence for the CFE perspective more strongly than the contractor 
manpower perspective. The chapter’s key finding is that both the manpower perspective and the 
CFE perspective are required to fully understand the impact military contracting has on military 
effectiveness. In particular, CFE creates new understandings on military effectiveness and 
suggests new ways in how contractors can be employed more optimally in future conflicts. As a 
result, the findings will have significant implications on how policymakers allocate limited 
resources to produce the military effectiveness gains necessary to win future wars.  
How do these findings from OIF correspond with the characteristics of the CFE 
perspective? Generally, contractor employment methods are able to produce gains by facilitating 
integration between military and contractor groups on two different levels. The first level 
promotes information sharing between military contractors and the military allowing them to 
reconcile movement on the battlefield. The second level relates to information sharing between 
the military and contractors to create an operational concept that links military and ctonractor 
actions with policy goals. Information sharing overcomes the divisions produced by contractors 
working for profit. Contractor employment methods cause contractors to elevate the needs of the 
military in fulfilling their contracts. Military-contractor integration aligns each group’s 
respective goals helping to establish an operational concept. Without information sharing, the 
financial goals of the contractor cannot be aligned to the battlefield goals of the military. Military 
contractors and the military both seek autonomy from one another and therefore are reluctant to 
share information. 
The CFE perspective suggests that contractor manpower will enhance military 
contracting when contractor doctrine and force structures are developed and applied alongside 
military contracting. The findings from the analysis of OIF offer support for the CFE perspective 
because the development of doctrine and structures directly corresponded to battlefield results. 
For instance, doctrine and structures that emphasized Coalition survivability resulted in 
contractor manpower having a positive effect on the number of Coalition deaths as indicated by 
the quantitative results. In contrast, the absence of instructions on civilian welfare precluded 
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contractor manpower from positively and meaningfully improving the number of coalition 
deaths. The data corroborate the CFE perspective and indicate that the proper development and 
application of contractor employment methods can cause military contracting to enhance a 
military’s effectiveness as predicted by the contractor manpower perspective. 
As such, the findings of the qualitative analysis add nuance to the quantitative results. 
Whereas contractor manpower results showed a correlation between contractor manpower and 
Coalition deaths, and the lack of a correlation between contractors and civilian deaths, the CFE 
perspective uncovers the deeper relationships between the variables. For example, the CFE 
findings demonstrate that contractor manpower and military effectiveness interact based on 
levels of integration fostered between military and contractor groups. The level of integration is 
contingent on contractor employment methods. Therefore, this finding asserts that the impact 
military contracting has on military effectiveness is more a function of contractor force 
employment than of the number of contractors employed. In other words, contractor employment 
methods are a prerequisite for manpower gains yielding improvements to military effectiveness. 
In terms of policy arguments, asserting that military contracting is ineffective or that 
military contracting is a force multiplier based on manpower alone are inaccurate. These 
arguments premise their assertions solely on contractor manpower causing them to miss the non-
material value of integration on the causal chain of translating manpower resources into 
enhanced military effectiveness. Military contracting could conceivably increase or decrease 
military effectiveness irrespective of changes to contractor manpower resources. Military 
effectiveness could also be improved upon by making investments in developing contractor 
employment methods without altering number of contractors employed. As such, assessing 
military contracting requires understanding the ways contractor resources are employed as well 
as the quantity of resources employed. Therefore, how military contractors are employed proves 
to be at least as important as what or how many contractors are employed when understanding 
the relationship between military contracting and military effectiveness. 
 
7.6 Summarizing the Quantitative Results and Qualitative Findings 
 
Given the characterizations of the contractor manpower and force employment, the 
question remains: Is military contracting as amazing as manpower proponents suggest? Is it as 
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hopeless as others charge? The OIF case suggests that the answer to both of these questions is 
“No”.  
The results do not correspond with the traditional manpower perspective of military 
contracting. The manpower perspective implies that the number of military contractors employed 
is directly related to military effectiveness and that as the number of contractors increases 
military effectiveness will also increase, and vice versa. Given that military contracting 
dramatically increased during OIF, the contractor manpower perspective projects unambiguous 
gains to military effectiveness. The dramatic increase in the number of contractors employed 
should be commensurate with enhanced military contracting. In such a case, contractor 
manpower should have been sufficient to increase military effectiveness regardless of contractor 
employment methods. However, the straightforward manpower predictions are not in line with 
the mixed historical findings from the OIF case.  
The CFE thesis indicates that increases in military contractors would not result in 
enhanced military effectiveness unless contractor employment methods were developed and 
implemented to foster military-contractor integration. Consequently, the CFE perspective 
predicts either unambiguous gains to military contracting so long as employment methods are 
developed alongside military contracting or unambiguous losses to military effectiveness if they 
are not. Although the statistical analysis of contractor force employment methods fell beyond the 
scope of this thesis, there is evidence of a relationship in two particular ways. First, Coalition 
deaths and contractor manpower were correlated when contractor force employment methods 
emphasized preserving the force. Second, civilian deaths and contractor manpower were not 
correlated, as contractor force employment methods did not emphasize the goal of reducing 
civilian casualties. The CFE perspective’s predictions are consistent with the actual results of 
OIF. Therefore, the findings corroborate the CFE thesis since there is evidence of a direct 
relationship between military effectiveness and the development of contractor employment 
methods, despite the presence of a numerically superior force that meets all traditional rules of 
thumb.  
The CFE perspective appears to outperform the traditional manpower perspective on 
military contracting in a case where the opposite should occur. The findings suggest that since 
CFE methods were effective at translating contractor manpower into increasing military 
effectiveness, as seen by the decrease in Coalition deaths, it stands to reason that CFE methods 
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applied to civilian deaths, or any other standard proxy of military contracting, would also be 
likely to produce similar results. Therefore, the thesis highlights the necessity of contractor 
employment methods to military contracting and the value of the CFE perspective to military 
contracting policy.  
Although a single case cannot validate the CFE perspective, the findings from OIF are 
valuable in three ways. First, they establish a degree of correspondence between contractor 
employment methods and military contracting in an actual combat scenario. Second, the case 
shows a close correspondence between the interaction of manpower and contractor employment 
methods in explaining military effectiveness in a critical case study. Finally, the findings provide 
evidence that could shift the military contracting policy debate from one concentrates on 
manpower to one that accounts for force employment as well.  
The implications of these findings support the manpower claim that military contracting 
does increase military effectiveness. However, military contracting does not impact the 
battlefield outcomes in the way that the manpower proponents suggest. The argument that 
contractors act as a “force-multiplier” by performing non-critical tasks enabling military 
personnel to perform critical tasks is tenuous. It is tenuous because accounting for contractor 
employment methods is a prerequisite for military personnel replacing contractors and being 
gainfully reallocated. Therefore, military effectiveness only increases as result of added 
manpower when contractor doctrine and structures are in place.  
Changes to contractor employment methods help to establish the instructions needed to 
foster military-contracting integration and the means of enforcing these instructions. The 
development of the CFE perspective helps to translate contractor manpower into enhanced 
effectiveness by increasing information exchanges between the military and contractors 
facilitating the development of an operation concept and strategy to military contracting that 
works. Inherent in the establishment of CFE is also the shift in thinking about military 
contracting beyond manpower terms. Although military contractors have regularly been 
employed throughout history to augment armed forces, OIF proves to be a forcing house for 
understanding that contractor force employment methods are critical to translating contractor 
manpower into enhanced military effectiveness.  
OIF demonstrates the need for both contractor manpower and contractor force 
employment methods to increase military effectiveness. Manpower is necessary to perform 
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specific functions but insufficient alone to improve military effectiveness. Contractor 
employment methods are necessary to instruct the military on how those functions must be 
performed and ensure that their outputs translate into the achievement of the overall military 
objective and policy goal. However, while CFE may cause the more effective use of contractors, 
it requires an adequate physical contractor force to perform the tasks required. Consequently, 
contractor employment methods are also a necessary but insufficient component in enhancing 
military effectiveness. Both CFE and manpower perspectives are critical to increasing military 
effectiveness as demonstrated by this case study. Only when the two perspectives are combined 
are they sufficient to enhancing the likelihood of achieving military objectives. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT: CONCLUSIONS 
 
This final chapter concludes by tying together the argumentation of the preceding 
chapters. It does so in three steps. First, the chapter discusses the key reflections of the impact 
military contracting had on military effectiveness during OIF. It does so by underscoring how the 
findings relate to the problems identified at the outset of this thesis. Second, the chapter 
discusses the implications the findings have on the theory and practice of military contracting. 
Third, the chapter offers theoretical and practical recommendations. Chiefly, the chapter 
endeavors to demonstrate the importance of the thesis to the real world use of military 
contractors. 
Military contracting has a long and diverse history that centers on the importance of 
manpower to victory (the “bigger is better” logic). Historical evidence as well as current trends 
in warfare suggest that the practice of contracting will continue for the foreseeable future and 
continue based on the manpower assumption. What remains to be seen is whether military 
organizations will begin to emphasize the CFE perspective to translate contractor manpower into 
military effectiveness. 
In the deep, storied history of warfare, manpower has been a necessary determinant to 
understanding victory and defeat. In this context, military contracting has come to be seen as a 
central means to enhancing military effectiveness, simply because it boosts manpower, or the 
number of proverbial “boots on the ground”. The manpower perspective informs much of 
contemporary policy on military contracting, despite the fact that the assumption has not been 
empirically tested. This thesis has demonstrated that manpower can no longer be considered the 
exclusive or most proximate determinant of contractor effectiveness. This research “gap” is 
particularly significant when one considers that that billions of dollars and thousands of lives are 
staked on an untested process that rests on underexplored theoretical foundations.  
Hope, however, comes in the form of a growing body of literature on military 
contracting. These days, material and non-material military contracting research is widespread 
within the IR literature. Yet to date there has not been a study that quantitatively and 
qualitatively analyzes military contracting in order to test the assumptions that underlie policy; 
nor has the broader research on force employment been applied to military contracting.  
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In an effort to fill the gap in research, this thesis sought to make three specific 
contributions. First, it critiqued the manpower assumption underlying policy and suggested that it 
needs to be reevaluated. Second, the thesis extended military contracting research on non-
material resources by applying the force employment literature to military contracting for the 
first time. Third, it established a framework appropriate for analyzing military contracting in 
both material and non-material terms. The thesis provided quantitative and quantitative evidence 
of the impact military contracting has had on military effectiveness in OIF and demonstrated the 
importance of both manpower and force employment to military contracting.  
To accomplish these aims, the thesis was divided into three sections of enquiry: 
ontological, epistemological, and methodological. Ontologically, Chapters One and Two focused 
on what is known about military contracting in the literature and in practical experience. 
Specifically, Chapter Two surveyed the historical use of military contracting and analyzed the 
distinct purposes of military contracting. The survey identified that the evolution of military 
contracting has been premised on trends in mannpower, which were explained throughout the 
remainder of the thesis. Chapter Three situated the practice of military contracting in a 
theoretical context and drew on historical and contemporary strategic theory. The chapter 
demonstrated that the theory informing military contracting and military effectiveness does not 
exist.  
The second section of the thesis engaged with the epistemology of military contracting to 
determine how military contracting could be theorized in a material and non-material sense. 
Chapter Four described and reviewed the theoretical strengths and weaknesses of the manpower 
perspective to military contracting. It outlined three rules of thumb (force-to-force ratio, force-to-
space ratio, and population density) that guide defense policy. In applying these rules of thumb 
to military contracting, the chapter developed propositions that comprise the contractor 
manpower perspective which were tested in the OIF case study. Similarly, Chapter Five 
described and reviewed the theoretical strengths and weaknesses of non-material approaches to 
military effectiveness. The chapter uncovered specific strengths in the force employment 
literature to military effectiveness that evidence weakness in the manpower perspective. These 
points were used to develop propositions for the contractor force employment perspective. 
In terms of methodology, the third section of the thesis examined the mixed method 
approach employed as a technique of inquiry and data collection. Chapter Six reviewed the 
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prevailing research methods in order to design a mixed methods approach to assessing the 
manpower perspective and the ial CFE perspective. The chapter then outlined the process of 
inquiry the thesis employed in its analysis. Finally, it identified the limitations of the study. 
Chapter Seven tested the contractor manpower and CFE hypotheses by examining 
military contracting in OIF. To do so, it first conducted statistical analysis of governmental and 
non-governmental data to determine if measures of violence were correlated with variance in the 
number of contractors employed in Iraq. It found that the correlation between the number of 
contractors and effectiveness was mixed. Next, the chapter assessed primary documents and 
original interview data to determine the predictive value of the CFE perspective and to better 
understand uncover deeper meaning between the contractor manpower, force employment, and 
military effectiveness variables. 
 
8.1 Overcoming the Problems with Measuring Contractor Effectiveness 
 
Each of the preceding chapters contain findings that correspond to the three core 
problems that were introduced in Chapter One: 1) the overemphasis placed on manpower; 2) the 
absence of theory and literature on contractor force employment to include contractor doctrine 
and tactics, and; 3) the lack of a rigorous methodological framework in understanding the 
relationship between military contracting and military effectiveness. This section addresses these 
findings in relation to each of these three problems. It does so in order to establish a more 
complete understanding of the impact military contracting had on military effectiveness in OIF.  
 
8.1.1 An Overemphasis on Manpower 
 
The first problem the thesis focused on was how the military contracting literature has 
emphasized manpower in its understanding of military contracting’s impact on military 
effectiveness. The analysis found that the “the bigger the better” assumption applies to military 
contracting and remains substantively intact in both academic and policy settings. The 
overemphasis of theory and practice on manpower has become problematic. 
Since the beginning of the Global War on Terror, scholars and practitioners have assessed 
military contracting primarily on the contributions contractors made to a military force. 
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Arguments from the past thirteen years of war are premised on the historical assumption that 
more manpower equates to more effectiveness. However, despite the singular focus on 
manpower, confusion nevertheless emerged as to whether military contracting increased military 
effectiveness as OIF unfolded and military contracting increased. Both sides of the debate 
maintained that if military contracting worked, then the more contractors hired would produce a 
more effective force. Yet, the efficacy of military contracting is debated. The cause for the 
debate has been the difference in the way that the key terms military effectiveness and contractor 
effectiveness have been defined.  
This thesis sought to mitigate this confusion by taking aim at the manpower assumption 
underpinning both sides of the debate. The thesis critiqued the manpower perspective and found 
that it had several weaknesses, chiefly that the approach is outdated, oversimplified, and 
incomplete. Whereas manpower would have been a sufficient determinant of military 
effectiveness in less complex, conventional warfare, assuming that manpower is the most 
proximate determinant in modern complex war is inaccurate. As a consequence, the thesis found 
that understanding military contracting on such simplistic terms led to unsupported assumptions, 
which were the source of confusion. 
 
8.1.2 The Absence of Theory and Literature on Contractor Force Employment 
 
The second problem with the current understanding of military contracting that the thesis 
sought to address was the lack of theory and literature on the CFE perspective. Theory’s absence 
is problematic because it has led to overestimating the impact contractor manpower contributions 
have on military effectiveness which has prevented the development of the contractor 
employment methods needed to translate contractor manpower into military effectiveness. The 
result has been that force employment methods are learned and employed but tare not carried 
over from one phase of military contracting to the next. A theory of military contracting is 
needed to enshrine military contracting learning. Without a military contracting theory military 
contracting policy is unable to optimize contractor resources because it does not recognize that 
how contractor resources are employed is as critical a factor to military contracting as what and 
how many resources are employed. 
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Recent research by Biddle has highlighted the importance of force employment to 
understanding battlefield outcomes. However, as the thesis demonstrated, rigorous analysis on 
force employment in relation to military contracting has been lacking. Of the relevant military 
contracting literature, none has sought to determine how the development of contractor 
employment methods impacted military effectiveness. In other words, the literature does not 
apply the broader research of force employment to military contracting. This thesis sought to 
rectify this problem by constructing the CFE perspective to rival the manpower perspective.  
 The reason behind introducing the rival perspectives is to challenge the policy debate on 
military contracting. So far, the debate has centered on the manpower perspective of military 
contracting and has inhibited an enlightened discussion on the force employment variables that 
impact the battlefield. This is significant because a coherent, all-encompassing and vibrant policy 
debate is necessary for the development of effective policy. After all, policymakers would not 
wittingly introduce suboptimal policies that rest on weak and untested empirical foundations. 
The fact that a non-material perspective has been ignored by policy discussions suggests that 
policymakers are misunderstanding how military contracting impacts military effectiveness. The 
construction of the CFE perspective should help shift the discussion from a primarily manpower-
centric conception of military contracting to one that recognizes the benefits of CFE.  
By introducing CFE, it is hoped that this thesis has taken the first step to encouraging 
theorists and practitioners to recognize that military contracting is a tool for achieving battlefield 
objectives, and that tools alone will not lead to the achievement of that objective. Military 
contracting for manpower is but one means to achieve policy goals and most certainly not an end 
in itself. If both academics and policymakers recognize that CFE plays a role in using contractors 
to achieve policy goals it is likely that non-material factors will be taken into account before 
spending (or wasting) billions more on hiring additional contractors. 
 
8.1.3 A Lack of Rigorous Analysis  
 
The ultimate aim of research is to contribute to a field of study. For Strategic Studies 
research, critiquing national security policy typically makes this contribution. Although military 
contracting research has contributed to ongoing policy debates surrounding the efficacy of 
military contracting, there is a lack of rigorous analysis on military contracting policy itself. Of 
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particular note is the absence of a rigorous methodological framework that tests the key material 
assumptions underpinning policymaker perceptions of military contracting and systematically 
testing the data related to these perceptions. 
As mentioned in Chapter Six, there are two paradigmatic approaches to national security 
research that are important to understanding military contracting. First, the interpretive approach 
perceives social reality being subjective based on how actors make sense of the external world. 
This approach has recently been used in military contracting research by Dunigan to discern how 
different military contracting deployment strategies affect battlefield outcomes. The second 
paradigmatic approach is the functionalist approach, which perceives social reality as being 
objective. The functionalist approach is the basis for material resource balances, which are the 
primary means for establishing defense policy. Consequently, military contracting policy is also 
based on material balances and the functionalist approach. However, despite the emphasis on the 
functionalist approach in military contracting, the literature is devoid of any analysis that 
employs it. That there has not been a systematic analysis of recent contractor manpower data in 
the literature despite the debate surrounding military contracting is significant.  
This thesis has sought to redress this imbalance by constructing a methodological 
framework that encompasses both functionalist and interpretivist approaches to accommodate 
materialist and non-materialist analyses. The thesis applied this methodology to recently released 
quantitative data to analyze the manpower assumption upon which military contracting policy is 
based. In addressing these three problems, this thesis has, in some part, theoretically and 
practically contributed to the military contracting literature. The following section addresses the 
theoretical and practical implications of this research. 
 
8.2 The Theoretical and Practical Implications of this Thesis 
 
 The aim of this thesis has been to explore, develop, and test two perspectives of military 
contracting – the material and the non-material. Initially, the work of two authors, Biddle and 
Dunigan were used as a point of departure for this task. By returning to and summarizing their 
central points, the success of the thesis in exploring, developing and testing the traditional 
manpower perspective and the emergent CFE perceptive can be gauged. 
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8.2.1 Theoretical Implications: How the Thesis Weighs in on Theory 
 
 Biddle’s ideas of force employment were found to be crucial for understanding military 
power and the effectiveness of a military. Essentially, Biddle was concerned with how force 
employment interacts with materiel to produce real combat outcomes. Central to his observations 
were the claims that material resources are necessary but insufficient to determine effectiveness 
and that force employment was the “most proximate” determinant of battlefield outcomes.628 For 
Biddle, force employment was an approach to military power that scholars and policymakers had 
taken for granted by choosing to assume that more meant better.  
 Adopting an emphasis on non-material resources, Dunigan sought to assess the impact of 
private security contractors on military effectiveness. Dunigan’s Victory for Hire highlighted that 
different contractor deployment strategies had a varying impact on how contractors contributed 
to military effectiveness. Her observations on military and PMSC integration based on these 
contractor employment strategies are compelling and useful to understanding the intersection of 
military contracting and battlefield outcomes, as well as expanding the military contracting 
literature to emphasize the importance of non-material resources. Dunigan notes that “doctrinal 
weakness” and structures influenced the utility military contracting provided militaries.629 Thus, 
Dunigan’s research suggests that constructing a CFE perspective that encompasses these non-
material aspects could be useful to understanding the relationship between military contracting 
and military effectiveness.  
The work of Biddle and Dunigan provided the foundation for this thesis. Biddle’s 
research provided the general foundation for a material and non-material analysis of military 
contracting. Biddle’s and Dunigan’s research provided the framework for this enquiry. This 
thesis extended Biddle’s research on analyzing material and non-material assumptions 
underpinning defense policy by applying it to military contracting. In applying Biddle to military 
contracting, the thesis found that contractor manpower is a poor determinant of the impact 
military contracting has on military effectiveness. It also found evidence that force employment 
could be a useful perspective in assessing contractor effectiveness. Both of these findings 
                                                          
628 Biddle, Military Power, 26. 
629 Dunigan, Victory for Hire, 156. 
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substantiated Biddle’s research. This suggests that general defense policy and more specific 
military contracting policy risk serious flaws if they are premised solely on material resources.   
Dunigan’s research focused the thesis’ non-material analysis on military-contractor 
integration. The finding that CFE is a valuable perspective to understanding military contracting 
substantiates Dunigans’ research  on military-contractor integration. Moreover, this thesis 
extends her research by arguing that the link between the efficacy of different contractor 
deployment strategies and military-contractor integration is CFE. CFE controls how military and 
contractor groups interact specific to their deployment strategy. Therefore, contractor 
effectiveness is based on how well contractor employment methods are developed and 
implemented. 
Applying Biddle’s research to military contracting highlighted a flaw in the manpower 
perspective to military contracting and the need for a competing force employment perspective. 
The extension of Dunigan’s research demonstrated that this flaw could be countered by 
producing contractor employment methods that fosters military-contractor integration in specific 
contractor deployment strategies. This means that contractor force employment is a causal 
prerequisite for translating contractor manpower into enhanced military effectiveness. Without 
the accompanying CFE, the military cannot gainfully employ additional contractor resources 
because it does not know how to integrate and employ those resources. In other words, the 
perceived marginal utility that military contractor resources provide cannot be realized until 
force employment mechanisms are in place. This means that the assumption that “more 
manpower equals more effectiveness” in relation to military contracting is misguided. Therefore, 
the central theoretical implications of these findings are that the general IR theory should shift its 
emphasis from concentrating on material resources in assessing power and effectiveness to 
concentrating on a force employment perspective. More specifically, the theory underpinning 
military contracting should shift its emphasis from concentrating on contractor manpower to 
developing contractor employment methods in order to maximize contractor resources. 
 
8.2.2 Practical Implications: How the Thesis Weighs in on the Policy Debate 
  
In addition to theoretical implications, this thesis also has policy relevance by speaking to 
the confusion surrounding the ongoing policy debate over the value and efficacy of military 
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contracting. To recap, both sides of the policy debate have hinged their opinions on material 
resources. Those supporting military contracting argue that additional manpower is a force 
multiplier while those against argue that military contracting is a waste of material resources 
since they do not lead to the battlefield outcomes they were hired to achieve. In this context, this 
thesis demonstrated that framing the debate around material resources is problematic. 
Quantitative results are mixed and can be used to support both sides of the debate. For example, 
the quantitative results showed both that increasing contractor manpower lowered Coalition 
deaths and increased civilian deaths. Therefore, material factors alone foster a circular argument 
that is not conducive to the establishment of sound policy.  
In evidencing the weaknesses inherent in the manpower perspective and the strengths 
inherent in the CFE perspective, the thesis asserted that re-conceptualizing the debate around 
CFE might be a more productive means of debating military contracting policy. Thinking about 
military contracting in terms of how resources are employed and the outcomes produced based 
on employment methods, as opposed to what and how many resources employed, will provide a 
more tractable foundation for objectivity in discussing the efficacy of military contracting. 
Without the subjective analysis and understanding of how contractors are employed in specific 
contexts, there can be no criteria for an objective assessment of military contracting. As 
demonstrated, the CFE perspective provides a framework for making sense of both functionalist 
and interpretivist perceptions, which are required for an accurate assessment that includes 
objective and subjective perspectives. 
To reiterate, there are two principle findings of this thesis. First, contractor manpower is 
not closely correlated to military effectiveness. Second, CFE is the necessary link to translating 
contractor manpower into enhanced military effectiveness. The implication that these findings 
have on military contracting in practice is that policymakers that do not consider the CFE 
perspective will not understand how military contracting can be used to achieve military 
objectives and policy goals. As a consequence, they cannot produce policies that leverage the 
benefits of contractor resources, nor can they produce policies that mitigate the pitfalls associated 
with employing them either. Therefore, any military contracting policy decisions, be they to 
continue, discontinue, increase or decrease military contracting risk serious error that could result 
in negative, unintended, and unforeseen effects. 
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The OIF case demonstrated the risks associated with military contracting. If future 
policies seek to engage in military contracting based on the manpower perspective and ignore the 
CFE perspective, then contractor waste, fraud, abuse, battlefield transgressions and a loss of 
military control over the battlefield are likely. As a result of the risks associated with military 
contracting, some policymakers supporting the manpower perspective, such as Senator Claire 
McCaskill, argue that militaries must stop military contracting. The logic of this argument hinges 
on an either/or proposition: either engage in military contracting and risk the negative aspects 
associated with it or refrain from military contracting and avoid its pitfalls. The findings of this 
thesis prove that this proposition presents a false dichotomy. Exchanging risk for resources need 
not be a pertinent factor of military contracting if the CFE perspective is applied. 
This finding is important in two ways. First, it implies that developing contractor 
employment methods gives states the ability to employ contractor resources and minimize the 
negative aspects of military contracting. Second, it suggests that states deciding to discontinue 
military contracting do so based on limited information and that making decisions on this 
information could severely limit their military effectiveness.  
Although military contracting is imperfect, it is important to note that contracting can be 
used to enhance military effectiveness. Oftentimes military contracting is more attractive to 
states than other means of improving effectiveness. For example, military contracting allows for 
faster increases in preponderance and technology as PMSCs can often deploy faster than 
supporting military units.630 In addition, hiring contractors enables military to expand more 
extensively and realize manpower growth and technological gains much faster than it would 
otherwise. Another advantage is that military contracting provides states with higher levels of 
expertise. States that did not take advantage of military contracting would face greater resource 
scarcity. They would be faced with the problem of having to grow expertise within the military 
organization. This is problematic given that it takes years to grow the capabilities that contractors 
offer immediately.631  Growing military capabilities from within the military organization would 
also increase costs as military personnel would remain on the budget even after the conflict for 
                                                          
630 Moshe Schwartz and Joyprada Swain, “Department of Defense Contractors in Afghanistan and Iraq: Background 
and Analysis,” Congressional Research Service (May 13,2013): 2. 
631 Admiral Olson, commander, U.S. SOCOM, discusses the pressures of high demand amidst low density of supply 
(HD/LD) and the difficulty of growing special operations forces. See, Andrew Feickert, “U.S. Special Operations 
Forces (SOF): Background Issues for Congress,” Congressional Research Service (February 6, 2013): 2, 5. 
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which they were hired for came to a close. In addition, it is unlikely that states like the US would 
be able to access the same level of resources without military contracting given the shrinking 
defense budget and political resistance to reinstituting the draft or instituting conscription. 
Without military contractor resources, some states would be faced with the disadvantage of 
going to war with a military that is less resourced then it would be with hiring military 
contractors.  
The decision to refrain from employing military contracting would thus further weaken 
military capability where it is already weakening. Against a numerically superior and 
technologically sophisticated opponent deciding not to employ military contracting could impose 
dangerous limitations on military capacity. Consequently, a policy decision to simply 
discontinue military contracting in order to rid a military of the problems associated with itwould 
be dangerous unless it is certain that a military will face smaller, less technologically 
sophisticated opponents in the future. Equally dangerous, as seen in the OIF case study, is the 
policy decision to continue military contracting without adapting a CFE perspective. As such, if 
military contracting decisions are made based of the ability of military contracting to supply 
resources and the negatives associated with these resources, then the assumptions underlying 
these policies need to be reevaluated by employing a CFE perspective. Employing CFE would 
enable states to employ military contractors without being exposed to the negative aspects 
associated with it. 
 
8.3 The Practical Recommendations of this Thesis 
 
In light of the expanding research and practice of military contracting, the future for the 
study and employment of military contracting looks bright. So bright, in fact, that several 
scholars and practitioners assert that contractors are “here to stay as real players” 632 and that 
future militaries will “heavily involve contractor support.”633 The study of military contracting is 
central to the future conflict environment and therefore warrants ongoing academic and policy 
                                                          
632 Bowen, the Special Inspector General of Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) quoted in Fifield, “Contractors Reap 
$138bn from Iraq War”. 
633 U.S. Army, Urgent Reform Require, 20. See also, Cancian, “Contractors,” 71; Schwartz, “Training the Military 
to Manage Contractors During Expeditionary Operations: Overview and Options for Congress,” 2. 
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attention. Military contracting serves as a valuable foreign policy tool. Learning how to better 
employ that tool is critical to realizing its inherent value to achieving objectives. The humble 
contribution that this thesis has made is to highlight the important role of CFE has in translating 
contractor resources into enhanced military effectiveness in order to redirect the practice and 
scholarship of military effectiveness away from manpower.  
 War is dynamic and is constantly becoming more complex. As more forms of warfare 
(e.g. conventional, irregular, nuclear, hybrid) and types of actors emerge (e.g. state, sub-state, 
non-state), states will require a wider array of resources and functional expertise to engage in a 
full spectrum of war. The increasing complexity of the battlefield will cause military contracting 
to become and even more important resource for militaries to increase military effectiveness. The 
historical and modern trends of military contracting presented in Chapter Three indicate that 
states will continue to turn to the military contracting industry in order to meet the more diverse 
and specialized requirements of the future conflict environment. Because military output will 
continue to be a function of how well the component parts of the military organization work 
together, CFE will continue to be a critical means of translating contractor resources into military 
effectiveness. Therefore, the increasing complexity of war will make the CFE perspective more 
important to future military contracting. 
 
8.3.1 Three Questions that Policymakers Must Ask When Formulating Military 
Contracting Policy 
 
 This thesis makes three policy recommendations to ensure that contractor employment 
methods are developed to maximize contractor resources. These recommendations correspond to 
three specific questions that policymakers must continually ask themselves when formulating 
military contracting policy. The first two questions address the strategic aspect of military 
contracting and the last question addresses the planning aspect of militaries making use of 
contractor resources. All of the questions are necessary to matching contractor resources with the 
achievement of military objectives and policy goals. 
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8.3.1.1 What Do We Need Contractors to Do? 
 
 In OIF, as well as other conflicts discussed in Chapter Four and Five, military contracting 
has yielded unintended effects. The cause of the unintended, and often negative, effects was due 
to a lack of strategy. The question: “What do we need contractors to do?” is a simple question 
but one that forces the discussion surrounding military contracting to focus on what outputs are 
required from military contractors to achieve a given objective. Addressing the outputs required 
also enables policymakers to anticipate the inputs required to produce the needed outputs which 
limit the tendency to assume that “more is better” by considering “how much more is better”. 
Therefore, posing this question helps policymakers identify the strategic purpose behind military 
contracting so that they can create policies directed at a specific strategic goal. This does not 
mean that the strategic goal needs to remain static. It just means that CFE must constantly 
change and adapt to ensure that contractors are serving in a way that helps the military achieve 
its objectives and, in turn, help policymakers achieve their desired end state. 
 It is important to differentiate the question “what do we need contractors to do?” from the 
question “What do we need contractors to accomplish?” because the difference between the two 
has significant practical importance. During OIF, there was a tendency to ask the latter question. 
The effect was that the military tried to use contractors to achieve its goals based on the 
accumulation of fulfilled contracts. In other words, the number of contracts fulfilled was the 
rubric for measuring contractor success, not the actual work that contractors performed. The 
problem with this approach is that how those contractors fulfilled their contracts proved 
detrimental to military effectiveness. Policymakers that ask the “What do we need contractors to 
do?” question will focus their analysis more specifically on the methods contractors employ. 
This specificity will better guide the development of contractor employment methods to 
instructing and monitoring contractors at the tactical and operational levels. In turn, providing 
more specific guidance to military contractors will force them to reconcile their practices with 
military practices both because of clearer instructions and monitoring mechanisms, but also 
because they will understand how their contribution to the force factors into the achievement of 
military objectives.  
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8.3.1.2  How Will Hiring Contractors Help Us Achieve Our Goals?  
 
 The second question, which focuses on strategy, is important to acknowledging the 
relevance of material and non-material perspectives to military contracting. In OIF, policymakers 
had a singular focus of enhancing military effectiveness by using military contracting to boost 
manpower. Policymakers did not consider how contracting for manpower would help enhance 
military effectiveness. Had they asked “Will hiring contractors work?” they would have had to 
consider the reasoning behind why they thought contractor manpower would likely lead to the 
outcomes that they desired. 
 Asking this question also leads to addressing other equally important questions that 
analyze the underlying assumptions of policy. The question forces policymakers to consider 
ways those contractor resources can be translated into enhanced military effectiveness. The 
process will help them to distinguish the means, ways, and ends of defense policymaking. In 
OIF, for example, it would have led to questions like “Do contractors fill critical a resource 
gap?” and “Do contractors actually free up military personnel to perform other tasks?” Asking 
these questions and considering underlying assumptions would have caused policymakers to 
analyze Rumsfeld’s and Petraeus’ assertions that contractors are a force multiplier because they 
allow uniformed personnel to focus on war fighting tasks. Had these questions been asked, it 
would have become clear that contractor manpower resources were not the only requirement to 
increasing military effectiveness. Rather, they would have highlighted the need for a framework 
for military-contractor integration. They would have recognized the need for a CFE perspective.  
 
8.3.1.3 How Can the Contractor Employment Methods Manage the Level of Military 
Contracting that We are Intending to Undertake? 
 
 The United States’ experience with military contracting in OIF highlighted the 
importance of engaging in policies that do not overextend the capabilities of the military. The 
inability of the US to manage large scale military contracting led to negative consequences such 
as the inefficient use of military and contractor resources. The result was that military 
contracting intended to unequivocally improve military contracting actually served to decrease it 
in some respects. 
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 Posing the question, “Can employment methods manage contracting?” would have 
helped identify the absence of sufficient contractor employment methods needed to support large 
scale military contracting. In terms of contractor structures, the question would have exposed the 
limitations of the DCMA and other institutions tasked with monitoring military contracting. 
Furthermore, it is also likely that exposing this structural gap would have led to the establishment 
of a SIGIR-type institution dedicated to monitoring military contracting much earlier in the war. 
It stands to reason that the benefits of SIGIR would have negated the early pitfalls of military 
contracting had this question been asked and the institution established at the outset of OIF 
instead of in 2007. Furthermore, asking the question would have also exposed the lack of 
contractor doctrine available to instruct the military on how to employ contractors, which only 
became clear after military contracting was in full swing. CFE is central to translating contractor 
resources into military effectiveness. As such, understanding what CFE is capable of is critical to 
establishing an effective policy.  
In addition, questioning the ability of CFE to manage military contracting is also a 
valuable mechanism for revealing the capacity of the institution to innovate and adapt to change.  
For example, if the military leadership were asked if it could handle military contracting, they 
would have expressed concern about controlling military contractors on the battlefield. 
Consequently, the control issue with military contracting would have been raised and identified 
as a point of concern. As such, control could have been used as a valuable criterion in gauging 
the efficacy of military contracting and of the military’s ability to adapt to the policy. Moreover, 
concerns over control would have highlighted the importance of questions like “Does the 
military have control over contracts?”, “Is control improving as CFE is developed?”, “What 
improves control and what does not?” The information gleaned from answering to these 
questions are vital to drawing important lessons learned from a military contracting policy; 
namely, what went wrong, what went right, and why? Learning these lessons and applying them 
are necessary in order for the military to draw on military contracting resources to field the most 
effective force possible. In addition, they provide an objective measure of policy assessment, 
which helps prevent the creation of follow-on policies that overcorrect previous policy mistakes 
such as discontinuing military contracting. 
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8.4 The Theoretical Recommendations of this Thesis 
 
 This thesis did three things. First, it analyzed material approaches to military and 
contractor effectiveness to determine the strengths and weaknesses associated with each. Second, 
it expanded the military contracting literature by applying force employment to military 
contracting and used the military contracting research on integration to build a CFE perspective. 
Third, it employed a methodology conducive to testing both material and non-material claims 
about military contracting. 
 However, while the thesis has endeavored to accomplish these three tasks, a vast amount 
of work remains to be done on the military contracting topic. An important implication for both 
scholars and practitioners concerns the importance of further research on the interaction between 
contactor manpower, contractor force employment, and the variance of battlefield outcomes. For 
scholars, this means analyzing military contracting from a battlefield-results perspective by 
asking questions that are directly relevant to the outcomes of war. For practitioners, an accurate 
assessment of military contracting bears on a wide range of issues such as how a military plans 
and structures its forces, to include the optimal work force mix (military to contractor ratios) and 
assessing the development of military contractor doctrine and force structure, as well as better 
understanding which functions contractors are most useful in performing.  
To address these issues, more work needs to be done to construct a military contracting 
theory capable of predicting the interaction of manpower, contractor employment methods, and 
military effectiveness. The first step in achieving this objective is to collect contractor data more 
systematically and to rigorously analyze it. While the DoD has significantly improved its 
collection of data on military contractors in conflict zones, more specific geographically based 
regional data is needed to better gauge the causes and consequences associated with military 
contracting. Further research employing regional data would bolster the analysis of manpower 
assumptions by more closely analyzing the validity of manpower rules of thumb to military 
contractors. Regional analysis would also benefit the analysis of CFE by providing a unit of 
analysis where variance in doctrine and structure can more readily be discussed amongst 
confounding effects occurring in the same battle space.  
 Finally, collecting data by geographic region would also enable the state of military 
contracting research to advance faster. Currently, there is a deficit in the quantity and quality of 
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data available on military contracting by states and non-states. For instance, data from OIF and 
OEF is incomplete as it omits regional-specific information. Other data on operations that 
employ military contractors such as Yemen and Somalia are not accessible. Collecting regional 
data in a single conflict and making it accessible would enable researchers to conduct a rigorous 
time-series analyses of military contracting in several regions of a single conflict thereby 
increasing the generalizability of the results and mitigating the weaknesses associated with the 
single case study design. 
 More broadly, military contracting research must focus on the impact military contracting 
has on victory and defeat. To be sure, military contracting impacts society and politics, but its 
real purpose is on improving the conduct of war and the outcomes of war. The causes of military 
contracting have been explored in great depth for the purpose of determining the scope and scale 
of military contracting and how it might impact military effectiveness. Now, after the 
unprecedented employment of contractors in the twenty-first century, it is time to test the 
consequences of military contracting on victory and defeat. The lack of empirical research on the 
subject combined with the trend of increased military contracting worldwide indicates a need to 
better understand contracting’s battlefield impact. Understanding whether and how military 
contracting contributes to success or failure is a matter of intrinsic importance to global security. 
 Despite the importance, scholarship and policy have refrained from conducting a post-
conflict review of military contracting. Scholars tend to focus their research on the impact 
military contracting has on state political and governmental structures. Scholars tend to ignore 
the conduct of military contracting and the effects it has on battlefield outcomes. Practitioners 
focus on short-term decisions about military contracting—Are contractors a cost-effective 
alternative to uniformed personnel? How can they be regulated?—which tend to overlook the 
operational effects policy decisions have on a conflict’s outcome. Especially troubling is that 
practitioners even make decisions on military contracting based on empirically weak information 
and unsound material assumptions.  
 In the post-9/11 world the use of PMSCs is multiplying, which suggests military 
contracting will continue to serve military utility for the foreseeable future. Understanding 
military contracting is therefore important to preparing for and addressing myriad security 
threats. In the absence of deeper and more rigorous research on military contracting, billion 
dollar policies will continue to be implemented and lives lost over something that is only 
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partially understood. This thesis sought to present the theoretical and practical, material and non-
material, assumptions behind military contracting to shed light on this issue. It also did so to 
analyze whether a manpower or CFE perspective was more useful in understanding the impact 
military contracting has on military effectiveness in the real world. The manpower perspective 
remains dominant in policy circles. However, this thesis argued that adhering to this single 
perspective in establishing and assessing military contracting policy is insufficient to 
understanding the real-life impact contractors have on the battlefield. By mirroring the broader 
non-material research in the IR discipline, this thesis argued the case for the salience of 
contractor force employment perspective in order to better understand military contracting.  
The introduction and development of the CFE perspective was intended to offer scholars 
and practitioners a competing perspective with which to understanding the interaction of 
contractor force employment with contractor manpower in producing combat outcomes. CFE 
provides policy and scholarship with a more refined means of understanding which 
characteristics of military contracting are relevant to enhancing military effectiveness. In 
providing more nuances to the traditional manpower perspective, CFE helps translate added 
capability to enhancing military effectiveness. Specifically, the CFE perspective provides a more 
plausible interpretation of the impact military contracting actually has on battlefield outcomes 
than the “bigger is better” manpower assumption. It argues that a manpower and CFE synergy is 
more effective than either perspective can be alone. The findings indicate that contractor 
manpower was a more potent enhancer of military effectiveness when CFE methods 
accompanied it. Moreover, contractor manpower is a precursor for CFE methods to even be 
effective. As such, military contracting in OIF illustrates the importance of analyzing how 
military contractors are employed over what and how many are employed. The lessons from 
military contracting in OIF suggest that CFE can be helpful in achieving a better understanding 
of the relationship between military contracting and military effectiveness and developing 
military contracting policies that improve military effectiveness.  
In recent conflicts such as OIF, military contracting has accounted for over half of the 
force. Military contracting has made contractors a significant component of modern military 
forces. Ensuring that it is integrated with other military components is critical for translating the 
resources it offers to enhance military effectiveness. CFE has a critical role in maximizing 
contractor resources such as manpower. The OIF case demonstrated that the benefits of both 
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contractor manpower and CFE to battlefield outcomes. Therefore, theorists and practitioners 
should endeavor to understand the relationship between military contracting and military 
effectiveness beyond material terms by considering the important roles that contractor doctrine, 
structures, and tactics have in achieving enhanced military effectiveness.  
In summary, this thesis critiqued the historical and modern relationship between war, 
military contracting, and military effectiveness. It highlighted the tendency of theorists and 
practitioners to overemphasize the importance of manpower in understanding the impact military 
contracting has on military effectiveness. The thesis also highlighted the negative consequences 
of the tendency toward the manpower perspective. Chiefly, the thesis argued that military 
contracting is better understood through a combination of manpower and CFE perspectives. In 
arguing this point, the thesis developed a CFE perspective representing a new way of thinking 
about military contracting. The findings of this thesis have policy relevance as they can cause the 
policy debate to shift its focus away from the weak contractor manpower perspective towards the 
CFE perspective. This is significant because developing and applying CFE can enable militaries 
to actually realize the force multiplier effect for which it has historically been employed to 
provide. 
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Appendix A: Interview Protocol 
 
Name __________________________________Position____________________Date_______ 
 
Occupation/ Department _______________________Years of Service______ Phone_______ 
 
Before we begin, I would like to ensure you that what you say during this interview will remain 
confidential should you choose it to. 
 
As you know, the United States military has greatly increased military privatization in the 21st 
century to increase military effectiveness.  In order to insure that military privatization is 
benefiting the contracting government, it is important to identify the strengths and weaknesses of 
this policy.  I am currently working on my PhD dissertation, which examines how military 
privatization impacts on government and the military of the state using Operation Iraqi Freedom 
(OIF) as a case study.  In fulfillment of research requirements, I am interviewing several people 
to learn about their experiences with military privatization during or leading up to OIF and their 
projections of military privatization in the future.  My goal is to understand the distinctive values 
of military privatization and how privatization can best be employed by the state to increase 
military effectiveness in order to reach policy objectives.  In other words, I am interested in how 
military privatization can help military means align with political ends.  Thus, the central 
research question is: What effect does military privatization have on the state and the military? 
 
The information you provide in this interview will be used to increase the richness of analysis by 
providing validity, meaningfulness, and insights to document and statistical analysis.   My 
interest is in learning from your experience.   
 
The interview takes approximately 60 minutes.  The interview will tend to focus on military 
privatization when it is most beneficial to the state in several different topic areas:  
 
EXPERIENCE WITH MILITARY PRIVATIZATION 
 
1. I would like to learn about your experience with military privatization.  
 
• What specific experiences have you had with military privatization in relation to your 
occupation?   
• What were your initial impressions when the United States began to heavily use 
private security contractors during Operation Iraqi Freedom?  
 
2. Looking at military privatization during OIF: 
 
• What was the doctrinal focus of the United States regarding privatization? (Probe: 
material capabilities, surge capacity, technology) 
• What were the advantages of privatization during OIF? (at least three examples) 
• What were the disadvantages of privatization during OIF? (at least three examples) 
• Why were they significant? (In what ways and how?) 
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MEASURING SUCCESS 
 
The United States, and its military, build on proven strengths and have a history of being a 
pioneer in military affairs.  In your opinion, how has military privatization illustrated this?  
 
1. Let’s talk for a moment about measuring operational success, specifically, how the military 
and the federal government measure military success.   
 
• What criteria do the military use in measuring operational success? 
• What criteria does the federal government use in measuring operational success? 
• How do these criteria differ from traditional (pre-privatization) criteria for operational 
success? 
• What do you believe are indicators of operational success, or failure? 
 
2. Operationalizing the criteria.  
 
• What criteria did the military secure funding for military privatization? 
• What criteria were used to weigh success against funding opportunities? 
 
3. Has military privatization been successful?  
 
• Was it successful during OIF? Why/Why not? 
• If it was successful, was it because it worked or because it was necessary? 
 
EFFECT AND OUTCOME OF MILITARY PRIVATIZATION 
 
National objectives are best achieved when military means align with political ends and there is a 
common vision between what must be done at both levels in relation to the core mission, intent, 
and direction.  When political and combat levels agree on the big picture they often operate as a 
single unit. 
 
Part A: 
 
• What are the effects of military privatization?  (If military privatization had no effect, 
to what do you attribute changes in military success during OIF?) 
• What does military privatization do to increase the effectiveness of the military? 
• What effect has military privatization had on operational effectiveness? 
• How has military privatization affected the authority and control of the federal 
government? 
• How did military privatization affect the authority of the U.S. government to control 
the battlefield? 
• What effect has military privatization had on the United States’ ability to reach its 
political objectives? 
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Part B: 
 
• How does military privatization affect the integration between political and combat 
levels? 
 
• What made integration between the political and combat levels originally possible?  
(Explore: planning methods used, communication systems or processes, leadership 
qualities, incentives for cooperation, skills). 
• What affect has military privatization had on the integration between political and 
combat levels?  
 
FUTURE OF MILITARY PRIVATIZATION 
 
States and militaries adapt past policies to more appropriately address similar problems in the 
future. 
 
• How can military privatization be improved?   
• What changes should be made from the military’s perspective? 
• What changes should be made from the government’s perspective? 
• What could private security companies do differently to better help the armed forces 
meet their objectives? 
• What role do you see military privatization playing in the United States, and other 
advanced industrial militaries, in the future? 
 
IN CONCLUSION 
 
1. What is the core factor that enables military privatization to facilitate the achievement 
of national objectives through military means (without military privatization could 
success be attained)? 
2. If you could develop or transform military privatization in any way you wished, what 
three things would you do to heighten its impact on military effectiveness? 
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I will end the conversation by asking if there is anything else that they would like to tell me. 
 
These questions are designed to determine, among other things, opinions of different professions 
involved with military privatization, what advantages/disadvantages they see in the policy, how 
they believe privatization affects the state, and what improvements can be made. 
 
INFORMATION FROM THE INTERVIEW (fill out after each interview)  
 
A.  What was the best quote that came out of the interview? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
B.  What was the best story that came out of the interview? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Date of Interview___________________________ 
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Appendix B: Statistical Analysis 
Figure 9.1: Coalition Deaths by Contractor Numbers 
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Figure 9.2: Civilian Deaths by Contractor Numbers 
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Figure 9.3: Coalition Deaths by Coalition and Contractor Numbers 
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Figure 9.4: Civilian Deaths by Coalition and Contractor Numbers 
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Figure 9.5: Coalition Deaths by Contractor Force-to-Force Ratio 
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Figure 9.6: Civilian Deaths by Contractor Force-to-Force Ratio 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
y = -19.354x + 1265.8 
R² = 0.0038 
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
3000
3500
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Ci
vi
lia
n 
De
at
hs
 
Contractor To Insurgent Ratio 
257 
 
Figure 9.7: Coalition Deaths by Coalition and Contractor Force-to-Force Ratio 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
y = -1.7715x + 72.416 
R² = 0.0191 
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
6 8 10 12 14 16
Co
al
iti
on
 D
ea
th
s 
Coalition and Contractor Force-to-Insurgent Ratio 
258 
 
Figure 9.8: Civilian Deaths by Coalition and Contractor Force-to-Force Ratio 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
y = 24.285x + 940.26 
R² = 0.0063 
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
3000
3500
6 8 10 12 14 16
Ci
vi
lia
n 
De
at
hs
 
Coalition and Contractor Force-to-Insurgent Ratio 
259 
 
Figure 9.9: Coalition Deaths by Contractor Force-to-Space Ratio 
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Figure 9.10: Civilian Deaths by Contractor Force-to-Space Ratio 
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Figure 9.11: Coalition Deaths by Coalition and Contractor Force-to-Space Ratio 
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Figure 9.12: Civilian Deaths by Coalition and Contractor Force-to-Space Ratio 
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Figure 9.13: Coalition Deaths by Contractor Population Density 
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Figure 9.14: Civilian Deaths by Contractor Population Density 
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Figure 9.15: Coalition Deaths by Coalition and Contractor Population Density 
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Figure 9.16: Civilian Deaths by Coalition and Contractor Population Density 
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